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cially so because in most cases, damages would be a relatively effec-
tive remedy. The Court’s prior restraint doctrine and sound First
Amendment policy suggest that preliminary injunctions in intellectual
property cases are often (though not always) unconstitutional.
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INTRODUCTION
Say we think a new book is going to libel us, and we ask a court
for a preliminary injunction against the book’s publication. We argue
that we’re likely to succeed on the merits of our libel claim, and that
failure to enjoin the speech would cause us irreparable harm.
Too bad, the court will certainly say; a content-based preliminary
injunction of speech would be a blatantly unconstitutional prior re-
straint. Maybe after a trial on the merits and a judicial finding that
the speech is in fact constitutionally unprotected libel, we could get a
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permanent injunction, though even that’s not clear.1 But we definitely
could not get a preliminary injunction, based on mere likelihood of
success. Likewise for preliminary injunctions against obscenity and
other kinds of speech, despite the fact that such speech, if ultimately
found to be unprotected at trial, could be criminally or civilly pun-
ished.2
In copyright cases, though, preliminary injunctions are granted
pretty much as a matter of course, even when the defendant has en-
gaged in creative adaptation, not just literal copying. How can this
be? True, the Supreme Court has held that copyright law is a consti-
tutionally permissible speech restriction; though copyright law re-
stricts what we can write or record or perform, the First Amendment
doesn’t protect copyright-infringing speech against such a restraint.3
But libel law and obscenity law are likewise constitutionally valid re-
strictions on speech, and yet courts refuse to allow preliminary in-
junctions there. The “First Amendment due process”4 rule against
prior restraints applies even to speech that’s alleged to be constitu-
tionally unprotected. Why, then, not to allegedly infringing speech?5
We explore this question below. In Part I, we discuss the history
of preliminary injunctions in copyright cases and the current law re-
lating to such injunctions. In Part II, we develop our central thesis by
explaining why copyright law is a speech restriction; why preliminary
injunctions of speech are generally unconstitutional; and why, at least
as a doctrinal and conceptual matter, it’s hard to see how copyright
law could be treated differently for First Amendment purposes.
What’s more, we argue, giving copyright law a free ride from the
normal First Amendment due process rules risks discrediting those
rules in other contexts.
In Part III, we step back and ask whether this inquiry has cast
some doubt on the prior restraint doctrine itself—whether copyright
law’s tolerance of preliminary injunctions might be right, and the free
1. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
2. See infra Part II.B.1.
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518
(1970).
5. Note that we speak here of copyright claims brought based on material that’s “ex-
pression” for copyright purposes—books, movies, songs, paintings, and so on. Our argument
doesn’t cover copyrighted software, which (at least in object code form) probably doesn’t qual-
ify as speech for First Amendment purposes. See infra Part IV.A and notes 395-402 and ac-
companying text.
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speech doctrine’s condemnation of such injunctions might be wrong.
In Part IV, we discuss the implications of the collision between copy-
right law principles and free speech principles, and propose some
changes that are needed to bring copyright law into line with consti-
tutional commands. We conclude that permanent injunctions in copy-
right cases should generally be constitutional, and the same should go
for preliminary injunctions in cases that clearly involve literal copy-
ing, with no plausible claim of fair use or of copying mere idea rather
than expression. Other preliminary injunctions, though, should gen-
erally be unconstitutional.
In Part V, we briefly explore these questions with regard to
other kinds of intellectual property—trademarks, rights of publicity,
trade secrets, and patents. We conclude that the problem is not lim-
ited to copyright, and that at least in trademark and right of publicity
cases, preliminary injunctions may sometimes run afoul of the First
Amendment. Finally, in Part VI we say a bit about the practical pros-
pects for revising the law along the lines we suggest.
I.    STANDARDS GOVERNING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN
COPYRIGHT CASES
A.  History
1. England. Preliminary injunctions have been a feature of Eng-
lish copyright law since its inception. The first modern English copy-
right act was the Statute of Anne in 1709.6 At that time, remedies
were divided between courts of law and courts of equity. While the
overlap between the two produced some disputes, it was well estab-
lished that injunctive relief could be ordered by the Court of Chan-
cery notwithstanding the existence of a legal remedy in damages.7
Lord De Grey’s review of the early cases led him to conclude that
injunctive relief could be granted in chancery “on a reasonable pre-
6. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies During the Times Therein Mentioned, 1709, 8 Anne,
ch. 19 (Eng.). For a discussion of analogous copyright cases prior to that time, see Howard B.
Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Com-
mon Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119 (1983); David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the
Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 140-41 (1992).
7. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 17 PARL. HIST. ENG. 953, 989 (H.L.
1774) (statement of De Grey, Lord Chief Justice) (observing that the availability of a remedy
at law is no barrier to the issuance of an injunction).
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tence, and a doubtful right, before the hearing of the cause.”8 There
seems little question that he was referring to what we would today
call a preliminary injunction.
The issuance of such injunctions in England appears to have
been rather common in the early days of copyright, and the standard
for their issuance rather lenient. In Donaldson v. Beckett, Lord De
Grey concluded that of the seventeen copyright decisions between
1710 and 1774, seven appeared to be “injunctions granted ex parte,
upon filing the bill, with an affidavit annexed.”9 Howard Abrams re-
fers to several preliminary injunctions from the 1730s “issued on an
ex parte basis and . . . not contested by the defendants.”10 Why the de-
fendants didn’t contest these cases is not entirely clear; it may be that
these were relatively obvious cases of counterfeiting. But it is notable
that English courts regularly issued preliminary injunctions in copy-
right cases in which “the defendant [was] not so much as heard.”11
Furthermore, in cases where the defendant did receive notice of
the proceeding in chancery and contested it, preliminary injunctions
were still routinely issued. Indeed, in one case the Chancellor issued
an injunction “till the hearing” at law on the basis of an expired copy-
right, on the grounds that the plaintiff might in addition be entitled to
common law copyright protection.12 English courts continued to apply
the standard offered by Lord De Grey: where there was a doubtful
claim, or a “fair question,”13 ex parte injunctions were available. Some
courts characterized this as an effective presumption in favor of in-
junctive relief.14
8. Id.
9. Id. at 989-90.
10. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1143 (citing Eyre v. Walker (Ch. 1735), Motte v. Falkner (Ch.
1735), Walthoe v. Walker (Ch. 1736), and Tonson v. Walker (Ch. 1739), none of which pro-
duced a reported decision).
11. Donaldson, 17 PARL. HIST. ENG. at 990 (statement of De Grey, Lord Chief Justice).
The practice seems to have been to grant at least some such injunctions on the papers, without
a hearing. Accord Smith v. Johnson, 22 F. Cas. 579, 579 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1859) (No. 13,066)
(discussing the practice of granting and denying preliminary injunctions on the strength of the
papers).
12. Tonson v. Walker, 36 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1020 (Ch. 1752); accord Little v. Gould, 15 F.
Cas. 604, 610-11 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 8,394) (discussing English precedent).
13. Wilkins v. Aikin, 34 Eng. Rep. 163, 165 (Ch. 1810).
14. See Banks v. McDivitt, 2 F. Cas. 759, 762 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 961) (noting that
an injunction is not ordinarily refused unless it will work a hardship on defendant). Little sug-
gested that refusing to grant a preliminary injunction required “serious doubt” as to the plain-
tiff’s case after a full investigation of the facts. Little, 15 F. Cas. at 611; see also EATON
SYLVESTER DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRO-
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On the other hand, some English courts proved reluctant to
grant preliminary injunctions where novel or uncertain questions of
copyright law were at issue. In Osborne v. Donaldson,15 for example,
the court dissolved a preliminary injunction after determining that
the plaintiff’s statutory copyright had expired, holding over the then-
unresolved issue of common law copyright for the law courts.16 How-
ever, it is noteworthy that the Chancellor in Osborne had apparently
issued an ex parte preliminary injunction as a matter of course on the
basis of an expired copyright, and only dissolved the injunction after
receiving the defendants’ answer.17 This suggests that a plaintiff was
presumptively entitled to preliminary injunctive relief unless the de-
fendant could show some reason why the court should refuse to grant
the injunction.18
Further, English courts seemed inclined to presume the equiva-
lent of “irreparable injury” to plaintiffs if copyright injunctions were
not granted. In Wilkins v. Aikin,19 Lord Eldon wrote that equity must
act in such cases because the legal right
cannot be made effectual by any action for damages; as, if the
work is pirated, it is impossible to lay before a Jury the whole
evidence as to all the publications, which go out to the world,
to the Plaintiff’s prejudice. A Court of Equity therefore acts,
with a view to make the legal right effectual by preventing the
publication altogether . . . .20
One court went so far as to enjoin copyright infringement in a
case where the only known pirated copy had already been sold and
there was no evidence that any other copies existed.21 Similarly, in
time-sensitive cases, the fact that the decision to grant or deny a pre-
DUCTIONS 516 (1879) (noting that where the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, “a temporary
injunction will usually be granted”).
15. 28 Eng. Rep. 924 (Ch. 1765).
16. See id. at 924; see also Sheriff v. Coates, 39 Eng. Rep. 61, 65 (Ch. 1830) (dissolving an
ex parte injunction because of doubts about the originality of the plaintiff’s fabric designs, but
requiring an accounting by defendants of their sales during the interim period).
17. See Osborne, 28 Eng. Rep. at 924.
18. See also Pope v. Curl, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch. 1741) (denying defendant’s motion to dis-
solve a preliminary injunction previously issued ex parte); Sheriff, 39 Eng. Rep. at 61 (noting an
ex parte injunction that was later dissolved).
19. 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch. 1810).
20. Id. at 164; see also Smith v. Chatto, 31 L.T.R. 775, 777 (V.C. 1874) (granting an injunc-
tion because it would be simpler to calculate the harm resulting from an injunction erroneously
granted than the harm from one erroneously withheld).
21. See Butterworth v. Kelly, 4 T.L.R. 430 (Ch. 1888).
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liminary injunction would effectively finally determine the rights of
the parties was used as an argument in favor of granting the injunc-
tion rather than denying it.22 A defendant could defeat an application
for an injunction by demonstrating that “irreparable injury would re-
sult from granting the injunction, unless the case is so clear that there
can be no reasonable doubt with regard to the legal title . . . .”23 It
seems clear that in England before 1850, preliminary injunctions
were the normal remedy in copyright cases.
2. United States. Despite the fact that United States copyright
law was based largely on the English model,24 early U.S. courts
showed some reluctance to grant preliminary relief to copyright
plaintiffs.25 Of the reported copyright cases in the first fifty years of
the republic, most refused to grant preliminary injunctive relief,26 and
22. See Prince Albert v. Strange, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1179 (Ch. 1849). Admittedly, injunc-
tive relief in this case—which involved a claimed invasion of privacy resulting from the unau-
thorized publication of private works—appears to have been particularly appropriate. None-
theless, the Chancellor’s argument was broadly applicable to many time-sensitive copyright
cases: “postponing the injunction would be equivalent to denying it altogether. The interposi-
tion of this Court in these cases does not depend upon any legal right, and to be effectual, it
must be immediate.” Id.
23. JOHN PAXTON NORMAN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE COPYRIGHT REGISTRA-
TION AND PROVISIONAL REGISTRATION OF DESIGNS 57 (1851) (citing Spottiswoode v. Clarke,
41 Eng. Rep. 900, 901 (Ch. 1846)) (emphasis added).
24. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 1171-78 (discussing the origins of American copyright in
English law); cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolution-
ary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990) (contrasting U.S. and French copyright
history).
25. Injunctive relief was probably available according to the rules of equity from the time
of the first copyright act in 1790. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (providing copyright
holders with the exclusive right of publication for fourteen years). It is clearly authorized in the
copyright statute passed in 1819. Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481 (extending the
circuit courts’ original jurisdiction to include patent and copyright cases, and providing that
they “shall have authority to grant injunctions”); see also Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1001
n.2 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872) (discussing the equity power conferred by this statute).
26. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 29 F. Cas. 862, 865-69 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 17,486)
(holding that equity cannot act preliminarily where the legal right is unclear), aff’d, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 591 (1834); Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917, 920 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824) (No. 4,584) (refusing to
grant a preliminary injunction where the court determined that the plaintiff probably did not
own the copyright); Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 765-67 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1,580)
(denying a preliminary injunction where difficult factual issues required resolution but later
granting a permanent injunction after trial).
Evidence of this reluctance can be found even as late as the early twentieth century.
See Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375, 378 (N.D.N.Y. 1913) (refusing to grant a preliminary
injunction where the defendant claimed that the material in question was common property);
West Publ’g Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 883-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1909) (rejecting a
preliminary injunction on the ground that the copyright was of dubious validity); Savage v.
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on several occasions courts and commentators noted that the
American rule seemed less favorable to plaintiffs than the English
case law.27 In particular, these early decisions inquired in detail into
the merits of plaintiffs’ copyright claims,28 and seemed in some cases
to resolve doubt on the merits against the plaintiff.29
Hoffmann, 159 F. 584, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) (same); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 142 (6th Cir.
1898) (same); Myers v. Callaghan, 5 F. 726, 734-36 (N.D. Ill. 1881) (concluding that a prelimi-
nary injunction was properly refused, though a permanent injunction was later issued).
Of course, not all early U.S. decisions refused preliminary injunctions. See, e.g., Chi-
cago Dollar Directory Co. v. Chicago Directory Co., 66 F. 977 (7th Cir. 1895) (per curiam)
(granting injunction); Photo Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 213 F. 374,
378 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (same); Hein v. Harris, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1910) (same).
27. See, e.g., Ewer, 8 F. Cas. at 918 (criticizing English cases granting injunctions “under
circumstances which rendered the title doubtful”).
28. See, e.g., id. at 918-19.
29. See, e.g., Photo Drama Motion Picture Co., 213 F. at 376 (noting that disputed facts
must be resolved against the plaintiff on a motion for a preliminary injunction); Hoffman, 209
F. at 378 (refusing to grant a preliminary injunction where the defendant claimed the material
in question was common property); West Publ’g Co., 169 F. at 883-87 (rejecting preliminary
injunction on the ground that the copyright was of dubious validity); Benton v. Van Dyke, 170
F. 203, 204 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) (holding that “the question of infringement is too much in
doubt to justify the granting of a preliminary injunction” and noting that “[s]uch a writ should
never issue unless the court is clearly of the opinion that the complainant will succeed at final
hearing”); Savage, 159 F. at 586 (same); Littleton v. Fischer, 137 F. 684, 685 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1905) (holding that “the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction should not be granted”
because “it is impossible to decide to what extent, if at all, the defendant has trespassed upon
the [complainants’] rights . . . and because it does not appear that defendant is unable to re-
spond in damages in case it shall finally appear that he has violated complainants’ rights”);
Howell, 91 F. at 142 (refusing to grant an injunction where infringement was not “clearly mani-
fest from the evidence”); Scribner v. Stoddart, 21 F. Cas. 876, 877 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1879) (No.
12,561) (noting that preliminary injunctions should “be granted with extreme caution, and only
in very clear cases” because of the “summary nature of the proceeding, and the consequent
liability to mistake” (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
290-91 (4th ed., Charles C. Little & James Brown 1846) (1836))); Blunt, 3 F. Cas. at 766 (“All
this may be susceptible of satisfactory explanation. It is at present, however, involved in too
much obscurity for me to safely act . . . and I shall leave the explanation to be given on a trial at
law. The application for an injunction is, accordingly, denied.”). The reasoning of the court in
Scribner is highly instructive:
The doubt in my mind as respects both of these cases, is such that, without more, I
should feel it to be my duty to deny this motion and decline the issuing of an injunc-
tion until the questions thus involved are fully, carefully, and deliberately considered
and settled. Were I to issue the process in advance of this I would incur the danger of
doing serious injustice to the defendants.
Scribner 21 F. Cas. at 878; see also id. at 877 (noting that in the absence of these precautions,
the preliminary injunction “instead of being an instrument to promote the public as well as pri-
vate welfare, . . . will become a means of extensive and perhaps irreparable injustice”).
In cases where preliminary injunctions did issue, it was generally because the court
found no doubt on the merits. See, e.g., Banks v. McDivitt, 2 F. Cas. 759, 762 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1875) (No. 961) (enjoining the sale of part but not all of the defendant’s book, noting that
“[w]here an infringement is palpable, and a provisional injunction will not be attended with
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Early American copyright plaintiffs also faced substantial bur-
dens in demonstrating that the balance of hardships favored an in-
junction, even when success on the merits was likely.30 In Dun v.
Lumberman’s Credit Ass’n,31 the Supreme Court held that even
though copying of protectable material was clearly established, a
permanent injunction was not warranted because the infringer’s work
contained a large amount of material that was not copied, and en-
joining publication of the infringer’s book would impose too great a
hardship.32 To similar effect is White v. Bender,33 where the court re-
fused to issue a preliminary injunction despite clear evidence of
copying because the infringing work was not a “mere copy” and was
unlikely to supersede the original.34 In another case, a preliminary
injunction was refused even though validity and infringement were
clear, simply because the infringement was innocent and noncom-
mercial, and the defendant was solvent.35
In contrast to the early English practice, which presumed that
damages would not adequately compensate injured plaintiffs,36 early
serious injury, it is not ordinarily refused, as to so much of the work as is a plain infringe-
ment”); see also Benton, 170 F. at 204 (noting that a preliminary injunction could issue if the
court found no doubt on the merits, although the standard was not met in the present case);
Littleton, 137 F. at 685 (same). But see Little v. Gould, 15 F. Cas. 604 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No.
8,394). In Little, the court noted that doubts as to legal rather than factual questions should not
ordinarily preclude a preliminary injunction if the doubts could be resolved by detailed analysis
at the preliminary injunction stage. See id. at 611. The court rejected the prior English chancery
practice of referring such issues to the law courts as irrelevant in the federal courts, where law
and equity were merged in a single court. See id.
30. See Scribner, 21 F. Cas. at 877 (stating that an injunction may be withheld for any equi-
table reason, even if the plaintiff can show a likelihood of success on the merits).
31. 209 U.S. 20 (1908).
32. Id. at 23, 24. This result was resurrected by the Court in a footnote in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music Co., 501 U.S. 569, 578, n.10 (1994) (“[T]he goals of the copyright law . . . are
not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to
have gone beyond the bounds of fair use.”). For an approach that would take the Campbell dic-
tum seriously, see Robert A. Kreiss, Access and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1, 71-74 (1995).
33. 185 F. 921 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1911).
34. Id. at 925. To some extent, of course, this reluctance reflects the narrower scope of
copyright before this century. Early U.S. copyright law gave copyright owners much less pro-
tection against the preparation of derivative works. See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and
Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 209 (1983). Because of this, the plain-
tiff’s case in White was weaker than it appears today.
35. See Hansen v. Jacquard Jewelry Co., 32 F. 202, 203-04 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1887).
36. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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U.S. courts applied the “irreparable injury” rule37 with some force to
copyright plaintiffs. Plaintiffs who had made a clear showing of in-
fringement were sometimes denied injunctive relief if the defendant
presented evidence that it could pay adequate damages after the
completion of the suit.38 Courts also used the fact that granting or de-
nying a preliminary injunction would effectively decide the case as a
reason to deny the injunction.39 This contrasts sharply with the Eng-
lish case of Prince Albert v. Strange, discussed above,40 where the
same factual circumstance was held to support rather than oppose the
granting of a preliminary injunction.
At some point in the early part of this century, judicial hostility
towards preliminary injunctions in copyright cases began to abate. In
his 1917 treatise on copyright law, Arthur Weil noted that “the mod-
ern tendency is to issue temporary injunctions more freely than in
earlier times.”41 There is some evidence that this change corresponds
roughly in time with a more general increase in the willingness of
courts to grant injunctions, at least in labor cases.42 Whatever the
cause, it seems clear that early U.S. courts were not nearly so willing
37. This general equitable rule provides that preliminary injunctions should not issue if a
later legal remedy would adequately compensate the plaintiff. For a discussion of the history
and modern status of the rule, see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE
INJURY RULE 111-18 (1991) (arguing that courts have failed to apply this rule rigorously).
38. See Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 F. 703, 734 (C.C.D. Mass. 1896) (establishing the rule that a
defendant could avoid a preliminary injunction by posting an adequate bond); see also Boosey
v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (ordering preliminary injunction to issue
unless defendant posted bond); Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co. 129 F. 761,
773 (C.C.D. Mass. 1904) (same); Hubbard v. Thompson, 14 F. 689 (E.D. Mo. 1882) (forecasting
the rule in Ladd). But see Reed v. Holliday, 19 F. 325, 327 (W.D. Pa. 1884) (“[I]f a plaintiff
shows infringement of his copyright, the court will grant an injunction without proof of actual
damage.”). This is exactly the opposite of the modern rule, which requires the plaintiff to post a
bond as a condition of the granting of a preliminary injunction. See infra notes 78-80 and ac-
companying text.
39. See Trow Directory Printing Co. v. Boyd, 97 F. 586, 734 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899).
40. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
41. ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 515 (1917); see also Historical Publ’g
Co. v. Jones Bros. Publ’g Co., 231 F. 638, 644 (3d Cir. 1916) (holding that a threatened infringe-
ment should have been preliminarily enjoined and reversing the lower court’s failure to grant
an injunction).
42. See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 169-73 (1997)
(discussing the general change in injunction practice). In particular, preliminary injunctions
against a wide variety of speech by labor unions were common in this era. The argument that
enjoining labor speech was a prior restraint was normally dismissed out of hand, sometimes on
the theory that the labor leaders were engaged in “verbal acts” rather than “real” speech. See,
e.g., Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 436-39 (1911). For a discussion of
this now-discredited approach to injunctions restricting speech, see RABBAN, supra, at 169-73.
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to grant preliminary injunctions in copyright cases as either their
English predecessors or their modern counterparts.
B. The Modern Rule
The Copyright Act of 197643 authorizes courts to grant
“temporary and final injunctions on such terms as [they] may deem
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”44 Pre-
liminary injunctive relief in non-copyright cases is nominally gov-
erned by the traditional four-factor preliminary injunction test, which
asks: (1) whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is
not granted; (3) whether the balance of hardships tips in the plain-
tiff’s favor; and (4) whether granting the injunction would be in the
public interest.45
In actual application, though, courts have given some of these
factors primacy over others, have permitted substitution among the
factors (so that if the balance of hardships strongly favors the plain-
tiff, she need only show “substantial questions” going to the merits),46
and have come close to eliminating the irreparable injury rule alto-
gether.47
Modern U.S. courts have treated plaintiffs seeking preliminary
injunctions in copyright cases more favorably than plaintiffs in other
43. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat.) 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-1101 (1994)).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994). As Paul Goldstein notes, the apparent intent of Congress in
enacting section 502(a) was to authorize temporary restraining orders as well. See 2 PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 11.1.1, at 11:5 n.5 (1995).
45. See LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at 118 (outlining the four-factor test); 11A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 131-33 (2d ed. 1995) (outlining
the test and citing cases).
46. See LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at 118. One strand of legal thought has attempted to
quantify the balance of the hardships, measuring the loss to both sides from wrongfully being
enjoined (or wrongfully being denied an injunction), and multiplying it by the probability that
the party will prevail at trial to determine a sort of “total hardship.” See American Hosp. Sup-
ply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986); cf. John Leubsdorf, The Standard
for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 540-42 (1978) (suggesting a similar test).
Given the uncertainty attendant upon both variables, and indeed the fact that preliminary in-
junctions are theoretically intended to be used only when the harm to the plaintiff cannot be
measured, one might reasonably question how much precision this formulation really adds. See
LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at 120; Linda S. Mullenix, Burying (With Kindness) the Felicific Cal-
culus of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REV. 541, 569-72 (1987).
47. See LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at vii (surveying more than 1400 cases in which injunc-
tive relief was sought and determining that courts do not apply the irreparable injury rule with
any teeth).
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areas of law, and certainly more favorably than they treated copy-
right plaintiffs a century ago.48 The ostensibly four-factor test49 col-
lapses, in virtually all circuits, to a simple inquiry into likelihood of
success on the merits. If that can be demonstrated, a preliminary in-
junction is the expected remedy.50 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held
that a preliminary injunction is the expected remedy in a copyright
infringement case once a “reasonable likelihood of success” has been
demonstrated.51
If the copyright owner demonstrates a likelihood of success,
courts are virtually unanimous in dispensing with the need to show
irreparable injury.52 While Goldstein argues that the presumption of
48. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“In a copyright infringement action, . . . the rules are somewhat different.”); Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1523 (D. Colo. 1995) (describing the test for pre-
liminary injunctive relief in copyright cases as “less rigorous” than the normal standard).
49. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, § 11.1.2.2, at 11:11-12 n.29 (collecting copyright cases
that use the four-factor analysis). The exceptions are the Second and Ninth Circuits, which do
not use the public interest factor, but instead only balance the three remaining factors, with a
greater likelihood of success on the merits lessening the required showing of irreparable injury
or balance of the hardships. See, e.g., Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189,
192 (2d Cir. 1985); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir.
1984).
50. See Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 612 (1st Cir.
1988); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Score Board Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1187 (5th
Cir. 1979) (“Preliminary injunctions are a common judicial response to the imminent infringe-
ment of an apparently valid copyright.”); Georgia Television Co. v. TV News Clips of Atlanta,
Inc., 718 F. Supp. 939, 945 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (noting that preliminary injunctions in copyright
cases are “common”); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 520 (1997) (noting that “preliminary injunctions are generally granted
as a matter of course”); 4 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
14.06[A], at 14-112 (1997) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (issuance of preliminary in-
junctions in copyright cases “is actually quite ordinary, even commonplace”).
51. See Cadence Design Sys. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1997); Johnson
Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989); Creative Labs
v. Cyrix Corp., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1872 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
52. See, e.g., Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996)
(endorsing the rule, which was already in force in “the overwhelming majority of our sister cir-
cuits”); Video Trip Corp. v. Lightning Video, Inc., 866 F.2d 50, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1989); Johnson
Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989); West Publ’g
Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1229 (8th Cir. 1986); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Formula Int’l, 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir. 1983); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 1982); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.,
558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977); Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg., 236 F.2d 144, 147 (2d
Cir. 1956); Georgia Television Co., 718 F. Supp. at 944, 948 (presuming irreparable harm de-
spite “speculative” nature of plaintiff’s injury); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 11:15-18
(collecting cases); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, at 14-100 (same). This presumption
is specific to copyright owners; it does not extend to accused infringers who are plaintiffs seek-
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irreparable harm is stronger for “substantially original” copyrighted
works than for works receiving lesser protection,53 in fact the pre-
sumption is so widespread that it has even been applied to telephone
white pages54 and the page numbers of West’s court reporters,55 nei-
ther of which presents a particularly strong case for copyright protec-
tion.56 Interestingly, modern U.S. courts have returned to the old
English rule that preliminary injunctions should be granted, not
withheld, where the ruling on the preliminary injunction motion will
effectively decide the case one way or the other.57 And various courts
have found both the defendant’s solvency and the defendant’s insol-
vency to favor the plaintiff.58
ing a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. See Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman
Enters., Ltd., 638 F. Supp. 292, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
The exception to the general practice of presuming irreparable harm once likelihood
of success on the merits is shown is the Fifth Circuit, which requires a showing of each of the
four factors regardless of the status of the merits. See, e.g., Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard,
730 F.2d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1984); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, at 14-104 n.36
(collecting cases).
Despite the presumption of irreparable injury, there are occasionally decisions in these
circuits in which courts deny injunctive relief because the harm to the plaintiff can be calculated
precisely and awarded as damages. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Basmajian, 600 F. Supp.
439, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); American Metro Enters., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 154
U.S.P.Q. 311, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). These cases, though, are clearly in the minority.
53. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 11:16.
54. See Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bedco of Minn., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299, 303 (D.
Minn. 1980).
55. See West Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1581 (D. Minn.
1985), aff’d, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986).
56. See Feist v. Rural Tel. Servs., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (holding that telephone white
pages are not copyrightable); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1930,
1934 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that West’s page numbers are not copyrightable). But see Oasis
Publ’g Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 924 F. Supp. 918, 923 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that West’s page
numbers are copyrightable despite Feist).
57. See Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1955) (considering the short-lived
nature of the market as a factor in favor of the plaintiff); Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole
Sons, Inc., 104 F.2d 306, 307 (2d Cir. 1939) (same); O’Neill Devs., Inc. v. Galen Kilburn, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 710, 715 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (same); Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635,
638 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, at 14-110 to 14-
111(citing cases); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 11:17-18 n.47 (same). But see Thomas Wilson
& Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 268 F. Supp. 711, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“[S]uch an injunction
would amount in substance to the ultimate relief sought in the action—a further factor weigh-
ing against the granting of this extraordinary remedy.”).
58. Compare McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (suggesting in dicta that defendant’s insolvency would favor a finding of irreparable
harm), with Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner, 574 F. Supp. 281, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding ir-
reparable harm where the defendant has sufficient financial resources, since the existence of
those resources suggests that the defendant may be able to threaten the plaintiff’s competitive
position).
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The third factor—balance of the hardships—is similarly unim-
portant in copyright cases because courts virtually always weigh the
balance of the hardships in favor of the copyright plaintiff if it has
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The Second and
Ninth Circuits, the most important in copyright cases because to-
gether they house the New York publishing industry and acting
community, Hollywood, and Silicon Valley, do not even require
hardship to the defendant to be balanced at all if the plaintiff can
show that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim.59 Even the
remaining circuits, which nominally consider this factor in all cases,
generally “tip the balance of hardships in the plaintiff’s favor to the
extent that it has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.”60
While some courts will give the benefit of the doubt to defendants if
the defendant’s product is mostly composed of noninfringing materi-
als,61 even that rule is not universally accepted.62
The final factor—the “public interest”—has also been effectively
eliminated in copyright cases. Courts find it “virtually axiomatic that
the public interest can only be served by upholding copyright protec-
59. In both the Second and Ninth Circuits, a showing of probable success on the merits will
obviate the need to prove that the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiff’s favor. If the plain-
tiff can only show the “existence of serious questions going to the merits,” however, it must also
show that the balance of hardships tips in its favor. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc.,
725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cin-
ema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1979); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, § 11.1.2.2, at 11:12.
The balance in such a case need only “tip” in the plaintiff’s favor in the Ninth Circuit, Apple
Computer, 725 F.2d at 523, but must tip “decidedly” in the plaintiff’s favor in the Second Cir-
cuit, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 207.
60. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 11:19. See, e.g., Georgia Television Co. v. TV News
Clips of Atlanta, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 939, 949-50 (N.D. Ga. 1989). A particularly striking example
is Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning System, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Tex. 1986),
which held that the balance of hardships favored plaintiff, despite the likelihood that an injunc-
tion would put the defendant out of business entirely. See id. at 357.
The exception to this rule is, once again, the Fifth Circuit, in which the balance of
hardships may favor the defendant in appropriate cases. See Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n v.
Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1261 (5th Cir. 1987); Apple Barrel Prods.,
Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net,
Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1527 (D. Colo. 1995) (finding the balance of hardships to weigh in favor
of the defendants).
61. See, e.g., Belushi v. Woodward, 598 F. Supp. 36, 37 (D.D.C. 1984).
62. See, e.g., West Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1229 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a preliminary injunction was proper even though page numbers were the only
allegedly infringing parts of the defendant’s work).
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tions,”63 and accordingly grant preliminary injunctions if the plaintiff
has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.64 Efforts by defen-
dants to assert a competing public interest in the wide dissemination
of information generally fail.65 As a result, courts which purport to
apply a four-factor test in fact generally find a showing of probable
success on the merits to be virtually conclusive in favor of granting an
injunction.66
The lenience of this standard is compounded by the definition of
“success on the merits” in many copyright cases. A prima facie case
of copyright infringement requires that the plaintiff prove that it
owns a valid copyright and that the defendant has infringed the copy-
right by violating one of the exclusive rights enumerated in the Act.67
But the first of these elements is trivial, at least in preliminary injunc-
tion cases: the plaintiff is entitled to rely on the presumption of va-
lidity that attaches to its copyright registration.68 Even in the rare case
in which the plaintiff has not registered a copyright, courts will some-
times overlook that fact and issue an injunction on an unregistered
work.69 Since registration of copyrights is essentially pro forma and
63. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1255 (3d Cir. 1983)
(quoting Klitzner Indus. v. H.K. James & Co., 535 F. Supp. 1249, 1259-60 (E.D. Pa. 1982)); ac-
cord Georgia Television Co., 718 F. Supp. at 950.
64. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 11:21 and cases cited therein. Alan Rau calls the
public interest factor in copyright cases “a makeweight, serving merely to re-state the general
public policy underlying the cause of action.” Alan Scott Rau, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Intel-
lectual Property, 16 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 355, 390 (1985).
65. See, e.g., West Publ’g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1582 (D. Minn.
1985) (rejecting the defendant’s arguments that the public interest favors dissemination), aff’d,
799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1184, 1187 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript
Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977) (same). But see F.A.C.T.Net, 901 F. Supp. at 1527
(accepting this argument for “matters of significant public controversy”); Belushi, 598 F. Supp.
at 37-38 (same); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp.
957, 959-60 (D.N.H. 1978) (same).
66. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, at 14-101 (“[T]he plaintiff’s burden for
obtaining a preliminary injunction in copyright cases collapses to showing likelihood of success
on the merits.”).
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (enumerating exclusive rights); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1563 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (defining the prima facie case).
68. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 11:13-14. The Copyright Act of 1976 states that
“[i]n any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years
after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1994).
69. See, e.g., Georgia Television Co. v. TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 939,
945 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Association of Am. Med. Colleges v. Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1358, 1364 n.15
(N.D.N.Y. 1980), and cases cited therein. This is so despite the fact that for U.S. plaintiffs, ei-
ther copyright registration or a rejection thereof is nominally a jurisdictional requirement for
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does not entail any significant examination by the Copyright Office
into originality or the propriety of ownership,70 copyright plaintiffs
have essentially cleared one of the two hurdles to injunctive relief
simply by virtue of filing suit.71 The requirement that the plaintiff
prove infringement, while more substantial, can be satisfied by proxy;
plaintiffs need merely show access and sufficient similarities between
the two works to raise an inference of copying (and therefore of in-
fringement).72 Where plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of
likelihood of success, in fact, some courts hold that it is reversible er-
ror to deny a preliminary injunction.73
To be sure, defendants have the opportunity to rebut the plain-
tiff’s prima facie case at the preliminary injunction hearing. They can
raise questions as to both the validity of the plaintiff’s copyright and
the scope of the protection it should receive; they can contest the in-
ference of copying, or argue that the portions copied were not them-
selves protectable;74 and they can (or at least they should be able to)
raise statutory defenses such as fair use.75 Still, it is striking that on
most issues likely to be significant in determining the ultimate out-
filing suit. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). But see Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386-
87 (5th Cir. 1984) (“In order to bring suit for copyright infringement, it is not necessary to
prove possession of a registration certificate. One need only prove payment of the required fee,
deposit of the work in question, and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration applica-
tion.”). Apple Barrel is inconsistent with section 411.
70. See, e.g., Nancy H. McAleer, A Bird’s Eye View of Copyright Registration, N.J. LAW.,
Feb. 15, 1993, at 15; Nelson R. Capes, The Software Copyright “Super Patent,” COMP. LAW.,
June 1995, at 8.
71. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the plaintiff’s certificate of copyright registration constituted prima facie evidence of va-
lidity of copyrights and that the defendant had the burden of overcoming the presumption of
validity); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 174, 179 (N.D.
Ga. 1980) (“[B]y obtaining a copyright certificate the plaintiff is entitled to a prima facie pre-
sumption of copyright validity (and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove lack of origi-
nality).”).
72. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at
11:14-15.
73. See, e.g., Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144, 146-48 (2d Cir.
1956); American Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Azad Int’l, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 84, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
74. See generally Computer Assocs. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that
the defendant could rebut the plaintiff’s proof of copying by demonstrating that copied ele-
ments were not themselves protectable).
75. See Kontes Glass Co. v. Lab Glass, Inc., 373 F.2d 319, 320-21 (3d Cir. 1967). But see
Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251 (W.D.N.Y. 1978)
(holding that a fair use claim would not bar a preliminary injunction and assuming for purposes
of the plaintiff’s motion that the plaintiff could prove its allegations of market harm caused by
the defendant’s work).
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come of the copyright claim, it is the defendant and not the plaintiff
who realistically bears the burden of proof in a preliminary injunction
hearing.76 Further, merely raising a plausible defense will not prevent
a court from issuing a preliminary injunction; in a contested case, a
substantial likelihood of success by the plaintiff may be enough for an
injunction.77
It is common practice in copyright cases to condition the grant of
a preliminary injunction on the plaintiff’s posting of a bond, which
may be forfeited if the defendant ultimately prevails at trial.78 These
bonds can be substantial,79 and arguably provide considerable solace
to defendants faced with preliminary injunctions. Nonetheless, the
practice in copyright cases seems to reverse the irreparable injury
rule: where plaintiffs were traditionally presumed to be compensable
by means of a damages award, preliminary injunctions are now rou-
tine and it is defendants who are entitled to “damages” if they are
wrongfully enjoined.80
Finally, there are other provisional remedies available to copy-
right plaintiffs besides preliminary injunctions. In appropriate cases,
plaintiffs can obtain temporary restraining orders ex parte in accor-
dance with Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.81 They
may also be entitled to seize the allegedly infringing goods before
trial,82 an act which in practice will have much the same effect as an
injunction prohibiting distribution or sale. Such seizures are also of-
76. For example, in Covington Fabrics Corp. v. Artel Products, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court gave so much weight to the presumption of originality that accom-
panied the registration certificate that it rejected the testimony of the defendant’s expert wit-
ness that the plaintiff’s work was not in fact original. See id. at 204. The court granted a pre-
liminary injunction, having concluded that the plaintiff’s copyright registration was sufficient
evidence of likelihood of success on the merits on this issue. See id. at 204-05.
77. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, at 14-104 to 14-105.
78. See id. at 14-98 to 14-99 (citing cases). For a history of bond requirements, see FELIX
FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1-46 (1930).
79. See, e.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th
Cir. 1994) (upholding the award of a $15 million bond to the defendant).
80. Cf. Wales Indus., Inc. v. Hasbro Bradley, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 507, 508-09 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (holding that the party seeking declaratory judgment of noninfringement was not entitled
to a preliminary injunction since its loss from being unable to sell its product was compensable
through money damages).
81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b); Fort Wayne Women’s Health Org. v. Brane, 734 F. Supp.
849, 850 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (“An ex parte temporary restraining order is an extraordinary rem-
edy which will not be granted unless the movant clearly shows that such relief is warranted.”).
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1994).
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ten ex parte, a fact which has caused some writers—and the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee—concern.83
C. Summary
Several things are notable about the law of copyright preliminary
injunctions. First, the modern U.S. practice is unquestionably more
favorable to plaintiffs than to defendants, and it is more favorable in
copyright cases than in most other contexts. Copyright plaintiffs can
dispense with most of the normal requirements for obtaining a pre-
liminary injunction, and disputed issues are regularly resolved in their
favor.
Second, in many cases it is the defendant, not the plaintiff, who
effectively bears the burden of proof with respect to such injunctions.
Bond practice reinforces this shift—it is the defendant who is pre-
sumed to be compensable by money damages if an injunction
wrongly issues, while plaintiffs are conclusively presumed to suffer
irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.
Finally, while the pro-plaintiff trend in copyright injunctions has
historic antecedents in early English practice, they are not lineal an-
tecedents. Early U.S. copyright practice differed markedly from both
the traditional English rule and the modern U.S. rule. Only in the
1900s have preliminary injunctions come to be an expected part of
U.S. copyright cases.
II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH, COPYRIGHT, AND INJUNCTIONS
A. Copyright Law as a Speech Restriction84
Copyright law restricts speech: it restricts you from writing,
painting, publicly performing, or otherwise communicating what you
83. See FED R. CIV. P. 65 advisory committee’s note; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 11:22-
24 (questioning such seizures and quoting Federal Rules Advisory Committee); Marc Alexan-
der, Discretionary Power to Impound and Destroy Infringing Articles: An Historical Perspec-
tive, 29 J. COPR. SOC’Y 479, 488-89 (1982) (asserting that the constitutionality of the rule de-
serves additional scrutiny); cf. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Doe, 821 F. Supp. 82, 86-89
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting Fourth Amendment problems with impoundment remedy); id. at 87
n.4 (observing that the Federal Rules Advisory Committee noted similar problems); Paul S.
Owens, Impoundment Procedures Under the Copyright Act: The Constitutional Infirmities, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 211 (1985) (noting potential First Amendment problems with this rule).
84. Portions of the discussion in Parts II.A, II.D, and II.E are adapted from Eugene Vo-
lokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright
Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431 (1998).
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please.85 If your speech copies ours, and if the copying uses our “ex-
pression,” not merely our ideas or facts that we have uncovered, the
speech can be enjoined and punished, civilly and sometimes criminal-
ly.86
And copyright law applies to creative adaptation as well as to lit-
eral copying, so it’s no answer to say that the copiers aren’t them-
selves originating the speech. Writers are barred from creating works,
even works based on real events, whose plots are too similar to what
others have done.87 Artists are forbidden from creating artworks that
are too similar to others’ art.88 Musicians are restricted from using
“vocal percussion effects” that are too similar to those of other art-
ists.89 Indeed, in some cases basing even a small bit of an otherwise
original work on others’ copyrighted expression can subject a defen-
dant to liability, as when movie producers are held liable for includ-
ing copyrighted posters, sculptures, or even furniture in brief scenes
from the film.90 Copyright law seriously restricts speakers’ ability to
express themselves the way they want.
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,91 the
Supreme Court made clear that copyright law is substantively consti-
tutional: the First Amendment does not shield speech that infringes
another’s copyright.92 Copyright, the Court said, is itself an “engine of
free expression” because it “supplies the economic incentive to cre-
ate and disseminate ideas.”93
But the Court strongly implied that this rationale would not jus-
tify restrictions on copying facts or ideas, or on certain kinds of com-
mentary historically protected by the fair use doctrine. The Court
characterized “the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable
85. Cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (giving
copyright law as an example of a speech restriction).
86. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (criminalizing “willful[]” in-
fringement that is either “for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain” or
involves material with “a total retail value of more than $1,000”).
87. See, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Publ’g Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950); Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
88. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
89. Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791, 1793 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
90. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text (discussing such cases).
91. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
92. See id. at 555-60.
93. Id. at 558.
VOLOKH FOR PRINTER.DOC 02/23/99 7:57 PM
1998] PRIOR RESTRAINTS IN COPYRIGHT 167
expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas” and “the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use” as “First
Amendment protections.”94 It pointed out that “[n]o author may
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates,”95 and cited Justice Bren-
nan’s concurrence in New York Times Co. v. United States,96 which
said that “[c]opyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech
as copyright protects only form of expression and not the ideas ex-
pressed.”97 And the Court stressed that it would be an “abuse of the
copyright owner’s monopoly” for copyright law to become “an instru-
ment to suppress facts.”98
Harper & Row thus suggests that the lines between using others’
expression and using their ideas and between some fair uses and
other uses are of First Amendment significance. Speech communi-
cating facts and ideas in a way that is “substantially similar” to some-
one else’s expression, and that is not a fair use, is constitutionally un-
protected.99 Speech that communicates the same facts and ideas in
other ways, or speech that borrows expression but falls within the fair
use exception, is constitutionally protected.100 Enjoining or punishing
94. Id. at 560.
95. Id. at 556 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994)).
96. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
97. Id. at 726 n.* (Brennan, J., concurring), cited with approval in Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 556.
98. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559.
99. We mean “unprotected” in the literal sense: the speech may constitutionally be pun-
ished by copyright law, despite the First Amendment, which means that the First Amendment
does not protect the speech against legal sanction. In this respect, infringing speech is just like
the traditional exceptions to First Amendment protection, such as obscenity, defamation,
fighting words, threats, child pornography, advocacy of unlawful conduct that’s intended to and
is likely to produce imminent lawlessness, publication of sailing dates of troop ships, and the
like. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (listing such exceptions).
We are not suggesting that infringing speech is “valueless.” Like advocacy of unlawful
conduct, or revelation of extremely sensitive government secrets, it can often make an impor-
tant contribution to public debate or at least provide public entertainment. It is punishable
primarily because of its perceived harm and the supposedly ample alternative avenues for ex-
pression, not because of its perceived lack of value. But whatever the reason, the First
Amendment does not protect this speech against the operation of copyright law.
Of course, speech that’s unprotected against copyright law might still be protected
against other laws: The government may not, for instance, constitutionally apply a ban on racist
speech or sexually suggestive speech even to material that’s infringing, just as it may not apply
a ban on racist speech even to material that constitutes fighting words. See R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992).
100. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977) (some cita-
tions omitted):
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noninfringing speech would thus be an unconstitutional restraint of
First Amendment protected expression. So would reducing or elimi-
nating the protections afforded users by the idea-expression dichot-
omy and the fair use rules.101
Such a dividing line makes constitutional sense. Free speech law
may tolerate certain limits on how someone expresses an idea or a
fact, but it ought not tolerate restrictions on communicating ideas
and facts as such, or on criticism or parody that must in some meas-
ure borrow another’s words.102 When you express an idea that some-
one else pioneered or discuss facts that others uncovered or use their
expression while commenting on it, you might be free riding on their
hard work, but it is a free riding we must allow.103
We note that Federal District Courts have rejected First Amendment challenges to
the federal copyright law on the ground that “no restraint [has been] placed on the
use of an idea or concept.” See also Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 345 F.
Supp. 108, 115-16 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (citing [Melville B.] Nimmer, Does Copyright
Abridge The First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L.
REV. 1180 (1970) who argues that copyright law does not abridge the First Amend-
ment because it does not restrain the communication of ideas or concepts).
See also Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 892 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“Serious First Amendment questions would be raised if Congress’ power over copy-
rights were construed to include the power to grant monopolies over certain ideas.”).
101. While Harper & Row suggested that the idea-expression dichotomy and at least some
sort of fair use doctrine are constitutionally required, see supra text accompanying note 94, it
did not say that all speech covered by current fair use doctrine is constitutionally protected. It’s
conceivable that Congress may to some extent constrict the fair use doctrine without trans-
gressing the First Amendment, though it seems that it may not eliminate it altogether or con-
strict it too much, at least in the area of “scholarship and comment.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 560. On the other hand, an effort to constrict the fair use or idea-expression privileges might
compel courts to expressly evaluate the constitutionality of the new rule, something that they
haven’t had to do in the past. On the constitutional significance of the fair use doctrine, and
efforts to whittle away at it, see Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Im-
age, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587, 612 (1997) (noting that “precisely because it requires case-by-
case analysis . . . fair use is a troublesome safe harbor for First Amendment rights”).
102. This is not to say that the courts have always gotten it right in interpreting the fair use
doctrine, or in drawing the line between idea and expression. For an argument that software
blurs the latter line in disturbing ways, see Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expres-
sion, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149 (1998); Dennis S. Karjala & Peter S. Menell, Applying Funda-
mental Copyright Principles to Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 10
HIGH TECH. L.J. 177 (1995).
103. Many commentators who have considered the issue have come to similar substantive
conclusions. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPR. SOC’Y 1
(1987); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Pro-
tection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Charles C. Goetsch, Parody as Free
Speech—The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 39 (1980); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaran-
tees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Hon. James L. Oakes, Copy-
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Thus, we will assume what Harper & Row strongly suggested,
and what lower courts have reaffirmed:104 speech that copies another’s
expression (setting aside fair use) can be restricted, but speech that
borrows only facts or ideas, or that fairly uses expression, is constitu-
tionally protected.
B. Prior Restraint Doctrine
1. Speech May Not Be Restrained Until a Final Judicial
Determination That It’s Unprotected by the First Amendment. As
we’ve argued above, copyright law is a speech restriction.
Accordingly, injunctions against distributing a supposedly infringing
work are injunctions restraining speech; and preliminary injunctions
restraining speech are generally considered unconstitutional “prior
restraints.”105
We stress here that we’re referring to preliminary injunctions,
not permanent injunctions.106 A permanent injunction, entered fol-
rights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 983 (1990); L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); David E. Shipley,
Conflicts Between Copyright and the First Amendment After Harper & Row, Publishers v. Na-
tion Enterprises, 1986 BYU L. REV. 983 (1986); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective
on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38
EMORY L.J. 393 (1989); Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and
Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79 (1996); Mel Marquis, Comment, Fair Use of the
First Amendment: Parody and Its Protections, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123 (1997); cf. Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 296-97
(1996) (offering speech-related justifications for limited copyright protection); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces
and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 666 (1992) (suggesting that if anything
commentators understate the problems caused by the conflict between copyright law and the
First Amendment).
104. See Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (the idea-
expression dichotomy is partly grounded “in the First Amendment interest in the free exchange
of ideas”); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170
(9th Cir. 1977) (noting that the “idea-expression dichotomy already serves to accommodate the
competing interests of copyright and the first amendment”); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates,
581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978) (“‘[T]he idea-expression line represents an acceptable definit-
ional balance as between copyright and free speech interests.’”), quoting Sid & Marty Krofft,
562 F.2d at 1170.
105. We owe much of the general analysis in this section to Martin H. Redish, The Proper
Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984).
106. There has been virtually no discussion of the particular problems we identify in this
Article. The one exception is the Nimmer treatise, which observes: “Indeed, the frequency of
copyright TRO’s and injunctions against expressive material under the copyright rubric is sur-
prising when juxtaposed against the reluctance of courts to engage in a prior restraint of speech
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lowing a final determination that the speech is unprotected, is gener-
ally seen as constitutional.107 “The special vice of a prior restraint,”
the Court has held, “is that communication will be suppressed . . . be-
fore an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First
Amendment.”108 After speech is conclusively judicially determined to
be unprotected—because it is obscene, for example—a permanent
injunction (such as the ones at issue in Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown109 or Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations110) would be no more troubling on constitutional grounds
than a civil or criminal penalty.111 “[T]he order will not have gone into
effect before [the court’s] final determination that the [speech was]
unprotected.”112 The Court’s occasional dicta suggesting that all in-
under the analysis mandated by the First Amendment.” NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
50, § 14.06[A].
For discussions of prior restraints in copyright law that focus on areas of conflict other
than preliminary injunctions, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and Innovation in the Global
Information Infrastructure, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 325-29 (1996) (arguing that strict liability for
Internet service providers is tantamount to a prior restraint); William L. LaFuze & Valerie K.
Friedrich, Aggressive Enforcement of Rights Involving Internet Abuses, COMPUTER L. REV. &
TECH. J. 1, 20-21 (1997) (noting the “surprising frequency” of TROs and injunctions despite
the prior restraint doctrine, without distinguishing preliminary injunctions from permanent
ones); Zimmerman, supra note 103, at 737-38 (criticizing the use of a property analysis to grant
injunctive relief in light of free speech law’s disapproval of prior restraints); James Thompson,
Permanent Injunctions in Copyright Infringement: Moral and Economic Justifications for Bal-
ancing Individual Rights Instead of Following Harsh Rules, 7 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 477 (1998)
(arguing for discretion in the grant of permanent injunctions); Tiffany D. Trunko, Note, Reme-
dies for Copyright Infringement: Respecting the First Amendment, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1940,
1941 (1989) (arguing that permanent injunctions “may look suspiciously like” prior restraints,
yet noting that “courts routinely issue copyright injunctions”). Trunko also mentions that
“preliminary injunctions can pose similar prior restraint problems.” Id. at n.5. For reasons we
will shortly discuss, we think that the problem is much worse for preliminary than for perma-
nent injunctions.
107. Copyright plaintiffs who win a final judgment on the merits are generally entitled to a
permanent injunction as a matter of course, though in some fairly rare cases courts have denied
such injunctions. See, e.g., Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d sub
nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (dictum) (suggesting this possibility for certain near-fair-use cases).
108. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973) (emphasis added).
109. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
110. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
111. See infra Part II.B.2.
112. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 390; accord Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. at 445 (upholding
an injunction of obscenity in part because the injunction covered only speech that already had
been found to be unprotected). This argument applies equally to any unprotected category of
speech. See Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62 (Ga. 1975) (upholding an injunction
against statements already found to be “false and defamatory”); O’Brien v. University Com-
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junctions are prior restraints are therefore somewhat erroneous
overgeneralizations.113
But when the injunction is entered prior to this final judicial de-
termination, it is almost always treated as an unconstitutional prior
restraint.114 This is so even when the injunction is entered for the
munity Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975) (“Once speech has judicially
been found libelous, if all the requirements for injunctive relief are met, an injunction for re-
straint of continued publication of that same speech may be proper.”); Advanced Training Sys.,
Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984) (approving an injunction against li-
bel issued after “full adversarial proceedings”); see also Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666,
675 (3d Cir. 1991) (striking down an injunction but noting in dictum that an injunction will gen-
erally not be unconstitutional if a “jury has determined that the speech is not constitutionally
protected”); Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639, 642 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (striking down an in-
junction but stating that “an injunction directed against a libel is not unconstitutional”)
(citation omitted); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623 special note on remedies for
defamation other than damages (1977) (stating that an injunction may be available when a
court has “formally determined” that the speech is unprotected); Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,
987 F.2d 939, 949 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding, albeit in a commercial speech context, that the prior
restraint doctrine did not apply “because there has been ‘an adequate determination that [the
expression] is unprotected by the First Amendment’” (quoting Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at
390)); SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same, in a case in-
volving securities information).
113. Compare Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (“The term prior re-
straint is used ‘to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communi-
cations when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.’ Temporary
restraining orders and permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech ac-
tivities—are classic examples of prior restraints.”) (citations omitted), with Madsen v. Women’s
Health Ctr., Inc. 512 U.S. 753, 764 n.2 (1994) (concluding that certain content-neutral injunc-
tions aren’t prior restraints), Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 389-90 (concluding that an injunction
barring the placement of want ads in sex-segregated columns was not a prior restraint), and
Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. at 441-45 (finding that a content-based injunction was not a prior re-
straint).
This area has been considerably confused by the Court’s penchant for occasionally
condemning speech restrictions as prior restraints when not even subsequent punishment of the
speech would be permissible. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-34, at 1040-41 (2d ed. 1988). Consider, for instance, Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (rejecting on prior restraint grounds a content-based injunction
against leafleting that criticized a local real estate broker as a prior restraint) and Nebraska
Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (rejecting on prior restraint grounds an injunction
against press coverage of judicial proceedings). It seems clear that under standard First
Amendment doctrine, the leafleting at issue in Austin and the press coverage in Nebraska Press
could not even have been punished after the fact, so the prior restraint inquiry added nothing
useful to the analysis. We agree with Professor Tribe that “[i]n order to test the extent and
strength of the prior restraint doctrine . . . one must examine expression that is at least arguably
outside the ambit of substantive first amendment protection, yet inside the ban on prior re-
straints.” TRIBE, supra, at 1040.
114. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 66 (1989):
Here there was not—and has not been—any determination that the seized items
were “obscene” or that a RICO violation has occurred . . . . [T]he petition for seizure
and the hearing thereon were aimed at establishing no more than probable cause to
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seemingly laudable purpose of preserving the status quo pending the
final determination of whether the speech is protected.115
Many of the quintessential unconstitutional prior restraint
schemes were in fact prophylactic mechanisms that were aimed at
preventing unprotected speech, but that ended up at least temporar-
ily restricting protected speech as well. Thus, traditional licensing sys-
tems made it illegal for people to print anything, protected or not,
unless they had licenses.116 Traditional prescreening censorship sys-
tems made it illegal for people to distribute anything, protected or
not, until the censors gave it their approval.117 The injunction in Near
v. Minnesota118 banned a newspaper that had printed libelous material
in the past from operating, even to publish material that was not li-
belous.119 Such restraints are presumptively unconstitutional, because
they may restrict protected speech as well as unprotected speech.120
The same goes for preliminary injunctions that restrict speech, as
the Court held in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.121 Vance struck
down a scheme which had let state courts preliminarily enjoin alleged
obscenity “based on a showing of probable success on the merits and
believe that a RICO violation had occurred, and the order for seizure recited no
more than probable cause in that respect . . . . [O]ur cases firmly hold that mere
probable cause to believe a legal violation has transpired is not adequate to remove
books or films from circulation.
See also M.I.C., Ltd. v. Bedford Township, 463 U.S. 1341, 1343 (1983) (Brennan, Circuit Jus-
tice) (issuing an emergency stay and noting that a stay is constitutionally mandated when “the
trial court’s broad proscription will bar, in advance of any final judicial determination that the
suppressed films are obscene, the exhibition of any film that might offend the court’s ban”);
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1980) (holding that a preliminary
injunction was a prior restraint).
115. See, e.g., Vance, 445 U.S. at 312; Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 420 (1971).
116. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the
Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661, 671-73 (1984).
117. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
118. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
119. See id. at 706.
120. The one possible exception here is commercial speech, which might be subjected to
various prescreening systems that are forbidden for noncommercial speech. See infra notes 330-
31 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty in the case law on this point). But even if
this exception is sound, it fits well into our general framework. Schemes that restrain speech
before a court makes a final adjudication that the speech is unprotected risk restraining pro-
tected speech as well as unprotected speech. When that risk is borne by speech that is fully pro-
tected—such as nonobscene movies or nonlibelous newspaper articles—the prior restraint
cases hold that this is too grave a restraint on free speech. But when the risk is borne by com-
mercial speech, which even when protected is considered to be of lower value than noncom-
mercial speech, see infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text, then the First Amendment cost
of erroneous temporary restraint is considerably less.
121. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
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without a final determination of obscenity.”122 Such injunctions, the
Court held, were unconstitutional because they allowed “prior re-
straints of indefinite duration on the exhibition of motion pictures
that [had] not been finally adjudicated to be obscene.”123 The Court
continued: “That a state trial judge might be thought more likely than
an administrative censor to determine accurately that a work is ob-
scene does not change the unconstitutional character of the restraint
if erroneously entered.”124
Vance’s wording and logic are relevant to all speech restrictions,
not just obscenity law, and lower courts have in fact struck down pre-
liminary injunctions in other contexts on this very ground.125 Prelimi-
122. Id. at 312.
123. Id. at 316; see also Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 420 (1971) (holding that a determina-
tion by a judge of “probable cause” that speech is obscene is insufficient to justify a restriction);
State v. Book-Cellar, Inc., 679 P.2d 548, 553-55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding a statute that
authorized preliminary injunctions against the distribution of obscenity by requiring “that a
final judicial determination [be] made by the end of 60 days from the issuance of a preliminary
injunction,” a safeguard compelled by Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)); Paradise
Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“A preliminary injunction
is a prior restraint.”); Cohen v. Advanced Med. Group, 496 S.E.2d 710, 710-11 (Ga. 1998)
(striking down a preliminary injunction of libel on the grounds that the injunction was not
“‘entered subsequent to a verdict in which a jury found that statements made by [defendant]
were false and defamatory’” (quoting High Country Fashions, Inc. v. Marlenne Fashions, Inc.,
357 S.E.2d 576, 577 (Ga. 1987))); City of Cadillac v. Cadillac News & Video, Inc., 562 N.W.2d
267, 270 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (striking down a preliminary injunction of obscenity on the
grounds that the injunction would permit “removal of allegedly obscene materials from circula-
tion before a judicial determination whether the material is obscene, with none of the safe-
guards” established in Freedman). Freedman is discussed further infra Part II.B.3.
124. Vance, 445 U.S. at 317.
125. See, e.g., Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 903 (1st Cir. 1993) (stressing
that an injunction of charitable solicitation was permitted only “after a final adjudication on the
merits that the speech is unprotected”); St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., Inc. v. Ho, 663
N.E.2d 1220, 1223-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a preliminary injunction of an alleged
libel was an unconstitutional prior restraint); Gilbert v. National Enquirer, Inc., 51 Cal. Rptr.
2d 91, 96-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (same); Pirmantgen v. Feminelli, 745 S.W.2d 576, 577-78
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (same); cf. San Antonio Community Hosp. v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council
of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1240 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (criticizing the ma-
jority, and arguing that “this . . . is the first ever [case] (so far as I am aware) to uphold [on ap-
peal] a preliminary injunction against speech covered by [New York Times Co. v. Sullivan]”);
San Antonio Community Hosp. v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 137 F.3d 1090,
1092-93 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (stating
that “until today, no court has ever upheld [on appeal] an injunction prohibiting the type of
speech at issue here”). But see San Antonio Community Hosp., 125 F.3d at 1233-39 (concluding
that a preliminary injunction in a labor union libel case was not a prior restraint because the
statements were so misleading as to be fraudulent, and “[t]he First Amendment does not pro-
tect fraud”); Vondran v. McLinn, No. C 95-20296 RPA, 1995 WL 415153, at *4-*6 (N.D. Cal.
July 5, 1995) (acknowledging that speech may be enjoined only when the statements have actu-
ally been found to be libelous, but nonetheless preliminarily enjoining libelous statements
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nary injunctions, no matter what sort of speech is being enjoined, rest
not on “[a court’s] final determination that the [speech is] unpro-
tected,”126 but on a mere finding of a likelihood that the speech is un-
protected.127
And this likelihood that the court must find need not be near
certainty: a preliminary injunction can generally issue in a copyright
case on a finding of “sufficiently serious questions going to the merits
to make them fair grounds for litigation and a balance of hardships
tipping decidedly in its favor.”128 In the Seventh Circuit, when the
balance of hardships tips towards the plaintiff, even a “better than
negligible chance that [the plaintiff] will succeed on [the merits]”129
may be enough.
Under the copyright preliminary injunction cases, then, a court
may enjoin the speech even if it recognizes that there’s a serious pos-
sibility that the speech will ultimately be proven to be constitution-
ally protected—for instance, even if it concludes that there are
“sufficiently serious questions going to the merits” of a fair use de-
fense.130 While the injunction is in force, the enjoined person may not
say what he wants to say, even if the speech would ultimately prove
to be constitutionally protected—under the collateral bar rule, the
enjoined person may be held in contempt for violating the injunction
even if he can prove at the contempt hearing that the speech is in fact
protected by the First Amendment.131
based on a mere finding of likelihood of success on the merits); Mercy Health Servs. v. 1199
Health & Human Serv. Employees Union, 888 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (allowing a
preliminary injunction in a labor union libel case without even considering the prior restraint
question); Bingham v. Struve, 591 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158-59 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (ordering a
preliminary injunction against a libel on a matter of private concern, concluding that the libel
was constitutionally unprotected but not considering the prior restraint issue).
126. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973).
127. See Richard Feiner & Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co., 98 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1996).
128. Id.
129. Publications Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Ro-
land Machinery v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1984)); see also Fashion Vic-
tim, Ltd. v. Sunrise Turquoise, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1302, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (denying a prelimi-
nary injunction because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a “‘better than negligible’” chance
that it would succeed on the merits (quoting Roland Machinery, 749 F.2d at 387)); Jackson v.
MPI Home Video, 694 F. Supp. 483, 492 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (finding a “greater than negligible
chance” that the plaintiff could gain injunctive relief).
130. New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1531
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
131. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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What’s more, as we discussed in detail in Part I.B, the prelimi-
nary injunction standard actually applied in copyright cases is even
more lenient to the plaintiff than the traditional equity rules for pre-
liminary injunctions—courts presume that the copyright plaintiff can
show irreparable harm and that the public interest and the balance of
hardships tip in its favor.132 Courts also suggest that “[t]he overarch-
ing consideration in granting preliminary relief is, of course, to pre-
serve the status quo,”133 which generally suggests a preference in close
cases for restricting the publication of the defendant’s speech. Such
restraints should be unconstitutional, at least unless (as we’ll discuss
below) there’s a framework for getting a truly prompt final determi-
nation of whether the speech is protected—something current pre-
liminary injunction practice does not provide.
2. Why This Rule Makes Sense. The above summary of the
prior restraint doctrine is not entirely free from controversy—many
still claim that the doctrine bans all injunctions of future speech,
whether or not the injunction is preceded by a holding that the
speech is constitutionally unprotected.134 Nonetheless, we believe our
summary best fits the precedents. Subject to two caveats we’ll
mention below,135 the case law does indeed allow permanent
injunctions of unprotected speech, entered after a final judicial
finding that the speech is unprotected, but doesn’t allow restraints
entered before such a finding.
And this rule makes sense out of what is otherwise a puzzling
distinction. Most prior restraints—except the rare ones that actually
involve seizing speech products136—are only enforced through subse-
quent punishment. An injunction doesn’t physically keep you from
speaking, but only makes you subsequently liable for violating the in-
junction. Conversely, the deterrent force of traditional subsequent
punishments, such as criminal penalties or civil liability, restrains
speakers from speaking in the first place (as it’s intended to do).137
132. See supra Part I.B. Professor Doug Laycock suggests that courts are effectively apply-
ing the irreparable injury standard for permanent injunctions to preliminary injunction cases.
See LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at 37-48.
133. Cheever v. Academy Chicago, Ltd., 690 F. Supp. 281, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
134. See, e.g., material from Alexander v. United States, quoted supra note 113.
135. See infra Part II.B.3.
136. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
137. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 427-29
(1983) (arguing that subsequent criminal punishments usually chill speech more than injunc-
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The focus on final judicial determination that the speech is un-
protected solves this puzzle. Traditional subsequent punishments,
such as civil or criminal liability, punish speech only when, at the end
of the trial, the speech is found to be constitutionally unprotected.
But judicial or administrative preliminary restraints are actually more
restrictive because while they are in force they restrain even speech
that may ultimately prove to be protected. In addition, since prelimi-
nary injunctions are often easier to get than final determinations on
the merits and are granted based on less evidence and less delibera-
tion, the danger that the court will get it wrong and mistakenly re-
strict protected speech is even greater.138
Of course, this requirement of a final judicial determination
makes it harder to prevent constitutionally unprotected, and quite
possibly harmful, speech. For instance, instead of preliminary en-
joining something that looks like it’s probably a constitutionally un-
protected libel, and thus averting the harm that the potential libel will
do, the court must wait until trial and a final determination that the
speech is indeed libelous. By then, the speech will likely have been
published and widely disseminated, and damages will be an uncertain
and incomplete remedy. Nonetheless, prior restraint law embodies a
judgment that such prophylactic injunctions are generally too grave a
burden on free speech rights.139
Some have argued that the prior restraint doctrine should turn
on other distinctions. Vincent Blasi argues that all injunctions, in-
cluding permanent ones, should be presumptively barred because
they “rely upon adjudication in the abstract, . . . encourage regulatory
agents to overuse the power to regulate, and . . . adversely affect
audience reception of controversial messages.”140 Justice Brennan
likewise criticized even permanent injunctions, entered after a final
adjudication that the speech is unprotected, on the grounds that the
ultimate decision as to whether the speech is protected should be
tions); Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 550-51 (1977)
(same).
138. See University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“A party . . . is not
required to prove his case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing.”); Compuserve, Inc. v.
Cyberpromotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (“A preliminary injunction is
customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less
complete than in a full trial on the merits.”).
139. We’ll discuss in Part III whether this judgment is sound, but, sound or not, it is quite
clearly part of free speech jurisprudence. See, e.g., supra note 114 and accompanying text.
140. Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 11, 92-93 (1981).
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made by juries, the traditional administrators of civil and criminal li-
ability, and not by judges, the traditional issuers of injunctions.141
We ultimately agree with Martin Redish’s responses to these ar-
guments,142 both as a theoretical matter and because the Redish re-
sponses better reflect the prior restraint case law. In any event,
though, the Brennan and Blasi theories would support narrower, not
broader, judicial power to issue preliminary injunctions. Our criti-
cisms of preliminary injunctions in copyright cases should thus be
shared even by those who adhere to the Brennan or Blasi schools.
Professor Redish does suggest that preliminary injunctions might
be permissible if “a strong likelihood exists that the government will
be able to establish that the challenged expression is [substantively
unprotected],” though he notes the “problems plaguing the use of
preliminary injunctive relief against expressive activity.”143 One could
support this position on the grounds that due process, including First
Amendment due process, is flexible enough to tolerate a certain risk
of error when the restraint is only temporary and when it is entered
by a judge rather than an administrative body. We think, though, that
this is inconsistent with the case law—especially with Vance—and
with the core principle that emerges from Professor Redish’s own
work and that the Court has validated: that it is improper for speech
141. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1957) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). We are somewhat skeptical that juries will in practice prove more protective of speech
than judges, but such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
142. See Redish, supra note 105. To briefly summarize—and thus necessarily vastly over-
simplify—Professor Redish’s points: (1) Permanent injunctions against speech found by a court
to be unprotected are in practice not especially likely (particularly when compared with crimi-
nal punishments) to deter or restrict speech that should be protected. (2) Permanent injunc-
tions are not especially likely to be overused, because, like civil and criminal punishments, they
can only be entered after a full trial on the merits. (3) The main supposed procedural advan-
tage of civil and criminal trials—the presence of the jury—is in fact not especially speech-
protective. (4) The danger of adjudication in the abstract based only on speculation about fu-
ture harm is often as present in criminal prosecutions, because many of the free speech excep-
tions (e.g., threats, fighting words, incitement, solicitation) allow the punishment of speech
based solely on a sufficient risk that it will cause harm. (5) While audiences may be under-
standably skeptical about the credibility of speech that has been precleared by censors, they
may be equally skeptical about speech that has been published with an eye towards avoiding
subsequent punishment. See id. at 59-75.
For an economic defense of Redish’s theory, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1516-17 (1998).
143. Redish, supra note 105, at 88-89.
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to be restricted by a “preliminary restraint imposed prior to a deci-
sion on the merits of a final restraint.”144
3. Two Possible Exceptions. There are two possible exceptions
to the basic rule that speech should not be restrained until a final
judicial determination that it’s unprotected. On the side of greater
protection of speech, there are a few Supreme Court cases that sug-
gest that speech may not be enjoined even after a finding that it is
indeed unprotected. Thus, for instance, in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts,145 a libel case, the Court suggested in passing (and in dictum)
that it had “rejected all manner of prior restraint on publication,
despite strong arguments that if the material was unprotected[,] the
time of suppression was immaterial.”146 There certainly has been a
long tradition in American law—at least as old as the 1839 New York
case of Brandreth v. Lance147—that libels ought never be enjoined,
and some state constitutions have been read as barring such
144. Id. at 55 (emphasis in original). See generally Part III (explaining why we think the
Vance view is correct, especially in copyright cases).
145. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
146. Id. at 149 (citation omitted). As an example of one of the “strong arguments,” the
Court cited Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29
HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916)—a leading article urging that libels be enjoinable. The only citation
the Court gave for the proposition that it had “rejected all manner of prior restraint on publica-
tion” was Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which rejected an injunction against speech
that had not yet been adjudicated to be constitutionally unprotected.
More recently, in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), the
Court cited Near v. Minnesota to similar effect:
It is elementary, of course, that in a case of this kind the courts do not concern them-
selves with the truth or validity of the publication. Under Near v. Minnesota, the in-
junction, so far as it imposes prior restraint on speech and publication, constitutes an
impermissible restraint on First Amendment rights.
Id. at 418 (citation omitted). Again, however, the Court doesn’t explain how Near applied to
libel cases generally, nor did it distinguish Kingsley Books, which held that some speech may be
enjoined once it’s found to be unprotected. See Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. at 445. In addition,
the statement in Keefe, like that in Curtis Publishing, is in dictum and in passing: Keefe was not
a libel case, and the speech at issue in Keefe would have been protected against subsequent
punishment as well as against prior restraint. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988)
(stating that speech in residential areas that’s aimed at reaching the public—the sort of speech
involved in Keefe—may not be banned).
147. 8 Paige Ch. 24, 26 (N.Y. Ch. 1839):
It is very evident that this court cannot assume jurisdiction of the case presented by
the complainant’s bill, or of any other case of the like nature, without infringing upon
the liberty of the press, and attempting to exercise a power of preventive justice
which, as the legislature has decided, cannot safely be entrusted to any tribunal con-
sistently with the principles of a free government.
Accord New York Juvenile Guardian Soc’y v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly 188, 191 (C.P.N.Y. 1877);
State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge Civ. Dist. Ct., 34 La. Ann. 741, 746 (1882).
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injunctions.148 Nonetheless, neither the Court nor lower courts have
gone far with the Curtis Publishing dictum, and some lower courts
have in fact authorized permanent injunctions against libels.149
On the side of greater tolerance for injunctions, some cases have
allowed prior restraint schemes that do temporarily restrict the dis-
tribution of speech, so long as the government promptly gets a final
judicial determination of whether the speech is indeed unprotected.150
As the Court held in Freedman v. Maryland,
Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determi-
nation on the merits must . . . be limited to preservation of the
status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound
judicial resolution . . . .  [T]he procedure must . . . assure a
prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent ef-
fect of an interim and possibly erroneous [restraint].151
These cases, which establish what we’ll call “the Freedman ex-
ception,” have been quite controversial,152 and though they’re firmly
established in the obscenity context, it’s not clear that they would be
extended elsewhere. For instance, we strongly doubt that the Court
would (or should) uphold a requirement that all books—or even all
non-time-sensitive books—be presented to a Defamation Prevention
Board for screening for libel,153 even if the scheme guaranteed a
prompt judicial determination of whether the speech was in fact li-
belous. Likewise, we doubt that courts would uphold a system under
which the Postmaster General could even temporarily deny use of
148. See, e.g., Wilson v. Superior Ct., 532 P.2d 116, 120 (Cal. 1975) (purporting to apply
both the United States and California constitutions); Gilbert v. National Enquirer, Inc., 51 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 91, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (same); Guste v. Connick, 515 So. 2d 436, 438 (La. 1987);
Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Pa. 1978); see also Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d
666 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing at length Pennsylvania’s constitutional prohibition against prior
restraint of libelous speech).
149. See supra note 112.
150. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367-75 (1971); 11126
Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 58 F.3d 988, 1001-02 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
that an eight-month delay for a final judicial determination could not be considered the brief
and prompt review “that is required to guard against the abridgment of protected speech”);
State v. Book-Cellar, Inc., 679 P.2d 548, 555 (Ariz. App. 1984) (stating that for prior restraints
to “pass constitutional muster,” adequate procedural safeguards, including a prompt and final
judicial determination, must exist).
151. 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
152. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 151 (1984).
153. But see Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (upholding such a sys-
tem aimed at screening out obscene movies).
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the mails to publications he thought were libelous.154 On the other
hand, the Court has suggested that the Freedman standards may ap-
ply in at least some non-obscenity contexts, such as injunctions
against offensive demonstrations.155
Thus, preliminary injunctions must at the very least be subject to
the Freedman v. Maryland principles: the preliminary injunction must
be immediately appealable, with the assurance of a prompt decision
(not just a prompt hearing) about whether the speech is actually un-
protected—actually obscene, libelous, or infringing—rather than
merely likely to be unprotected.156 And if the Freedman exception is
limited to the obscenity context, then all other preliminary injunc-
tions of speech would be unconstitutional unless the court were to
simultaneously determine on the merits that the speech was indeed
unprotected.
To summarize, even if it’s permissible to restrict speech that falls
within certain unprotected categories, it shouldn’t be permissible to
restrict speech, for several months or perhaps even just for several
days, simply on the grounds that it might fall within an unprotected
category. Or at least so say Vance and the remainder of the Court’s
prior restraint jurisprudence.
C. Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Orders
The Court’s skepticism towards content-based preliminary in-
junctions extends in spades to ex parte temporary restraining orders
(TROs). Ex parte restraints on speech are generally forbidden, at
least unless one can show that it’s impossible to give the target notice
and an opportunity to participate. The Court held this in Carroll v.
President and Commissioners of Princess Anne,157 where it struck
down a ten-day ex parte TRO that banned—in order to prevent vio-
154. But cf. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971) (suggesting that such a system might
be constitutional when applied to material that’s supposedly obscene if the system contained
the procedural protections required by Freedman).
155. See National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977); cf.
New York State Ass’n of Career Sch. v. State Educ. Dep’t, 823 F. Supp. 1096, 1106 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that a scheme requiring preapproval of adult education curricula was a prior
restraint, but concluding that such a restraint was valid because it passed strict scrutiny and in-
corporated procedural safeguards like those present in Freedman).
156. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
157. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
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lent clashes—a march by the racist National States Rights Party.158
Even when speech may be enjoined, the Court said, both sides must
be present in court to ensure that an injunction is issued only when
genuinely necessary and is drafted as narrowly as possible.159 When
only one side is heard, the Court concluded, “there is insufficient as-
surance of the balanced analysis and careful conclusions which are
essential in the area of First Amendment adjudication.”160
It might conceivably be desirable to permit a narrow exception
to the general ban on TROs if giving notice would pose unusual dan-
gers—for instance if it would create a risk that an infringer would es-
cape and take the infringing goods with him to be distributed else-
where.161 Nonetheless, even if such an exception were to be recog-
nized, it could only be applied in extreme cases. It can’t be enough to
show that a speaker will, before the injunction is entered, continue
engaging in his allegedly harmful speech: this argument could be
made for most attempts to enjoin supposedly unprotected speech,
and would justify ex parte orders delaying the publication of suppos-
edly libelous books or newspaper articles, ex parte prohibitions of
news coverage that supposedly interferes with a fair trial, and so on.
Certainly lower courts have interpreted Carroll as prohibiting such ex
parte speech restrictions.162
158. See id. at 180 (stating that because the TRO was obtained “without any effort, how-
ever informal, to invite or permit [the opposing party’s] participation in the proceedings,” it
must be set aside).
159. See id.
160. Id. at 183; cf. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, § 14.07, at 14-128 to 14-130
(discussing this point in the related context of ex parte impoundment of allegedly infringing ar-
ticles under the Copyright Act).
161. See Carroll, 393 U.S. at 184-85 (“We need not here decide that it is impossible for cir-
cumstances to arise in which the issuance of an ex parte restraining order for a minimum period
could be justified because of the unavailability of the adverse parties or their counsel, or per-
haps for other reasons.”).
162. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225-26 (6th Cir.
1996) (setting aside an ex parte TRO against publication of confidential court documents, even
though the district court concluded that it needed to issue the TRO to have time to consider the
evidence); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 561 (5th Cir. 1988)
(setting aside an ex parte TRO against union picketing); Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639,
642 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (holding that an ex parte TRO against making libelous statements was un-
constitutional unless adequate safeguards were present); United Farm Workers v. Quincy
Corp., 681 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (setting aside an ex parte TRO against
union demonstrations and picketing); State v. Alston, 887 P.2d 681, 688 (Kan. 1994) (setting
aside sua sponte a gag order prohibiting the publication of information that would have alleg-
edly interfered with the fairness of a criminal trial). But see Falwell v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 521
F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (W.D. Va. 1981) (mentioning an ex parte TRO that enjoined the distribu-
tion of an issue of Penthouse on the grounds that it might have constituted “false light” invasion
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D. Can Preliminary Injunctions of Copyright Infringement Be Distin-
guished from Preliminary Injunctions of Other Speech?
So far, we’ve applied standard First Amendment doctrine to
copyright law and concluded that preliminary injunctions in copyright
cases pose serious free speech problems. But could it be that copy-
right law is somehow specially immune from the normal concerns
surrounding other speech restrictions? We’ve often heard this view
among copyright lawyers. While copyright law is clearly a speech re-
striction, to many it lacks that speech restriction flavor. It doesn’t
sound like censorship, just people enforcing their lawful property
rights. Still, while many have this intuition, is there some specific rea-
son underlying it, some reason that can justify setting aside the nor-
mal First Amendment procedural guarantees?
1. Property Rights. The argument that copyright law should be
exempted from standard First Amendment procedural rules because
it protects property rights strikes us as a non sequitur.163 Free speech
guarantees can’t be avoided simply by characterizing a speech
restriction as an “intellectual property law.” After all, one could
plausibly view libel law as protecting a person’s property interest in
his reputation, or a company’s property interest in its product’s
reputation—some courts have indeed done so.164 Likewise, a bill
of privacy and infringement of common law copyright, but not discussing the First Amend-
ment).
163. Compare Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d
1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding that the prior restraint doctrine doesn’t apply to copy-
right and trademark cases because “[t]he first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally
recognized rights in intellectual property”), with L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811
F.2d 26, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1987) (disagreeing with this view in the trademark and parody context,
and noting that “the constitutional issue raised here cannot be dispensed with by simply as-
serting that Bean’s property right need not yield to the exercise of first amendment rights”).
See also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1537 (1993) (expressing concern
that “[t]he incantation ‘property’ seems sufficient to render free speech issues invisible”).
164. See, e.g., Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 514 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that
Florida law recognizes business reputation as a property interest); Nossen v. Hoy, 750 F. Supp.
740, 743 (E.D. Va. 1990) (holding that “an individual holds a . . . property interest in his or her
reputation” for purposes of Washington and Virginia conversion law). Given the economic
value of reputation—something any businessperson would attest to—such an approach isn’t
surprising. To most businesses and businesspeople, one’s reputation is considerably more valu-
able than the copyrights one may own.
Reputation is generally not a property interest for purposes of the federal Due Process
Clause, so the government may defame people without incurring constitutional liability. See
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976). But this merely means that the government doesn’t
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introduced in the 104th Congress would have declared the United
States flag copyrighted, and would have imposed “criminal penalties
for the destruction of a copyrighted flag.”165 Congress can’t get
around the First Amendment merely by characterizing otherwise
protected speech166 as treading on a property interest, as the flag
copyright bill sought to do.167 One still has to ask whether these
intellectual property laws are unconstitutional speech restrictions
(something the Supreme Court has in fact asked in its free
speech/intellectual property cases),168 and, if they are substantively
constitutional, what procedural protections the First Amendment
nonetheless requires.
The First Amendment does not, of course, license people to
trespass on private real estate in order to speak.169 Trespass laws are
generally applicable to all conduct (speech or not) and operate with-
out regard to the communicative impact of the speech, so it makes
sense not to view them as speech restrictions for purposes of the prior
restraint doctrine.170 But content-based laws, specifically targeted at
speech, must be seen as speech restrictions regardless of whether one
frames them as “property” rules. They may be substantively valid
have to consider reputation to be a property interest; the government may still do so if it wants
to.
165. H.R. 3883, 104th Cong. (1996) (introduced by Rep. Torricelli).
166. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (holding that flag burning is protected
speech); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (reaffirming Johnson).
167. The property argument has appeared in other contexts as well. In Federal Election
Commission v. International Funding Institute, Inc., 969 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc),
for example, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld a restriction on the use of politi-
cal contributor names collected by the Federal Election Commission. The FEC got the names
from political committees (which are required to give them to the FEC) and then revealed
them to any member of the public on the condition that they not be used for fundraising pur-
poses. See id. at 1112-13. Judges Buckley and Randolph would have upheld this condition sim-
ply on the grounds that “treating the lists as property provides reason enough to find [the con-
dition] constitutional.” Id. at 1120 (Buckley, J., concurring); see also id. at 1121 (Randolph, J.,
concurring). We don’t agree with this logic, and instead prefer the majority’s reasoning, which
conceded that the condition restricted speech, but upheld the condition on the grounds that the
government may attach such strings when it releases information that it has no obligation to
release. See id. at 1114 (following Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)).
168. See generally San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522 (1987) (quasi-trademark); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985) (copyright); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (right
of publicity).
169. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
170. Cf. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 n.2 (1994) (concluding that
certain content-neutral injunctions that may incidentally affect expression are not prior re-
straints).
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speech restrictions, but calling them property rules doesn’t justify ex-
empting them from the normal First Amendment procedural princi-
ples, especially when they ban people from saying a particular thing
anywhere, at any time, and not just on others’ land.171 Indeed, if the
First Amendment rules didn’t apply to intellectual property laws, the
Court’s entire discussion of the First Amendment issue in Harper &
Row172 would have been not only unnecessary but affirmatively mis-
leading.
Furthermore, consumption of intellectual property, unlike con-
sumption of tangible property, is “nonrivalrous”—one person’s use of
a work does not prevent others from using it as well.173 This makes in-
tellectual property sufficiently unlike tangible property that some
courts that have faced the issue directly have even concluded that
copyrights and trademarks are not “property” within the meaning of
the Takings Clause.174 Whether or not that’s correct, the nonrivalrous
aspect of intellectual property infringement weakens the property
rights argument. Generally speaking, writing graffiti on someone
else’s building damages the building owner in a different way than
making a copy of a book injures the author. One might perhaps think
of both as using another’s private property to facilitate one’s
speech,175 but graffiti, unlike unauthorized copying, interferes with the
owner’s use of his own property. This isn’t to say that copyright law is
unjustifiable or an unconstitutional speech restriction, only that the
171. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting the trespass
law analogy in a trademark case on the grounds that “a restriction on the location of a speech is
different from a restriction on the words the speaker may use”); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Pub-
lishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The first amendment issues involved in this case
cannot be disposed of by equating the rights of a trademark owner with the rights of an owner
of real property . . . .”). But see Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Plaintiff’s trademark is in the nature of a property right, and as
such it need not ‘yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where
adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.’” (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972) (involving trespass law) (citations omitted))).
172. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
173. Among many other discussions of this “public good” characteristic of intellectual
property, see Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
174. Compare College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148
F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 1999 WL 5331 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-531)
(holding that patents are property for Fourteenth Amendment purposes), with Chavez v. Arte
Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that copyrights are not property for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes).
175. Cf. Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 567 (holding that there is no First Amendment right to
access private property to distribute handbills).
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constitutional questions surrounding it can’t be avoided merely by
invoking the tangible property cases.
2.  Private Enforcement. Because copyright law is largely en-
forced by private litigation rather than government prosecution,
some argue that it’s much less likely to turn into an engine of gov-
ernment censorship.176 But of course libel law is also enforced almost
exclusively by private litigation.177 Despite this, courts correctly ban
preliminary injunctions in libel cases, even those brought by people
who aren’t public officials.178
Libel law is a government-imposed restriction that uses govern-
ment power to restrict speech that people want to see restricted;179
this is troublesome enough that the Court has insisted on strict pro-
176. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 731 n.1 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that private judicial enforcement of copyrights might not raise the same
First Amendment risks as government suits seeking to enjoin the press from publishing infor-
mation about government affairs).
177. Criminal libel law may still be constitutional, see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964), but such prosecutions are very rare.
178. See libel cases cited supra notes 123 and 125.
179. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (“Although [a libel suit]
is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the [state] courts have applied a state rule of law . . . .
It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action . . . .”); cf. Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 940-41 (1982) (holding that judicial enforcement of a civil writ against
the defendant’s property is state action).
There’s no doubt that a court’s enforcement of copyright law to restrict private speech
constitutes state action. Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-78 (1977)
(assuming that private enforcement of a government-granted intellectual property right—here
the right of publicity—constitutes state action); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539, 558-60 (1985) (discussing First Amendment defense to a copyright claim
without even suggesting that there’s any state action difficulty); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that private enforce-
ment of the right of publicity constitutes state action). See also Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read
Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV.
981, 1020-21 (1996) (arguing that a finding of state action is implicit in the fact that copyright
protection is limited by the First Amendment); Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols,
1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 193 n.146 (“The impact of the first amendment on the exclusive rights
granted to copyright owners remains unclear. . . . [However, t]he applicability of the constitu-
tional limitations has not been challenged.”) (citations omitted); Marquis, supra note 103, at
136 (noting that the Supreme Court has determined that the First Amendment is “implicated
where a private party seeks enforcement of a government-created right of action that limits
free speech”) (citation omitted).
VOLOKH FOR PRINTER.DOC 02/23/99 7:57 PM
186 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:147
cedural safeguards to make sure such a restriction is applied cor-
rectly. The same should be true for copyright cases.180
3. Content-Neutrality. It’s also incorrect to argue that intellectu-
al property law is content-neutral and should therefore be subject to
laxer rules.181 Copyright liability turns on the content of what is pub-
lished.
It’s true that copyright law draws no ideological distinctions: just
like libel law, obscenity law, and fighting words law, it applies equally
to speech advocating democracy, speech advocating communism, and
speech with no ideological message at all. But while this might make
the law viewpoint-neutral, it doesn’t make it content-neutral,182 and it
doesn’t avoid the prohibition on preliminary injunctions, which ap-
plies even to viewpoint-neutral restrictions such as libel law.
4. Subject Matter of the Jeopardized Speech. Some suggest that
injunctions in copyright cases pose less of a threat to free speech
because they typically involve nonpolitical matters; after all, would it
be such a big deal if a court erroneously concluded that Battlestar
Galactica infringes the plot of Star Wars?183 When the risk of error or
chill falls only on such nonpolitical material, the argument goes,
there’s no need for special procedural protections.
This argument, though, runs counter to fifty years of First
Amendment precedents that give art, entertainment, comedy, and
the like the same level of protection that is given to political speech.184
180. Privately enforced laws might sometimes prove to be more restrictive than govern-
ment-enforced ones. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1871, 1877-78 (1997)
(suggesting that private, self-interested enforcement of legal rules may be more zealous and
more thorough than direct government enforcement).
181. But see Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 n.11 (9th
Cir. 1997) (citing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979) (“The prohibition of the Lanham Act is content neutral, and therefore does
not arouse the fears that trigger the application of constitutional ‘prior restraint’ principles.”
(citations omitted in original)).
182. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality opinion) (holding that
content-based restrictions, even viewpoint-neutral ones, are constitutionally suspect); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (same); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 230 (1987) (same); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38
(1980) (same); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1980) (same).
183. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir.
1983).
184. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (holding that lowbrow enter-
tainment is “as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature”); South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (holding that the play Hair, and theat-
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The Court has never suggested that the risk of erroneous restriction
is less important as to these materials than as to political advocacy.
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.185 itself was an obscenity case, in-
volving movies that were probably no more socially valuable than the
subject of the typical copyright lawsuit; nonetheless, the Court con-
cluded that their display could not be preliminarily enjoined so long
as they had not been definitively found to be constitutionally unpro-
tected.
And of course quite a few copyright cases do involve political or
other socially significant speech—as did Harper & Row186 and the
cases that involved the videotapes of the Kennedy assassination187 and
the Los Angeles riot188—and quite a few libel cases involve material
that seems to be as much “entertainment” as a typical movie or
novel.189 A law that precludes news organizations from publishing the
film of an assassination, or the audiotape of a White House intern,190
certainly affects “core” protected speech.
5. Copyright Law Furthers Free Speech Values. Nor can
copyright law be exempted from the general prior restraint rules on
the grounds that “copyright itself [can] be the engine of free expres-
sion.”191 Copyright law’s speech-enhancing effect, coupled with the
rical productions generally, were constitutionally protected); Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding that music is fully constitutionally protected); Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that a
nonpolitical parade, even one that lacks a particularly clear and articulate message, is fully con-
stitutionally protected). Commentators have likewise warned against testing First Amendment
protection by reference to the supposed political value of the defendant’s work. See Denicola,
supra note 103, at 313-15; Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 103-06 (1996).
185. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
186. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(involving excerpts from President Ford’s memoirs); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (involving religious
scriptures).
187. See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 141-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
188. See Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1992).
189. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); cf. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g
Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (false light invasion of privacy case involving entertainment); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (same).
190. Technically, Monica Lewinsky’s statements on the notorious audiotapes are probably
not protected by copyright, because the tapes were not created “by or under [her] authority,”
see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1994), but this doesn’t affect our broader point.
191. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
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specific constitutional authorization for copyright law,192 may justify
holding copyright law to be a substantively valid speech restriction,
though even this is in large part true because copyright law is limited
in the powers it gives copyright owners.193 But the point of procedural
rules, such as the prior restraint doctrine, is precisely to make sure
that even substantively valid speech restrictions don’t end up
restricting speech that should remain protected.
Preliminary injunctions may be entered without a final adjudica-
tion that the speech is unprotected, and thus may restrict speech that
is not in fact infringing, frustrating free expression rather than fur-
thering it. And there’s no reason to think that applying the prior re-
straint doctrine would substantially diminish copyright law’s benefits
to the marketplace of ideas: damages remedies and permanent in-
junctions entered after a final adjudication would still be available,
and would give creators plenty of incentive.
We’re also generally skeptical of distinguishing supposedly
speech-furthering restrictions from other restrictions. Many kinds of
speech restrictions may be seen as furthering free speech values in
some way. Justice White argued that libel law furthers free speech:
libel law, he claimed, was needed in part because “virtually unre-
192. The Copyright and Patent Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is discussed in detail
infra at Part II.D.6.
193. As Jessica Litman notes, “the harmony between the First Amendment and copyright
doesn’t inhere in their essential nature; rather, it derives from accommodations and restrictions
we have built into copyright to enhance its role as an engine of free expression.” Litman, supra
note 101, at 619. See also David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary
Trademark Law: An Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We
Ought to Care, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 240 (1996) (echoing Litman’s view as to the
way in which intellectual property laws enhance free expression principles); Kreiss, supra note
32, at 6-10 (noting the tension between protecting copyrighted works and encouraging the dis-
semination of information and speech). For a stronger argument challenging the core compati-
bility of copyright and the First Amendment, see Lange, supra note 6, at 140-44 (arguing that
copyright grew out of government censorship efforts: “what comes naturally to copyright . . . is
the deliberate, if selective, suppression and advancement of speech”).
Justin Hughes has offered a First Amendment defense of copyright based on the lis-
tener’s as well as the speaker’s need for integrity, arguing that “freedom of expression is
meaningless without assurances that the expression will remain unadulterated.” Justin Hughes,
The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 359 (1988). Hughes takes as his
paradigm cases instances in which defendants have altered an author’s work in ways the author
finds objectionable, and then attributed the adulterated work to the original author. See id. at
360-65. The cases he discusses are troubling, but primarily because they involve misrepresenta-
tions as to the source of various parts of the work. Such deceptive speech may in some situa-
tions constitute a “false designation of origin” actionable under the trademark laws; whether or
not it does, we would distinguish misrepresentations about the source of speech from additions,
deletions, or changes to the speech itself.
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strained defamatory remarks about private citizens [may] discourage
them from speaking out and concerning themselves with social prob-
lems.”194 Some have argued that pornography tends to “silence” wom-
en, which might suggest that obscenity law may serve First Amend-
ment values.195 Similarly, some have argued in favor of banning racist
speech on the grounds that it silences minorities.196 Others have
claimed that restrictions on the speech of the wealthy further free
speech values by preventing well-funded speech from “drowning out”
other speech.197 Less controversially, licensing requirements for use of
a public forum serve free speech by preventing concurrent parades or
demonstrations that would interfere with each other.
Some of these arguments (for instance, the one about licensing
requirements) may justify substantive speech restrictions, and some
might not.198 But even when the arguments support substantive re-
strictions, they don’t justify exemption from the normal procedural
rules that ensure that the substantive rules are accurately applied;
and they certainly don’t justify any special suspension of the proce-
dural rules for copyright law and not for other supposedly speech-
enhancing restrictions.
6. The Copyright and Patent Clause. Unlike libel and obscenity
law, copyright laws have a specific textual hook in the Constitution:
194. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 400 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (endorsing
the view that “fascists’ effective use of defamatory attacks on their opponents” suggests that
“‘the law of libel . . . [may be] important for modern democratic survival’” (quoting David Ri-
esman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1085,
1088 (1942))).
195. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND
CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN’S EQUALITY 47-48 (1988); see also Paul E. McGreal,
Constitutional Illiteracy, 30 IND. L. REV. 693, 697 n.30 (1997) (discussing this argument).
196. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2337 & n.86 (1989). But see David F. McGowan & Ragesh K.
Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV.
825 (1991) (critiquing Matsuda’s argument in detail).
197. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN
STATE 255, 270-71 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986). But see Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech,
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 64-76 (1997) (agreeing that one
goal of the First Amendment was to ensure open and robust public discussion, but arguing that
“this was to be achieved by protecting individual liberty interests against government interfer-
ence, not through an activist government role in political debate”).
198. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension
Method, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 223 (1996) (discussing and criticizing arguments
based on the supposed tension between the Free Speech Clause and “values” flowing from
other constitutional provisions).
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Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”199 In Harper & Row, the Court
mentioned this as one reason why copyright law is a constitutionally
permissible speech restriction.200
But the existence of the congressional power can’t exempt copy-
right law from all First Amendment scrutiny. The Copyright and Pat-
ent Clause grants power to Congress, but the point of the Bill of
Rights is to restrain the federal government in the exercise of its
enumerated powers. In exercising its other powers, Congress is sub-
ject to First Amendment constraints: For instance, the government
has the enumerated power to run the post office, but this doesn’t
mean it can refuse to carry communist propaganda;201 the government
has power to regulate interstate commerce, but this doesn’t mean it
can impose content-based restrictions on the interstate distribution of
newspapers. Likewise, in exercising its copyright power, Congress is
bound by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.202 Copyright law
must be bound by the First Amendment too.
That is not to say that the presence of the Copyright and Patent
Clause is irrelevant to the First Amendment inquiry. We agree that it
would be unsound to read the First Amendment as entirely elimi-
nating the copyright power created by the Framers only two years
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
200. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); see
also Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 849 (11th Cir.
1990) (“Since the Copyright Act is the congressional implementation of a constitutional direc-
tive to encourage inventors by protecting their exclusive rights in their discoveries, copyright
interests also must be guarded under the Constitution, and injunctive relief is a common judi-
cial response to infringement of a valid copyright.”); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 15:58, at 15-87 to -88 (arguing that since “copyright pro-
tection is itself a value of constitutional dimension, vindicating the directive of the Constitu-
tion’s Copyright Clause,” injunctions should be permitted).
201. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (striking down a restric-
tion on mailing of communist advocacy); see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)
(striking down on First Amendment grounds a law, enacted pursuant to the Federal District
Clause power, prohibiting the public display of any flag, banner, or device on the grounds of
the Supreme Court); Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1639, 1649 (1993).
202. See, e.g., Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. Does, 876 F. Supp. 407 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that an ex parte seizure of supposedly infringing materials, though authorized by the
Copyright Act, was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment).
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earlier.203 The Copyright and Patent Clause does represent the Fram-
ers’ judgment that “copyright itself [can] be the engine of free expres-
sion,”204 so courts ought not, in their zeal to protect speech, eviscerate
the incentive that copyright law provides. This was a good reason for
the Harper & Row Court to conclude that copyright law is substan-
tively constitutional.
But this argument hardly shows that copyright law ought to be
free of the traditional procedural protections available in all other
First Amendment cases.205 A general ban on preliminary injunctions
wouldn’t eviscerate or even greatly diminish the incentive provided
by copyright law, just as such a ban doesn’t eviscerate libel law or ob-
scenity law; it would merely require the law to be enforced in a
slightly different way.
7. Importance of the Government Interest. The interest
promoted by copyright law—the interest in providing an incentive for
the dissemination of ideas—is, even without regard to its
constitutional status, quite important. One might even go so far as to
call it “compelling,” a term of constitutional significance.
But many speech restrictions—for instance, those aimed at pro-
tecting individual reputation, preventing harms caused by the distri-
bution of child pornography, protecting national security, and pre-
venting violent acts incited by violent advocacy—are justified by
important (perhaps even compelling) interests, too. The requirement
that speech be finally adjudicated to be unprotected before it can be
enjoined doesn’t prevent these important interests from being served;
it just requires that they be served through a certain set of proce-
dures. True, the procedures might in some cases make the process of
vindicating these interests a bit less effective. But the general First
Amendment judgment underlying the prior restraint doctrine is that
this extra burden is justified by the interest in preventing the punish-
ment of constitutionally protected speech.
203. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (“The first ten amendments and
the original Constitution were substantially contemporaneous and should be construed in pari
materia.”).
204. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
205. But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 1231, 1258 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (concluding that Harper & Row implicitly validated all the
provisions of the Copyright Act, including those providing for preliminary injunction).
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8. Irreparable Harm. Courts often stress that copyright infringe-
ments presumptively cause “irreparable injury,” harm that can’t be
remedied by an eventual damages award.206 And to a certain extent
that’s true: preventing illegal behavior is generally more effective
than is trying to compensate for the harms after they have occurred.207
But this is true for virtually all kinds of harmful speech; for some
kinds, such as libel, it’s even more true than for copyright infringe-
ment. Copyright law is aimed primarily at ensuring that authors are
economically rewarded so that they and others will continue to create
new works of authorship208—damages can generally reward authors
relatively adequately and are often not terribly hard to estimate.
Reputation, on the other hand, once sullied can never be perfectly
repaired. Damages are only a highly imperfect palliative, may be im-
possible to get from an indigent defendant,209 and in any event are
very hard to estimate, even roughly. Further, one might reasonably
contend that enriching plaintiffs is not really the point of libel law, as
it is with copyright: certainly one sees many cases of copyright owners
licensing their rights in exchange for money, while it is harder to
imagine people regularly selling others the right to defame them. Yet
despite all this, libels may not be preliminarily enjoined.
And even if the harm caused by copyright infringement really
were “irreparable,” this shouldn’t matter. The point of the prior re-
straint doctrine is that prevention of potentially harmful speech isn’t
allowed without a final judicial finding that the speech is unpro-
tected.210 This necessarily causes some harm to the government inter-
206. See, e.g., Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir.
1997).
207. We are skeptical that this is necessarily true, however, and might therefore question
the Cadence court’s conclusion that the presumption of irreparable harm can never be rebutted
in a copyright case by a showing that monetary damages would be adequate. See id. at 829.
208. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). We stress
the “primarily”—many scholars, and some countries, have argued for the primacy of
noneconomic motivations for protecting copyright owners. Still, under United States law, the
predominant justification for copyright is the incentive it creates. For further discussion, and
reference to numerous authorities, see Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric
of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 888-90 (1997).
In any case, even if copyright law is also seen as a means of protecting an author’s
feelings or reputation, this would only make clearer the analogy to libel law, where preliminary
injunctions to protect feelings or reputation are forbidden.
209. See Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Pa. 1978) (holding that a preliminary
injunction against libel was improper even though the defendant was indigent and could not
pay damages).
210. See supra Part II.B.1.
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est (and to the private plaintiff’s interest), whether it’s the interest in
protecting people’s reputations, in preventing the moral harms
caused by obscenity, or in preventing competitive injury to copyright
owners. But under the prior restraint doctrine, it’s a harm that must
be borne. It certainly is borne by libel victims; why not copyright
owners?
9. Ideas Can Be Expressed in Another Way. Copyright law,
properly applied, generally restricts expression and not ideas or facts.
Even a preliminarily enjoined speaker may be able to communicate
the gist of his message, so long as he expresses it differently enough.
Thus, some have suggested that copyright law is not a speech
restriction because it leaves open adequate alternate channels of
communication by allowing defendants to choose different words to
express their ideas.211
But obscenity law likewise restricts expression more than idea. If
a city holds up the display of a sexually suggestive movie, without
providing the Freedman v. Maryland protections,212 the filmmaker
might still be able to communicate his ideas by just cutting or sof-
tening some of the more explicit scenes. Nonetheless, the prior re-
straint doctrine applies to obscenity law; and this makes sense be-
cause, as the Court pointed out in Cohen v. California,213 “one
can[not] forbid particular [expression] without also running a sub-
stantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”214
Furthermore, while a damages award or a permanent injunction
should by definition punish or restrict only copying of expression,
preliminary injunctions may well enjoin even speech that will ulti-
mately turn out to copy only facts or ideas. This is the nature of pre-
211. See In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 918 F.2d 140, 144 (11th Cir. 1990) (dictum) (arguing
that an injunction requiring defendant to remove infringing material “does not ‘give directives
as to the content of expression,’ only the manner of expression” (quoting Goldblum v. National
Broad. Corp., 584 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1978))); Marquis, supra note 103, at 136-37. This ap-
proach apparently derives from Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), where the Court
held that the owner of a private shopping center could exclude speakers from his property, so
long as adequate public fora existed that the speakers could use. See id. at 567. It is not at all
clear to us that the “private property” analogy works well here, where the “property” involved
is intellectual rather than real (and is itself the speech at issue). See supra Part II.D.1. Nor will
it necessarily always be the case that defendants can make the same point without using the
plaintiff’s copyrighted work.
212. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
213. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
214. Id. at 26.
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liminary relief: because the test for entering a preliminary injunction
turns on a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, some frac-
tion of preliminary injunctions will eventually prove to have enjoined
speech that’s not infringing—speech that copies only facts or ideas, or
speech that’s a fair use.215 So preliminary injunctions in copyright
cases, like preliminary injunctions in libel cases, may often suppress
facts and ideas, and not just particular modes of expression.
10. “The Only Question Is Who Gets to Do the Publishing.”
Some might argue that copyright law is unlike other restrictions
because it doesn’t actually suppress speech: the expression involved
will in due course be published, but by the copyright owner and to his
financial benefit. An injunction won’t deprive the public of the
speech; it will just cause the speech to come from a different person.
As with the right of publicity, the argument would go, “the only
question is who gets to do the publishing.”216
In cases of nonliteral copying, though, this factual claim will of-
ten be wrong. Nonliteral copiers, even when they use another’s ex-
pression, are by definition creating something different from (albeit
in some ways similar to) the copyright owner’s work.217 Sometimes
the differences are quite dramatic; copying can be infringement even
when the copier adds a great deal, and thus only part of the copy is
substantially similar to the original.218 A satire of the O.J. Simpson
trial based on Dr. Seuss’s The Cat in the Hat is clearly quite different
from the original Seuss book, and yet it was preliminarily enjoined as
a likely infringement.219 The movie 12 Monkeys was vastly different
from a drawing on which the visual design of one of its scenes was
based, and yet the movie’s distribution was preliminarily enjoined as
a likely infringement.220 And when the expression is enjoined, the
215. See infra Part III.C.
216. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
217. Zacchini, from where the “only question is who gets to do the publishing” quote is
drawn, involved literal copying. Id. at 570-74.
218. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936)
(“True, much of the [defendant’s work] owes nothing to the [plaintiff’s work]; . . . but that is
entirely immaterial; it is enough that substantial parts were lifted; no plagiarist can excuse the
wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”).
219. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997); Tyler
T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, the Juice, and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody, 46 J. COPR.
SOC’Y (forthcoming 1999) (criticizing this result).
220. See Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). For similar
cases, see Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997)
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public will only see what the copyright owner is saying, not what the
would-be copier wanted to say.
What’s more, even if the copying is literal or close to it, a copy-
right injunction may well prevent the expression from reaching the
public altogether, at least for the many decades that the copyright
lasts; some copyright owners use copyright law precisely for this pur-
pose.221 The whole point of a copyright injunction, as opposed to a
suit for damages, is not merely to redistribute the profits, but to pre-
vent dissemination of defendant’s work.222 There might be good rea-
sons, in the copyright owner’s mind or even the public’s, to restrict
distribution of the new work, but it seems hard to argue that such an
injunction isn’t really a speech restriction.
11. No Need for Timeliness. Some might argue that brief,
temporary injunctions of movies or books pose little danger to free
speech because such media, unlike newspapers or demonstrations,
(concluding that a preliminary injunction may be appropriate against a television show which
portrayed portions of plaintiff’s copyrighted poster in the background for a total of 26 seconds);
Aielleen Fajardo, Holy Case of Copyright Infringement, Batman!, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 263
(1996) (discussing a sculptor’s case against the makers of Batman Forever for showing a brief
glimpse of his sculpture, displayed on a street in Los Angeles). But see Chase-Riboud v.
Dreamworks Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1259 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (refusing to enjoin the movie Amistad
days before release, both because of doubts about the plaintiff’s claim and because the balance
of hardships tipped in the defendant’s favor); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F.
Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a fleeting use of copyrighted photographs as back-
ground in the movie Seven was a fair use).
221. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1966)
(describing the trial court’s reliance on copyright law to suppress an unauthorized biography of
Howard Hughes); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the Church of Scientology could enjoin the defen-
dant in order to keep its works from being further distributed to the public); New Era Publica-
tions Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that J.D. Salinger could enjoin the defendant
from distributing a book that contained excerpts from Salinger’s private letters); Francis X.
Clines, Creator of Religious Art Prevails on ‘Devil’ Film, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998, at A5
(discussing the successful copyright suit by a sculptor against the makers of the film Devil’s Ad-
vocate, who used a similar sculpture in ways the artist found offensive); Richard Hurowitz, Sur-
viving Copyright Infringement: Fair Use of Protected Works in “Biopics,” 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 247, 247 n.2 (1998) (noting that Picasso’s heirs used copyright to prevent his works
from appearing in the film Surviving Picasso “because they did not like the film’s portrayal of
the artist”); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990) (adding new protections, albeit limited ones, that allow
artists to restrict certain behavior that they believe is prejudicial to their “honor or reputa-
tion”).
222. Cf. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573-74 (stressing that Zacchini was asking only for damages,
not an injunction).
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aren’t particularly time-sensitive: it doesn’t much matter whether you
see a movie or read a book today or a week or two later.
This is a plausible argument, and is perhaps the best defense
(though maybe still not an adequate defense) of the Court’s tolera-
tion of prescreening systems for books and movies, so long as such
systems really do create only a brief delay.223 It might justify some
preliminary injunctions in copyright cases, and perhaps even libel
cases, involving non-time-sensitive media.
But even for these injunctions, Freedman v. Maryland imposes
certain requirements which copyright injunctions don’t now satisfy—
preliminary injunctions in copyright cases can last for many months,
hardly the brief restraint that Freedman contemplates.224 And the
timeliness argument can’t justify any preliminary injunctions of more
time-sensitive publications, such as newspaper articles or television
programs or even articles in weekly magazines.
12. Tradition: “A Copyright Question, Not a Free Speech
Question.” Finally, we’ve heard some people argue that it’s a
mistake—a form of “constitutional law imperialism”—to disrupt, on
recently discovered First Amendment grounds, a balance carefully
established over 200 years. Whether preliminary injunctions should
be available in copyright cases should be seen, the argument goes, as
a copyright law question, not as a free speech question.
Constitutional law imperialism, however, isn’t our invention.
The theory of Marbury v. Madison is that all U.S. laws are subject to
the U.S. Constitution;225 and as the Court has clearly held, no
“formulae for the repression of expression” can claim “talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations.”226 Tradition alone cannot
223. See, e.g., United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 374 (1971); Blount v. Rizzi,
400 U.S. 410, 421 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). But see infra Part
IV.D for some of our criticisms of such systems.
224. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59 (“Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial
determination on the merits must . . . be limited to preservation of the status quo for the short-
est fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution.”).
225. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803).
226. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (footnotes omitted):
[W]e are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the
epithet ‘libel’ than we have to other ‘mere labels’ of state law. Like insurrection, con-
tempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have
been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitu-
tional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amend-
ment.
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prevent constitutional scrutiny, as the Court made clear with respect
to obscenity law and libel law, which had long been seen as not
“rais[ing] any Constitutional problem”227 but which were ultimately
held to be restrained by free speech principles.228 Sometimes, as in
Harper & Row, the Court will conclude that a speech restriction
passes constitutional muster; but all speech restrictions, regardless of
their historical provenance, must be tested by First Amendment
standards.
Moreover, as we discussed in Part I.B, the tradition of routinely
issuing preliminary injunctions in U.S. copyright cases is a relatively
recent one, dating back largely to the early 1900s. Even the tradition
of applying copyright law to adaptations and abridgments, as op-
posed to literal or very nearly literal copying, is mostly a creature of
the 1900s.229 This broader procedural and substantive copyright pro-
tection may in fact be justifiable, but not on the grounds that “we’ve
always done it this way, so it must be constitutional.” If copyright law
is to be exempted from the normal free speech rules, it should be be-
cause of some substantive difference between copyright and other
speech restrictions, not simply because it has not historically received
much constitutional scrutiny.
E. Against Special Pleading for Copyright
We thus see no compelling normative reason to treat copyright
differently from other speech restrictions, restrictions that are like-
wise substantively valid but that nonetheless require certain proce-
dural safeguards. And we see a good reason not to treat copyright
more favorably than other speech restraints.
The First Amendment demands sacrifices from many who ear-
nestly believe in the legitimacy of their favorite speech restrictions.
227. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1952) (“‘There are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the pro-
fane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words . . . .’” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942))), dismissed as overbroad dictum by New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964).
228. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957) (describing the constitu-
tional boundaries of unprotected obscenity, which were narrower than had historically been
applied); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (same, as to libel).
229. As late as 1908, the Supreme Court refused a permanent injunction to a copyright
plaintiff on the ground that the defendant’s work contained substantial new expression in addi-
tion to the copied material. See Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908).
See generally Lemley, supra note 208, at 886-87.
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Exempting restrictions such as copyright law—which is largely identi-
fied with rich and powerful interests—from the “normal” rules of the
First Amendment throws the legitimacy of free speech protection
into question. Partisans of restrictions on bigoted speech, for in-
stance, routinely defend the restrictions they propose by pointing out
that not all speech restrictions are looked upon with disfavor;230 while
we disagree with their substantive proposals, they are right to de-
mand that existing exceptions to the First Amendment get the same
scrutiny as the proposed ones. Likewise, libel victims who are denied
preliminary injunctions in their lawsuits against publishers deserve an
explanation for why the same publishers routinely get preliminary
injunctions in their lawsuits against supposed infringers.
Any special preference for copyright law must thus be justified
by some substantial difference between copyright and other speech
restrictions. Where, as here, no such difference exists, favoritism for a
particular kind of speech restriction risks corroding public respect for
First Amendment law more generally. And, ironically, publishers and
producers—the very people who often benefit from the way copy-
right law now ignores First Amendment protections—have the most
to lose from any corrosion of First Amendment protection outside
copyright.231
230. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Ten Arguments Against Hate-Speech Regula-
tion: How Valid?, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 475, 484 (1996):
Powerful actors like government agencies, the writers’ lobby, industries, and so on
have always been successful at coining free speech ‘exceptions’ to suit their inter-
est—copyright, false advertising, words of threat, defamation, libel, plagiarism, words
of monopoly, and many others. But the strength of the interest behind these excep-
tions seems no less than that of a black undergraduate subjected to vicious abuse
while walking late at night on campus.
See also Martin E. Lee, The Price We Pay: The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda
and Pornography, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP., Oct. 4, 1996, at 17 (book review):
Noting routine exceptions to free speech absolutism (copyright, trademark and such)
that hew to business interests, the essays cite studies that document the heavy toll in-
flicted by the multibillion dollar porn industry, as it profits from a kind of hate
speech that degrades women and children. . . . This book provides a sober rejoinder
to cliche-ridden thinking by highlighting the profound power imbalance and social
inequities that dim the luster of the First Amendment.
See also Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analy-
sis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871, 892 (1994)
(“Perhaps . . . in twenty or fifty years we will look upon hate speech rules with the same equa-
nimity with which we now view defamation, forgery, obscenity, copyright, and dozens of other
exceptions to the free speech principle, and wonder why in the late twentieth century we re-
sisted them so strongly.”).
231. We are indebted to Doug Laycock for this point.
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III. DOES PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE MAKE SENSE?
A. Questioning Prior Restraint Doctrine
Thus, under orthodox prior restraint doctrine, many (though, as
Part IV describes, not all) preliminary injunctions in copyright cases
are unconstitutional. But could it be that the law of copyright pre-
liminary injunctions is right, and prior restraint doctrine is wrong?
Why not tolerate some preliminary restraints on speech, even
given that such restraints will sometimes restrict speech that will ulti-
mately be found constitutionally protected? The restriction on pro-
tected speech will only be temporary, the argument goes, and will be
for a good cause: without the restriction, the underlying government
interest, be it defending national security, protecting reputation, or
stimulating creative expression, wouldn’t be furthered as effectively.
Sure, under a prior restraint regime, some books or movies or news-
paper stories will have to be delayed until their truthfulness or ab-
sence of infringement is ultimately adjudicated; but as a result, libel
law and copyright law, both worthy rules, will be better vindicated.
We think this is a credible argument. Prior restraint doctrine
does cause real harms to government interests, and needs a more
thorough defense than the Court has given for it in the past.232 And
certainly the copyright experience shows that in at least one area of
the law prior restraints are commonplace, even uncontroversial, and
yet the sky hasn’t fallen.
Nonetheless, we think the ban on prior restraints, including pre-
liminary injunctions, makes practical as well as doctrinal sense. The
free speech costs of preliminary injunctions generally do exceed the
benefits—especially in copyright cases.
B. Free Speech Cost of Delay
To begin with, the temporary delay created by preliminary in-
junctions is still a significant speech restriction: the time between the
issuance of a preliminary injunction and a decision on the merits is
rarely less than a year, and often more. When the work is tied to a
particular current event, such as an election campaign, trial, scandal,
232. For challenges to the orthodoxy of prior restraint law, see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 140-69 (1991); Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free
Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1353 n.98 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First
Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 725-30 (1978).
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or policy debate, this cost is dramatic—by the time the injunction is
lifted, the work might have become largely pointless. Other works,
too, may reflect quickly-changing trends and public interests: delay-
ing the release of a movie or a musical work by a year, for example,
may deprive it of a large part of its productive lifespan, and may cost
millions of dollars.
Furthermore, the collateral bar rule precludes the defendant
from disobeying the injunction and then attacking its constitutionality
in court later.233 If a court enjoins you, you can be jailed or fined for
violating the injunction, even if a court later finds that the injunction
was improperly issued. So the injunction is in fact likely to delay the
speech: defendants can’t be expected to make a judgment that this
injunction really is worth disobeying in order to get the information
out.234 And the delay may well become permanent; many cases settle
on terms favorable to the plaintiff once a preliminary injunction has
been issued.235
C. The Risk That Preliminary Injunctions Will Restrict Speech That
Ultimately Proves Protected
The risk of delay is, of course, relevant primarily for those works
that are ultimately found to be protected by the First Amendment. If
preliminary review almost always correctly predicted the result on
the merits, then relatively little protected speech would be lost.
But why should we expect this to happen? For a preliminary in-
junction, a court need not conclude that the plaintiff is 95% likely to
succeed on the merits, or even 51% likely. The threshold likelihood
of success varies depending on the other equitable factors, such as the
balance of hardships; if a court concludes that the balance of hard-
ships tips far enough in the plaintiff’s favor, it need only find
“sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them fair
233. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
234. Scot Powe notes that the threat of criminal prosecution did not stop the New York
Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers, but that a lower court injunction did prevent pub-
lication while the injunction was in effect. See POWE, supra note 232, at 153.
235. See, e.g., JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 7.02[2][a], at 7-7 (1997):
[S]ecuring an injunction early in a case often leads to prompt resolution of the entire
matter. The defendant, constrained by the risk of contempt and looking down a long
and expensive road toward a trial that he’s likely to lose, will feel strongly motivated
to settle, sometimes accepting business terms that would not be available to the
plaintiff from a court.
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grounds for litigation,”236 or, in the Seventh Circuit, a “better than
negligible chance that [the plaintiff] will succeed on [the merits].”237
And recall that in copyright cases, courts generally presume that the
balance of hardships and the public interest tip in the plaintiff’s fa-
vor.238
When even a low probability of success on the merits can yield a
preliminary injunction, we should expect that in many cases even
speech that would ultimately be found protected will be preliminarily
enjoined. If a court concludes, for instance, that a plaintiff should get
a preliminary injunction even though he has only a 33% chance of
success on the merits (perhaps because the balance of hardships fa-
vors him), this in effect represents a judgment that it is better that
two constitutionally protected works be temporarily enjoined than
one copyright infringement remain unenjoined. Perhaps this is a
sound judgment as a matter of pure copyright law (though even there
one might question the wisdom of the tradeoff239), but it is particu-
larly troubling from a First Amendment perspective.
Moreover, temporary restraining orders may be issued on only a
few hours of reflection, and preliminary injunctions must generally be
issued within ten days of the TRO.240 The judge has limited time for
contemplation. The parties have limited time for briefing. Prepara-
tion for a typical copyright trial, even a bench trial, generally takes
many months; the arguments about why one work isn’t substantially
similar in its expression to another, or about why it’s a fair use of an-
other, are often sophisticated and fact-intensive, and must be crafted
with a good deal of thought and effort. Unless we believe that the
lion’s share of that time is wasted—in which case we should just make
preliminary relief automatically final, and save everyone a lot of time
and money—it seems likely that omitting this effort will mean that
236. Richard Feiner & Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co., 98 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1996).
237. Publications Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996). At least one
court has applied this standard to issue a preliminary injunction even though the plaintiff
seemed unlikely to prevail on the merits. See Art Line, Inc. v. Universal Design Collections,
Inc., 966 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
238. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
239. There is a large literature on the importance not only of granting incentives to original
authors, but also of encouraging the dissemination of new ideas and expression and allowing
change and improvement to existing works. See, e.g., Kreiss, supra note 32 (discussing the copy-
right value of access and dissemination); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997) (emphasizing the need for
others to build on the works of original authors, and citing sources).
240. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
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preliminary review will often reach different results than would be
reached on final judgment.241
The decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is also of-
ten explicitly driven by the court’s goal of “preservation of the status
quo,”242 which in copyright cases tends to refer to the status quo ex-
isting before the defendant’s publication. Thus, where the ultimate
result is in doubt, many judges may often lean in favor of an injunc-
tion; even if they don’t explicitly cite this factor, the status-quo-
preserving culture of preliminary injunction law may push them in
this direction. This in effect further lowers the threshold likelihood of
success needed for a preliminary injunction, thus increasing the num-
ber of cases in which a preliminary injunction will restrict speech that
ultimately proves to be protected.
We do not claim that courts will always be ready to grant pre-
liminary injunctions in close cases. Some judges may be hesitant to
issue such injunctions: courts sometimes suggest that the “prelimi-
nary injunction is an extraordinary remedy . . . which is at best used
sparingly, if at all.”243 But others may take seriously the notion that
even a “better than negligible” chance of success on the merits is
enough for an injunction if the balance of hardships weighs suffi-
ciently in the plaintiff’s favor. This is the nature of discretionary
remedies—some courts will exercise their discretion sparingly and
others generously. We claim only that in some considerable number
of cases, though of course not in all cases or in all courtrooms, pre-
liminary injunctions will lead to the preliminary restraint of speech
that is quite likely to ultimately prove constitutionally protected.
241. Ideally, we would empirically study the degree to which decisions at the preliminary
injunction stage match the ultimate decision on the merits, but we know no way to do this re-
liably and cost-effectively, especially given the number of preliminary injunction decisions that
are unreported and the number of cases that settle shortly after the preliminary injunction.
242. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965); see also CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v.
Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 48 F.3d 618, 620 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying this standard to trade-
mark infringement); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (applying this standard to copyright infringement); Value
Group, Inc. v. Mendham Lake Estates, 800 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (D.N.J. 1992) (same); Cheever
v. Academy Chicago, Ltd., 690 F. Supp. 281, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
243. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1523 (D. Colo. 1995); cf.
Financial Control Assocs., Inc. v. Equity Builders, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1103, 1113 (D. Kan. 1992)
(“The movant has the burden to establish by clear proof its right to a preliminary injunction.”).
This mantra, however, is more often breached than observed. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 50, § 14.06[A], at 14-112 to -113 (“[P]reliminary injunctions are sometimes reflex-
ively labeled an ‘extraordinary remedy’; in actual practice, nonetheless, their issuance is actu-
ally quite ordinary, even commonplace.”) (footnotes omitted).
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D. The Dangers of Judicial Discretion
The deeply discretionary nature of the preliminary injunction
balance also exacerbates the First Amendment difficulty in another
way. One central tenet of First Amendment law is that speech restric-
tions should rest on standards that are as definite and nondiscretion-
ary as possible.244 And while some uncertainties and judgment calls
are of course inevitable, the Court has recognized that greater discre-
tion brings a greater chance that even seemingly viewpoint-neutral
speech restrictions will be enforced in viewpoint-discriminatory
ways.245
Copyright’s fair use test and substantial similarity of expression
test are already rather vague,246 but adding the preliminary injunction
balance adds to the problem. The preliminary injunction framework
requires a judge to guess the likelihood of success on the vague mer-
its tests, and then also to “weigh” this likelihood against the balance
of hardships (itself a rather vague factor). Even conscientious judges
may find it hard to make this judgment uninfluenced by their sense of
the value or fairness or correctness of the defendant’s speech and of
the plaintiff’s speech.
First Amendment law has almost entirely avoided such explicit
balancing, “weigh all the factors” tests. Though tests such as the ones
for obscenity and libel are hardly the brightest of lines, they are at
least attempts to create more precise rules. The balancing, as Melville
Nimmer pointed out, is generally done at the time the categories are
defined, rather than on a case-by-case basis,247 so judgment calls are
244. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1988);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
245. See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
246. Cf. Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression
Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175 (1990) (arguing
that the idea-expression dichotomy is indeterminate); Netanel, supra note 103, at 303-04
(arguing that “the copyright law safeguards that have made First Amendment defenses seem
overly intrusive and unnecessary have in fact been only sporadically effective in protecting
First Amendment values,” in part because “while the idea/expression dichotomy makes sense
in principle, it is notoriously malleable and indeterminate”); id. at 381 (describing how
“prevailing uncertainties” in copyright law interfere with the creation of certain kinds of new
works); Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the
Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 777-78 (1993) (citing sources); Alfred C. Yen, A First
Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total
Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989) (explaining how the vagueness of the idea-
expression dichotomy can deter constitutionally protected speech).
247. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE
FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.02, at 2-10 (1984).
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normally made more or less openly by the Supreme Court, rather
than implicitly by many lower court judges exercising their largely
unexplained discretion.
The main First Amendment test that involves explicit, uncon-
strained balancing is the Pickering standard, applicable where the
government, acting as employer, imposes restrictions on what its own
employees say on matters of public concern.248 The doctrine there
specifically calls for “balanc[ing] . . . the interests of the [employee],
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern” against
“the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees.”249 The
Court has acknowledged that “such particularized balancing is diffi-
cult,”250 and this seems to be an understatement. From all we’ve seen
of the lower court decisions, the test is essentially indeterminate in all
but the easiest cases. This indeterminacy is troubling even when the
government is acting as employer, a context in which the Court prop-
erly accepts greater speech restrictions; it is especially improper for
rules imposed by the government acting as sovereign.251
E. The Comparatively Small Marginal Benefit of Preliminary
Injunctions Relative to Damages
The argument against the prior restraint doctrine is that prelimi-
nary injunctions are necessary to adequately vindicate the govern-
ment interest. We might really need preliminary injunctions in (for
instance) libel cases, because people’s reputations would otherwise
be dramatically underprotected. After all, once a libel is published,
there’s no way to restore a reputation; damages are an extremely
poor substitute. Likewise for preliminary injunctions in national se-
curity cases.
248. What government employees say on matters of private concern is entirely unprotected
against government-as-employer retaliation. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-49 (1983).
This part of the government employee speech test is a rule, not a balancing test; regardless of
whether it’s a correct rule, our focus in the text is on the balancing test used for public-concern
speech.
249. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); accord Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
250. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
251. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-75 (1994) (plurality opinion) (discussing dif-
ferences in the First Amendment tests applied when the government is acting as sovereign and
when the government is acting as employer). For elaboration of this distinction, see Robert C.
Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
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The Court has disagreed with this argument even in the libel and
national security contexts,252 but we need not go into this broader
question here, because the pro-injunction argument has less force in
copyright cases than it does in the other cases where preliminary in-
junctions are generally forbidden. Copyright law is primarily in-
tended to provide a financial incentive that encourages people to
contribute to the marketplace of ideas.253 Allowing damages awards
and permanent injunctions but disallowing preliminary injunctions
would not dramatically undercut this goal.
Copyright owners would still be rewarded fairly well by damages
awards. Perhaps they’d be somewhat less rewarded than they would
be if they could get preliminary injunctions, but there’s no reason to
think that the difference would be especially great. Of course dam-
ages, including consequential damages such as the loss of indirect
business opportunities, would often not be easy to determine, but no
more so in copyright than in any other field. Damages awards are
thus a less restrictive—because focused on actual infringers, rather
than merely possible infringers—but pretty much equally effective
alternative to preliminary injunctions.254
In copyright preliminary injunction cases, courts often say that
denying the injunction would cause “irreparable harm,” but this is a
legal fiction, not a judgment about economic reality.255 The theory is
that copyright is property, property rules are supposed to give one an
entitlement to exclusive use, not just compensation for use, and
therefore an injunction is the proper way to vindicate the interest.
The irreparable harm judgment doesn’t rest on any particularized
finding that awarding damages would inadequately compensate the
copyright owner, or would substantially interfere with the govern-
ment interest in providing people an incentive to create.
It may be, of course, that damages will be hard to calculate be-
cause the goods in question are unique. Arguments of this sort are of-
252. See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the Court’s cases, and supra Part II.B.2 for a
rough justification of their soundness.
253. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
254. Cf., e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990) (stressing that, as a general
rule, content-based substantive speech restrictions are unconstitutional when there are less re-
strictive alternatives available).
255. Courts may be erroneously borrowing the “irreparable harm” concept from the per-
manent injunction context—where irreparable harm is definitionally assumed when property is
involved—into the preliminary injunction context, where a higher quantum of injury had theo-
retically been required. See LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at 111.
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ten used to bolster the property rule nature of intellectual property
rights.256 But while this may justify permanent injunctions, it doesn’t
necessarily justify preliminary injunctions, especially where speech is
at stake.257 Courts make difficult valuation decisions in all sorts of
cases. They must make them even when granting preliminary injunc-
tions in copyright suits, because such injunctions must be accompa-
nied by a bond to compensate the defendant in case the injunction is
found to have been erroneously entered.258 This calculation is as im-
portant and as difficult as the calculation of the ultimate damages; the
bond is itself a damages measure, albeit one aimed at compensating
the defendant rather than the plaintiff, and the amount of the bond
also affects the course of litigation by influencing the settlement dis-
cussions. If courts are going to engage in the difficult process of
valuation anyway, it’s hard to see why they can do it for purposes of
calculating bonds but not damages.
We respect the law’s judgment that copyright is a form of prop-
erty, and we sympathize with the outrage that people might feel when
something that they’ve been told is theirs is nonetheless used by oth-
ers without their consent, even if they are eventually compensated in
some measure. But it’s important to recognize that intellectual prop-
erty rights, unlike other property rights, are a form of content-based,
government-imposed speech restriction. The mere fact that the re-
striction is denominated a “property right” should not exempt it from
conventional First Amendment scrutiny,259 or justify government ac-
tion, such as a preliminary injunction, that may end up restricting
speech which ultimately proves to be constitutionally protected.260
This is especially so where, as a practical matter, damages would be a
fairly effective remedy.
The primary instance where damages are not a relatively effec-
tive remedy is where copyright law is used not to assure economic
reward but to protect the copyright owner’s “moral right” to control
256. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 50, at 515 (“[Intellectual property rights] are exceed-
ingly difficult to value . . . . partly because, by statutory definition, each of these rights is in
some sense unique.”).
257. See LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at 111.
258. See, e.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.
1994) (reviewing a dispute over the amount that the plaintiff had been forced to post as a pre-
liminary injunction bond to compensate the defendant after the injunction proved to have been
wrongly issued).
259. See supra Part II.D.1.
260. See infra Part III.C.
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how his work is used. A copyright owner might be outraged by hav-
ing his work adapted in a certain way, or by having it linked with
some other work, cause, or person, or (in case of unpublished works)
by having it published at all.261 Damages here would probably do little
to palliate this outrage caused by loss of artistic control.
But we don’t believe that the interest in protecting owners’ sup-
posed moral rights to control their works is weighty enough to justify
preliminary injunctions. We’re not even sure that, standing alone, it
would be weighty enough to justify subsequent punishment. Recall
that Harper & Row accepted copyright law largely because of the
economic incentive that it provides for creative expression, and thus
because of its contribution to the marketplace of ideas;262 the moral
rights rationale has not been similarly validated by the Court as a jus-
tification for restricting speech, and we doubt that it should be.263 Free
speech requires us to suffer considerable indignities, for instance
from statements of opinion that are injurious to our reputations, or
from accurate statements of fact that are nonetheless unfair or emo-
tionally distressing.264
Indeed, in many areas copyright law itself refuses to give owners
categorical control over their works. Congress has chosen to enact
261. For example, in Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), J.D.
Salinger objected to the publication of a book containing excerpts from his private letters.
Similarly, in Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995), the copyright holders objected to the Internet publication of L. Ron
Hubbard’s unpublished works. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), the
copyright holders of Roy Orbison’s song Oh Pretty Woman objected to 2 Live Crew’s adapta-
tion of the song. And in Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), Disney
objected to the use of its characters in counterculture comic books that dealt with sex and
drugs.
We refer here primarily to traditional copyright law’s ability to protect an artist’s
moral rights, not to the specific and narrow moral rights provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
262. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). For a
further discussion of Harper & Row, see supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
263. The interest may be stronger where the adaptation involves a misrepresentation—that
is, where the defendant passes off an adulterated work as the original. See Hughes, The Phi-
losophy of Intellectual Property, supra note 193, at 358-65; Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellec-
tual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming February
1999). But the moral rights go beyond misrepresentations, and prohibit alteration even if it is
clear who has written what.
264. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990) (holding that state-
ments of opinion that don’t contain implicit false factual assertions are protected); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-52, 56 (1988) (holding that emotionally distressing
statements are constitutionally protected unless they fall into an established First Amendment
exception, at least when the statements are about public figures).
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only a limited and highly qualified moral rights law.265 The fair use
doctrine has been interpreted to protect unauthorized parodies of a
copyright owner’s works, despite the “moral” objection the owner
likely has to the publication of such a parody.266 Similarly, the copy-
right owner has no right to prevent a newspaper from publishing a
devastating review of her new book, or even from using snippets of
the book in the review to bolster the critique.267
In any event, even where certain speech restrictions, such as re-
strictions on false and defamatory statements of fact, are tolerated,
procedural protections like the ban on preliminary injunctions are re-
quired. We don’t see why authorial dignity is so important that it’s
entitled to special protection where other dignity interests are not.
F. Free Speech Benefit Incidental to Allowing Temporary
Publication Even of Infringing Material
What if a court refuses to enter a preliminary injunction on prior
restraint grounds, but the speech is ultimately found to be unpro-
tected? In libel and obscenity cases, we might in retrospect wish that
the speech had been preliminarily enjoined. False statements of fact
and obscenity are theoretically of no constitutional value,268 so the
fact that they could be distributed before the final adjudication on
the merits is all minus and no plus.
But works that build on another’s expression, such as The Na-
tion’s excerpt of the Ford memoirs,269 actually do have constitutional
value even if they infringe a copyright. They are new works that may
enlighten or entertain in ways the originals didn’t; their original,
noninfringing components often dwarf the infringing snippet, such as
in the movie cases, where full-length, original feature films have been
preliminarily enjoined because they included a shot of a copyrighted
265. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994) (providing moral rights protection only to a limited class
of paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs, and only against destruction, inten-
tional distortion, physical mutilation, and misattribution).
266. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (allowing 2 Live Crew’s
parody of Roy Orbison’s song Oh Pretty Woman).
267. See, e.g., id. at 591-92 (“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills
demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”)
(citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Biting criticism suppresses demand;
copyright infringement usurps it.”)).
268. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (false statements of fact); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity).
269. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
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chair, poster, or sculpture in one scene.270 Tolerating dissemination of
these potentially infringing works before the final adjudication on the
merits increases the range of material available to the public. While
withholding a preliminary injunction may impose some cost on the
government interest underlying copyright law (albeit a cost substan-
tially mitigated by the availability of damages), there is at least some
countervailing benefit to the marketplace of ideas.
This is not to say that copyright law is substantively unsound.
The social benefit of allowing damages awards and even permanent
injunctions in copyright cases may justify the free speech cost of re-
stricting creative adaptations. But the fact that the creative adapta-
tions, even if ultimately found to be infringing, have constitutional
value diminishes the aggregate social damage done by the continuing
infringement, and therefore weakens the argument that this speech
must be suppressed before a final determination that it really is in-
fringing.
G. Conclusion
It thus seems to us that, at least with respect to preliminary in-
junctions in copyright cases, the traditional ban on prior restraints is
sound. Allowing preliminary injunctions imposes more free speech
costs, and creates fewer copyright benefits, than might at first appear.
Other situations might present closer calls. For instance, in libel
cases, where damages are indeed a grossly inadequate substitute for
prevention of publication, the prior restraint doctrine does dramati-
cally burden the government interest. We think that on the whole the
law is nonetheless right not to allow preliminary injunctions even in
libel cases, but this is at least a tougher question. Likewise, in at least
some narrow category of national security contexts, some sort of pre-
liminary injunctions are inevitable; the court in United States v. Pro-
gressive, Inc.271 may have been right to enjoin publication of H-bomb
secrets,272 though we don’t wish to debate that issue here.
270. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. The “balance of hardships” prong may
sometimes prevent such injunctions, but many courts generally ignore the balance of hardships
once the plaintiff shows a likelihood of success on the merits. See supra notes 59-62 and accom-
panying text.
271. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
272. But see L.A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 55 (1990)
(describing the case and suggesting that the preliminary injunction was less appropriate than
many might think).
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Copyright law, though, presents a comparatively weak case for
preliminary injunctions and the concomitant suppression of speech
that ultimately proves to be protected. It is thus all the more remark-
able that courts have applied prior restraint doctrine in the libel, ob-
scenity, and even national security contexts, but not to copyright law.
IV. MODIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REMEDIES IN LIGHT OF
FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE
We thus believe that the First Amendment requires some sig-
nificant modifications to the law of preliminary injunctions in intel-
lectual property cases. Ex parte TROs should almost always be for-
bidden;273 preliminary injunctions should likewise generally be
prohibited in cases involving nonliteral copying.274 Still, a consider-
able range of injunctive relief may remain permissible.
A. Injunctions in Non-Speech Cases
Most obviously, our argument applies only when the work falls
within the constitutional definition of “speech.” Certain types of
functional expressive works may not qualify as speech at all. Repro-
duction and distribution of computer object code, for instance, could
be preliminarily enjoined with no First Amendment difficulty.275
B. Permanent Injunctions
As we discuss above, we don’t believe that prior restraint doc-
trine prohibits (or should prohibit) permanent injunctions of unpro-
tected speech, entered after a full consideration of the merits,
whether at trial or on summary judgment.276 There’s some contro-
versy about this, especially in libel cases, where some courts refuse to
enter even permanent injunctions.277 Still, we think that permanent
273. See supra Part II.C.
274. But see infra Part IV.C (discussing the exception for cases involving literal copying).
275. This assumes that copying and distribution of executable object code, as opposed to
source code, is not “speech.” If we’re wrong in assuming this, then even the reproduction of
object code would be problematic. Cf. infra notes 395-402 and accompanying text (discussing
an analogous issue in the patent context).
Likewise, creating a new building based on a protected architectural work is in our
view probably sufficiently nonexpressive that a preliminary injunction against this conduct
wouldn’t be a prior restraint.
276. See supra Part II.B.1.
277. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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injunctions are not a materially greater burden on speech than is the
risk of financial or even criminal liability; and if one opposes both
permanent injunctions and damages liability as undue restraints on
free speech, then one’s quarrel is with the Supreme Court’s recogni-
tion of a copyright exception in Harper & Row,278 not with our par-
ticular proposal. Permanent injunctions against copyright infringe-
ment should thus be constitutionally permissible.279
Our approach is therefore consistent with the traditional view
that intellectual property should be protected by means of a property
rule (a presumptive entitlement to injunctive relief) rather than a li-
ability rule.280 We would simply require a final showing of entitlement
before the property rule is invoked.
C. Preliminary Injunctions in Piracy and Other “Easy” Cases
The danger of preliminary injunctions is that they may tempo-
rarily suppress speech that ultimately proves to be protected. If a
judge can, at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing, make a
reliable finding that the speech is constitutionally unprotected, rather
than just that it might be unprotected, then there should be no prob-
lem with issuing the preliminary injunction.
This could happen whenever the defendant has made identical
or nearly identical copies of the plaintiff’s works, and there is no
claim of fair use but only some other copyright defense (such as that
278. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985).
279. Of course, the injunction should not enjoin speech that isn’t infringing. For instance, an
injunction barring any use of plaintiff’s work, even use only of ideas and not expression, or uses
that are fair, would be wrong as a constitutional matter as well as wrong under substantive
copyright law.
280. See supra text following note 255. On the economic propriety of the choice between
the two, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972) (arguing that
transaction costs and valuation difficulties influence the choice between property and liability
rules); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facili-
tate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1092-94 (1995) (arguing that a divided entitlement
rule may facilitate preference revelation during bargaining); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621,
631 (1998) (arguing that overdivided property entitlements may inhibit the efficient use of
property). On the implications of this work for intellectual property, see Robert P. Merges,
Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organiza-
tions, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1391-93 (1996) (arguing that legal property rules can support the
private creation of liability rules where efficient); Lemley, supra note 239, at 1061-65 (arguing
that where efficient licensing does not occur, property rules must be allocated so as to achieve
optimal improvement).
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defendant has a supposedly valid license, or that plaintiff’s copyright
wasn’t properly renewed, or something along those lines). Most cases
alleging outright piracy, as well as most claims that the defendant has
exceeded the boundaries of its license, would fall within this category.
In this situation, the defendant’s conduct is not constitutionally
protected speech, even if the defendant ultimately proves that it’s not
a copyright infringement. Harper & Row, as we read it, divides uses
of another’s work into two areas: on the one hand, use of another’s
idea or facts, or fair use of another’s expression, which is constitu-
tionally protected; on the other hand, use of another’s expression
that’s not a fair use, which falls within the “copyright exception” to
the First Amendment.281 So long as Congress and the courts restrict
speech that’s within this copyright exception, there’s no First
Amendment problem.282 And while the First Amendment imposes
certain limits on copyright law—the requirement of copying, the
idea-expression dichotomy, and some aspects of the fair use doc-
trine—it does not constitutionalize every nuance of the Copyright
Act.
Thus, Congress could, for instance, abolish the registration re-
quirement for a lawsuit, or bring some lapsed copyrights back into
private hands,283 without violating the First Amendment.284 Likewise,
courts can, pursuant to the Copyright Act’s authorization,285 prelimi-
narily enjoin speech that clearly falls within the “copyright excep-
tion” without violating the First Amendment. So long as there’s a re-
liable determination on the merits that the speech does fall within the
exception—rather than just a finding that the speech might fall within
the exception—courts may act even based on only a tentative deter-
mination of other, constitutionally irrelevant, factors related to the
copyright claim. This may inadvertently lead to temporary suppres-
sion of speech that ultimately proves to be noninfringing, but it won’t
281. See id.
282. Unless, of course, the restriction is improperly content- or viewpoint-based, such as a
special copyright rule that provides different copyright protection for, say, sexually suggestive
speech, religious speech, racist speech, or communist speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 387-88 (1992) (holding that content-based regulations are presumptively invalid).
283. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104A (1994).
284. There might be other constitutional objections, however. See Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye
to All That—A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Dis-
course of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595, 606-08 (1996)
(arguing that section 104A is inconsistent with the grant of power in the Copyright and Patent
Clause).
285. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994).
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lead to temporary suppression of speech that is constitutionally pro-
tected.
Under this approach, the initial determination that the defen-
dant’s speech is constitutionally unprotected will take place without a
jury trial, but First Amendment law generally doesn’t require that
speech restrictions be ratified by a jury—just that they be made after
a full consideration on the merits. For instance, petty criminal speech
restrictions, those that result in a maximum sentence of no more than
six months in jail, may be imposed without a jury;286 in civil free
speech cases where there’s no disputed issue of material fact, dam-
ages can be awarded without a jury; and given that the Seventh
Amendment isn’t incorporated against the states,287 a state could con-
ceivably dispense with juries altogether in civil cases, even ones in-
volving free speech, without violating the First Amendment.
This category of “easy cases” isn’t necessarily limited to ones in
which no speech-related argument is raised by the defendant. If a
counterfeiter claims fair use in a situation where it’s clearly not appli-
cable, courts may still be able to dispose of the fair use claim without
a full trial using the normal standards for pretrial decisionmaking:
judgment on the pleadings, partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability, and the like. The First Amendment doesn’t preclude sum-
mary judgment in libel cases,288 and it shouldn’t in copyright cases ei-
ther.
Of course, not all cases will fit into this category. Where the de-
fendant raises a credible argument worthy of trial that he didn’t copy
the work, that he copied only the unprotectable elements, or that his
copying was protected by fair use, he is entitled to a full hearing on
the merits, and courts should not impose a preliminary injunction be-
fore that hearing. But the fact that many of the most obvious cases of
copyright infringement won’t implicate the prior restraint rule at all
should make our proposal less worrisome to copyright owners.
286. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
287. See, e.g., Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La.), aff’d without opinion
sub nom. Hill v. McKeithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972).
288. Summary judgment for the plaintiff in a libel case is rather rare, especially if the plain-
tiff is a public figure and the question therefore focuses on the defendant’s mental state, but it is
theoretically possible. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Orlowski
v. Koroleski, 651 N.Y.S.2d 137 (App. Div. 1996).
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D. Applying the Freedman Exception to Copyright Law?
Freedman v. Maryland289 suggests that there’s some room for pre-
liminary injunctions against possibly protected speech, so long as the
injunctions create only relatively slight delay, something on the order
of a few days or weeks.290 Copyright law today doesn’t give any such
assurance of rapid final adjudication on the merits, but perhaps Con-
gress could implement some special fast-track procedure.291
We are skeptical about this proposal, in part because we are
skeptical about Freedman itself. As we argue above, even relatively
short delays can be significant.292 We doubt that it would be constitu-
tional, for instance, to require that all movies, or even all movies
about which libel complaints have been filed, be prescreened for pos-
sible libel, even if there were a guarantee of final adjudication on the
merits within weeks. And in copyright cases, unlike libel cases, dam-
ages do seem to be a practically sufficient remedy. Especially in light
of this, we believe that giving a special speech-restricting privilege to
copyright owners that is denied to other victims of speech (such as
people who are libeled) tends to corrode public respect for First
Amendment law.293
Nonetheless, realizing that our broader proposal is quite a sub-
stantial step, we insist on at least half a loaf: at the very least, if pre-
liminary injunctions are allowed, there must be some guarantee that
the defendants can get a truly prompt final adjudication on the mer-
its. Perhaps such a fast-track solution is politically difficult—courts
after all have to adjudicate many other important cases294—but
289. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
290. See id. at 59 (“Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on
the merits must . . . be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period
compatible with sound judicial resolution.”). For a more detailed discussion of the Freedman
exception, see supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
291. Courts have discretion to order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and
consolidated with the hearing of the application for a preliminary injunction. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 65(a)(2); see also Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 668 (D. Minn. 1986)
(applying the rule). Combining the preliminary injunction hearing with a full trial on the merits
should satisfy the requirements of the First Amendment, though it may present Seventh
Amendment problems if one of the parties requests a jury trial. See Feltner v. Columbia Pic-
tures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279 (1998) (holding that the Seventh Amendment requires
right to jury trial in copyright cases whenever damages are sought).
292. See supra Part III.B.
293. See supra Part II.E.
294. Congress has not generally set up prior restraint schemes with fast-track review in
other areas of the law, despite the Court’s conclusion in Freedman that some such schemes
would be valid. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
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Freedman suggests that the First Amendment requires at least this
much.
Time-sensitive works, be they timely news magazine articles,
books, or movies, ought not be preliminarily enjoinable even under
Freedman; the free speech cost here would be too great. To our
knowledge, Freedman has in practice not been applied to time-
sensitive works at all, and we think it should not be extended to them.
E. Requiring a Finding of High Probability of Success on the Merits
Finally, even if preliminary injunctions in copyright cases are too
deeply entrenched to be dislodged by the above arguments, at the
very least they should only be available when there’s a truly high
probability of success on the merits. Non-speech conduct may prop-
erly be preliminarily enjoined based on a finding of “sufficiently seri-
ous questions going to the merits”295 or a “better than negligible
chance” of success on the merits;296 when a court is enjoining such
conduct, the presumption may properly favor “preservation of the
status quo.”297 But a court should not enjoin speech unless it has con-
siderably greater confidence that the speech is in fact constitutionally
unprotected.298
Thus, when a court concludes that the defendant’s expression is
probably not substantially similar to the plaintiff’s expression, or is
probably a fair use, the court should never issue a preliminary injunc-
tion, even if the balance of hardships tilts in the plaintiff’s favor.
Likewise when the court concludes that the case is genuinely close:
erroneously failing to enjoin speech is better than erroneously en-
joining speech, especially when erroneous failure to enjoin speech is
remediable by a damages award.299
We suggest that at the very least courts should borrow from libel
law, where the Court has required that actual malice be proved by
295. Richard Feiner & Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co., 98 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1996).
296. Publications Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996).
297. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
298. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 113, § 12-36, at 1047 (suggesting that prior restraints may be
permissible where the standard of proof on the merits is raised sufficiently).
299. We use “error” here in the sense of a determination at the preliminary injunction stage
that is different from the final determination on the merits. Technically, this need not be an
error at all; under the traditional preliminary injunction balance, a court may correctly enter a
preliminary injunction, because of the likelihood of success on the merits and the balance of the
hardships, but then correctly dissolve it when the final decision on the merits is reached. But
the speech will have been suppressed based on a legal claim which turned out to be erroneous.
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clear and convincing evidence.300 This higher quantum of proof re-
flects the principle that oversuppression of speech is considerably
worse than underprotection of the government interest. If this judg-
ment is true with regard to whether the plaintiff can recover at all in
libel cases, it is even more appropriate when the only question is what
sort of relief—a preliminary injunction, or damages plus a permanent
injunction—the plaintiff can get in copyright cases. Thus, a court
should not enter a preliminary injunction unless it is clearly con-
vinced that the speech falls within the copyright exception (i.e., that
it’s substantially similar to the plaintiff’s expression and is not a fair
use).301
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
If we’re right that preliminary injunctions in copyright cases re-
strict speech, what does that say about other types of intellectual
property cases? After all, virtually all intellectual property regimes
rely heavily on “property rules” and enforce injunctions—even pre-
liminary injunctions—as a matter of course.302 Do these injunctions
also violate the First Amendment?
The answer to this question is complex, and turns on the par-
ticular characteristics of each intellectual property right. We’ll try to
sketch the outlines of each inquiry below, considering whether laws
within each of these fields restrict speech, whether the speech restric-
tion is substantively valid, and whether the law involves prior re-
straints. But we stress that what follows is indeed only a sketch, much
less detailed than our analysis of copyright law. We hope others will
build on it to provide a more detailed treatment.
A. Trademarks
Injunctions are the most important remedy in trademark cases.
This largely follows from the rationale for trademark law, which is
300. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (holding that clear and con-
vincing evidence is required in public figure libel cases); cf. People v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana
Theater, 180 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that clear and convincing evidence is
required in civil obscenity injunction cases).
301. Cf. Oakes, supra note 103, at 992-97 (suggesting that courts should pay more attention
to traditional equitable factors when deciding whether to grant copyright injunctions, rather
than simply presuming irreparable harm).
302. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 50, at 297-98.
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rooted in consumer protection.303 If consumers are deceived by the
defendant’s use of a mark that is confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s
mark, awarding damages to the plaintiff won’t alleviate that confu-
sion—only preventing the defendant from using the mark at all will
serve that purpose. Similarly, trademarks can rarely coexist if con-
sumer confusion results. Thus, one side or the other will frequently
have to give up the mark entirely at the conclusion of the case; in-
junctive relief arguably prevents wasted investment by defendants in
doomed trademarks.304 Consonant with this policy goal, injunctive re-
lief is standard in trademark cases.305
At the same time, the burden placed on trademark owners in
preliminary injunction cases is somewhat higher than in copyright
cases. Most courts require a significant showing of likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits.306 While courts will normally presume that the
plaintiff faces irreparable injury upon a showing of likely consumer
confusion,307 and while the public interest in avoiding confusion often
favors the plaintiff,308 courts do balance the hardships to each party,
303. Commentators and courts have increasingly articulated a “property” rationale for
trademarks. See Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?,
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 715 (1993). But trademarks do not bear many of the indicia of real
property, or even other forms of intellectual property. Rather, they have traditionally been
thought of as a means of preventing consumers from being deceived. See MERGES ET AL., supra
note 50, at 524-26.
304. See George Washington Mint, Inc. v. Washington Mint, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 255, 263
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (contending that a preliminary injunction can be “an act of kindness” to the
defendant, if issued before the defendant can invest substantial resources in an infringing
mark).
305. Some have suggested that the proper goal of trademark law is not protecting consum-
ers at all, but rather protecting investments in brand quality and reputation. See, e.g., MERGES
ET AL., supra note 50, at 527-30 (discussing the economic rationales for trademark protection).
To the extent that this is true, injunctive relief should be less important, since incentives to in-
vest in brand quality might be preserved by damage awards rather than injunctive relief.
306. See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION § 30:32 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS] (collecting cases
from different circuits).
307. See id. § 30:47 (collecting cases); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 79 (2d
Cir. 1985) (“Likelihood of confusion is itself strong evidence that in the absence of an injunc-
tion [the plaintiff] might face irreparable harm.”); Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Cam-
era Co., Inc., 451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1971) (“Where there is . . . high probability of confu-
sion, injury irreparable in the sense that it may not be fully compensable in damages almost
inevitably follows.”).
308. See, e.g., Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Independent Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197-
98 (3d Cir. 1990). But see Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Lab., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 505
(8th Cir. 1987) (observing that the public’s interest in competition and low prices weighed
against an injunction). See generally 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 306, § 30:52.
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and will refuse preliminary injunctions when the equities so require.309
Further, the inquiry into the merits is a detailed one, and a greater
showing is required to support an injunction that compels affirmative
conduct than one that merely maintains the status quo.310
As to free speech issues, some cases have dismissed prior re-
straint arguments on the grounds that the trademark laws do not re-
strict protected speech at all, because the use of a mark is not a
speech act, or is not subject to the normal protections afforded
speech.311 Other courts have concluded that while trademark laws do
restrict speech, they do so in a “content-neutral” manner and are
therefore permissible.312 These courts have apparently confused view-
point-neutrality with content-neutrality.313 Still other courts have sim-
ply assumed that trademarks are property interests, and that such
property interests must trump the constitutional guarantee of free
speech.314 The First Amendment argument cannot be disposed of so
easily, however, for reasons explained above in Part II.D.1.
309. See 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 306, § 30:51 (noting that an injunction
may be inappropriate where the resulting financial loss to the defendant “significantly out-
weighs” any damage to the plaintiff).
310. See id. § 30:50.
311. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1440
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the defendant’s use of the “Planned Parenthood” mark could be
prevented by preliminary injunction because such use was “not part of a communicative mes-
sage”). Even the McCarthy treatise says that the rule against prior restraints will not normally
apply to trademark cases, though it doesn’t explain why. See 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS,
supra note 306, § 31:142. We discuss one possible explanation—that the prior restraint rule
doesn’t apply to commercial speech—below. See infra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
312. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 n.11 (9th Cir.
1997) (“reject[ing] outright” the prior restraint argument, and citing cases rejecting the proposi-
tion that trademark laws violate the First Amendment); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (asserting that a preliminary injunction
is “content neutral” and “therefore does not arouse the fears that trigger the application of
constitutional ‘prior restraint’ principles”). The Dr. Seuss opinion didn’t even consider whether
the preliminary injunction it granted on the copyright claim in the same case might be an un-
constitutional prior restraint. See Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1403 n.11.
313. See supra Part II.D.3.
314. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184,
1188 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized
rights in intellectual property.”); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 12 n.2 (D.D.C.
1988) (ruling that the First Amendment “gives no right to steal another’s statutorily protected
intellectual property”); Fund for Community Progress v. United Way of Southeastern New
England, 695 A.2d 517, 523 (R.I. 1997) (holding that “there is no speech interest involved in
the use of another’s private property for purposes of solicitation”).
The Supreme Court seemed to take this approach in San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 532 (1987) (“[W]hen a word acquires
value as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill and money by an entity,
VOLOKH FOR PRINTER.DOC 02/23/99 7:57 PM
1998] PRIOR RESTRAINTS IN COPYRIGHT 219
Most trademark cases involve “commercial speech”—that is,
speech which proposes (directly or indirectly) a commercial transac-
tion.315 Commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection,
albeit to a lesser degree than political speech.316 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has called the free flow of commercial information
“indispensable” to the economy.317 Since trademarks are a form of
commercial speech entitled to at least some First Amendment pro-
tection, and since a trademark injunction prevents a defendant from
using a particular term or phrase, it makes little sense to argue that it
doesn’t restrict speech at all.318
Further, a significant minority of trademark cases do not involve
commercial speech by defendants at all, but rather traditional speech
entitled to full protection. Cases in this category include certain
that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word.”) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted), though only after stressing that the law involved in that case—a quasi-
trademark statute—applied predominantly to use of a quasi-trademark in commercial speech,
and would not be “applied to infringe significantly on noncommercial speech rights.” Id. at 535-
36 & n.15. For criticism of the Court’s conclusion in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, see JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 145-48 (1996); Gordon, supra note 163, at 1583-91. Boyle quite rea-
sonably points out that the constitutional protection given to flag burning in Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989), seems at odds with the result in San Francisco Arts & Athletics. See
BOYLE, supra, at 147-48. While the Supreme Court is right to suggest that trademark law is
substantively constitutional, at least within boundaries, see San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483
U.S. at 536, it has not addressed what those boundaries are, and therefore invocation of the
Court’s language is not terribly helpful in resolving the conflict.
315. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989). For discussions of the char-
acteristic elements of commercial speech, see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 67 n.14 (1983) (declining to answer whether reference to a particular product is a necessary
element of commercial speech); 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 306, § 31:139, at
31-197 (“[A] firm’s trademark is the most important element of commercial speech . . . .”). On
the difficulty of defining commercial speech, see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid
of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 638-48 (1990); David F. McGowan, Comment, A
Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 357, 381-410 (1990). Note that how-
ever commercial speech is defined, it cannot be so broad as to encompass any speech which is
made for an ultimate purpose that is commercial or for-profit. See Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). The content of a
book, for example, is not “commercial speech” regardless of how much money the publisher
will make from it.
316. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24 (observing that, while
commercial speech is protected, the differences between commercial speech and “other forms”
suggest that “a different degree of protection is necessary”); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) (same).
317. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
318. Cf. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding in a copyright case that the defendant’s advertisements con-
veyed “useful information which is protected by the First Amendment”).
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parodies of trademarks, political or socially-directed advertisements,
the use of the plaintiff’s marks outside of advertisements to truthfully
refer to the plaintiff’s product (so-called “non-trademark use”),
product reviews, uses in fiction, commentary or film, and the mer-
chandising of a trademark as a good in itself.319 In none of these cases
is the trademark itself used to propose a commercial transaction;
rather, it is used as the subject of speech. Still other cases may involve
trade dress or product configurations in which the “trademark” is
both the product itself and the advertisement for that product. In
such cases, use of the trademark may be both commercial and non-
commercial speech.320
There are persuasive reasons to permit political and social uses
of trademarks. With the importance of brand image in today’s econ-
omy, trademarks “form an important part of the public dialog on
economic and social issues.”321 Rochelle Dreyfuss and others have
noted that modern expression frequently requires the use of trade-
marks in their role as social referents—whether or not the product
itself is being discussed directly.322 As Judge Kozinski has noted,
“[m]uch useful social and commercial discourse would be all but im-
319. For a discussion of the use of trademarks in political and social speech, see Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming May 1999).
320. Think of the picture of a building and skyline at issue in Rock & Roll Hall of Fame &
Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Productions, 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998). A postcard, photograph, or
poster that’s displayed in a store is both a speech product (akin to a book or a newspaper),
which is noncommercial speech, and an advertisement for itself, which is commercial speech.
321. 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 306, § 31:146; see also L.L. Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]rademarks offer a particularly
powerful means of conjuring up the image of their owners and thus become an important, per-
haps at times indispensable, part of the public vocabulary.” (quoting Denicola, supra note 179,
at 195-96)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Lemley, supra note 319.
322. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 424 (1990) (observing that “Betty Crocker has
replaced Hestia in the public consciousness”); see also Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams It-
self to be American: Reflections on the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark
Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L.J. 523, 528-31 (1997) (arguing that
trademarks and insignia, instead of identifying the source or origin of goods, are increasingly
being used as status symbols); Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of
the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603 (1984) (discussing the in-
creased use of logos and trademarks on consumer goods); Mira Wilkins, The Neglected Intangi-
ble Asset: The Influence of the Trademark on the Rise of the Modern Corporation, 34 BUS. HIST.
66, 87-88 (1992) (discussing the impact of trademark law on economic growth); Tara J. Gold-
smith, Note, What’s Wrong with this Picture? When the Lanham Act Clashes with Artistic Ex-
pression, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 858-80 (1997) (arguing that
works of art that contain trademarks or brand names should be protected as artistic expression
under the First Amendment).
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possible if speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit
every time they made reference to a person, company or product by
using its trademark.”323 And as the scope of trademark protection ex-
pands to all aspects of the appearance of the product itself and its
packaging, more and more trademark cases actually involve non-
commercial speech, at least in part.324
 The strongest constitutional justification for trademark laws is
that, properly construed, they prevent only commercial speech that is
likely to cause consumer confusion, and that false or misleading
commercial speech can be restricted.325 The Supreme Court took this
323. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992);
accord Yankee Publ’g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(holding that the First Amendment is implicated by expressive, rather than commercial, uses of
a trademark).
324. On this expansion, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Dis-
tinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471 (1997). An obvious example is
Romm Art Creations, Ltd. v. Simcha International, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992),
where the court held that a distributor could be prevented under trademark law from selling
paintings resembling the famous Women and Cafes series by Itzchak Tarkay. See id. at 1134-35.
325. A number of courts have taken this approach. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting First Amendment parody de-
fense where the court thought the parody was likely to confuse consumers); E. & J. Gallo Win-
ery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that misleading and con-
fusing commercial speech can be restricted under the First Amendment); see also Denicola,
supra note 179, at 165 (“Protection is normally limited to instances in which there is a threat-
ened appropriation or injury to goodwill arising through consumer confusion.”); Alex Kozinski,
Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 973 (1993) (suggesting that trademark law
should be limited to the prevention of confusion in the marketplace). Some courts, however,
have proven a little too willing to find that a parody is likely to confuse consumers. See, e.g.,
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 198-200, 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the use of the name “Velvet Elvis” by a bar was likely to confuse consumers as to sponsorship,
and rejecting a parody defense); Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d at 776 (concluding that consumers
would think “Michelob Oily” parody actually involved a new kind of beer).
It is worth noting that the argument that false or misleading speech is unprotected—
the one most commonly used to defend trademark laws against First Amendment attack—
offers no support for dilution statutes such as the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1996) (providing that the owner of a mark shall be entitled to an in-
junction against an infringing user “if such use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark”). The substantive constitutionality of dilu-
tion statutes is beyond the scope of this Article. For discussions of the issue, see Megan E.
Gray, Defending Against a Dilution Claim: A Practitioner’s Guide, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
205, 225-27 (1996); Malla Pollack, Time to Dilute the Dilution Statute and What Not to Do
When Opposing Legislation, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE SOC’Y 519, 540-41 (1996);
Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Stat-
ute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 446 (1994); Marla J. Kaplan, Note, Antidilution
Statutes and the First Amendment, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 1139 (1992).
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view in Friedman v. Rogers.326 This may mean that trademark law is
substantively constitutional, so long as it is linked to evidence that the
defendant’s mark is in fact misleading, and so long as the defendant’s
speech really is commercial.327
By itself, this characterization doesn’t do away with the prior re-
straint problem. Just as in copyright law, the danger addressed by
prior restraint doctrine is that speech will be silenced before a court
can make a full determination on the merits that the speech is in-
fringing. One certainly couldn’t get a preliminary injunction against
the publication of a book on the grounds that the contents of the
book might eventually be demonstrated at trial to be false or even li-
belous and therefore constitutionally unprotected. Indeed, the highly
fact-specific nature of trademark infringement analysis, which neces-
sarily focuses on what the ordinary consumer thinks, makes it par-
ticularly important that courts not leap to the conclusion that a
trademark is being infringed without a detailed consideration of the
evidence.328 Unless courts can effectively conduct the final trial on the
merits at the preliminary injunction hearing, we do not see how they
326. 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (holding that a state’s interest in protecting the public from con-
fusion is sufficient to withstand a First Amendment challenge).
327. In practice, some trademark parody cases involving social and political messages seem
to turn on whether the parody was successful—that is, on whether consumers were actually
confused, or whether they understood that the use of the plaintiff’s trademark was a parody.
See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 505 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that the use of character named “Spa’am” didn’t infringe the Spam trademark because
confusion was unlikely); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding that a “noncommercial parody” challenged under antidilution statute was sub-
ject to First Amendment protection); cf. LightHawk, the Environmental Air Force v. Robert-
son, 812 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (holding, in a non-trademark case, that use of
Smokey the Bear in a political satire was not likely to cause confusion and was subject to First
Amendment protection). But see Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d at 776 (suggesting in dictum that the
First Amendment might require courts to tolerate confusion if necessary to convey the political
message of a parody). By and large, we think this approach is reasonable. But see Steven M.
Perez, Comment, Confronting Biased Treatment of Trademark Parody Under the Lanham Act,
44 EMORY L.J. 1451 (1995) (arguing that likelihood-of-confusion analysis in trademark parody
cases is too unpredictable to be consistent with the First Amendment).
328. Some courts have acknowledged this prior restraint problem. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the
risk of confusion “is outweighed by the public interest in free expression” and that the district
court “unjustifiably impose[d] the drastic remedy of a prepublication injunction upon the cover
of a literary parody”); Pocket Books, Inc. v. Dell Publ’g Co., Inc., 267 N.Y.S.2d 269, 273-74
(Sup. Ct. 1966) (reaching the same result in an unfair competition action).
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can make this determination with sufficient certainty to satisfy the
prior restraint rule.329
The Court has suggested in cautious dictum that the rule against
prior restraints may not apply to commercial speech at all.330 There
may be something to this distinction, though the courts have been
uneven in applying it.331 If it’s true that prior restraints against com-
329. See Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Neither we
nor the district court can conclude as a matter of law that [the] parody does or does not confuse
the purchasing public. Too many disputed facts require a trial for resolution.”). While not all
cases will involve factual disputes about consumer confusion (counterfeiting cases may be a
notable exception), many will.
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S.
522 (1987), the Court upheld a preliminary injunction in a quasi-trademark case without serious
consideration of the prior restraint problem. But see Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678
(1994) (plurality opinion) (cautioning that “cases cannot be read as foreclosing an argument
that they never dealt with”); Miller v. California Pac. Med. Ctr., 991 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir.
1993) (invoking the “venerable principle” that a court is not bound by a prior decision that
failed to address an issue the later court finds persuasive).
330. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (noting that different circumstances
“may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints” in commercial speech
cases (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976))); see also Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1204
(11th Cir. 1985) (interpreting these decisions as meaning that “commercial speech seldom im-
plicates the traditional concerns underlying the prior restraint doctrine”). In Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the Court suggested
that the Commission might impose a “system of previewing advertising campaigns to insure
that they will not defeat conservation policy.” Id. at 571 n.13. Whether this prescreening policy
would have to be accompanied by the sorts of procedural safeguards that the rule against prior
restraints otherwise requires was not addressed by the Court.
331. Administrative agencies impose injunctions against commercial speech in various cir-
cumstances without courts raising prior restraint concerns. The Federal Trade Commission and
the Securities and Exchange Commission enjoin deceptive speech, see FTC v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (affirming an injunction based on past
deceptive statements); SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the SEC
can revoke an individual’s registration as an investment adviser and prohibit him from pub-
lishing an investment newsletter), rev’d on other grounds, 472 U.S. 181 (1985); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385, 391-92 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the FTC may require prior
substantiation of product performance claims after finding a past claim to have been false),
though not all of these restrictions occur before a final determination on the merits. State bar
associations regulate lawyer advertising by requiring ads to be submitted in advance for ap-
proval, a classic form of prior restraint. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 382 (1977)
(recognizing that the regulation of attorney advertising was subject to the First Amendment);
cf. Fargo Women’s Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 182 (N.D. 1986) (upholding
preliminary injunction against deceptive advertising by medical clinic).
On the other hand, some cases have flatly rejected a distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech for purposes of the rule against prior restraints. See New York
Magazine v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1998):
[W]e see no reason why the requirement of procedural safeguards should be relaxed
whether speech is commercial or not. . . . [T]he difficulty of the question alone con-
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mercial speech are permissible, this would dispose of the prior re-
straint problem in some trademark cases.332 But not all trademark
cases can be resolved in this way. Even if trademark law can properly
reach noncommercial speech, a preliminary injunction against such
speech seems to us to be an unlawful prior restraint.333
In short, trademark law is substantively constitutional, at least so
long as it is limited to cases of consumer confusion. But it may suffer
the same prior restraint problem as copyright law. And at the very
least, some trademark preliminary injunctions—such as those re-
stricting noncommercial speech—cannot pass constitutional muster.
B. Rights of Publicity
The right of publicity derives from the common law tort of inva-
sion of privacy by appropriation of likeness.334 The publicity tort
grants a potentially sweeping right to plaintiffs, making it unlawful to
appropriate the name, likeness or identity of another for commercial
vinces us that the requirement of procedural safeguards in a system of prior re-
straints should not be loosened even in the context of commercial speech.
See also In re Search of Kitty’s East, 905 F.2d 1367, 1371 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
Supreme Court has not distinguished between political and commercial speech in judicial re-
view of prior restraint cases); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 676 F.2d at 399 n.31 (“The doctrinal ques-
tion whether prior restraint analysis is properly applicable to any commercial speech question
remains open.”) (citations omitted).
A number of trademark cases involving commercial speech have applied the rule
against prior restraints. See, e.g., Consumers Union v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044,
1052-53 (2d Cir. 1983) (striking down preliminary injunction); Better Bus. Bureau v. Medical
Dirs., Inc., 681 F.2d 397, 404-05 (5th Cir. 1982) (modifying overly broad injunction); see also
William W. Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on Commer-
cial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635 (1996) (discussing the First Amendment, commercial
speech and trademark law).
332. Alternatively, some courts have suggested that prior restraints against commercial
speech are still troubling, but should be subject to less exacting scrutiny than restraints on core
protected speech, just as substantive evaluation of the two types of speech differs. See Benefi-
cial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1976) (concluding that a prior restraint must be
“reasonably necessary” to achieve the remedial aim, and tailored to that aim).
333. Where speech involving trademarks is both commercial and noncommercial speech, at
the very least a preliminary injunction would have to be tailored to restrict only the advertising
or marketing effects of the speech, and not the underlying speech itself. Thus, we can imagine a
preliminary injunction against a photograph like the one in Gentile that restricted the display or
packaging of the photograph, but not one that prevented it from being sold at all. See Rock &
Roll Hall of Fame & Museum v. Gentile, 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998).
334. On the origins of the tort, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
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advantage.335 “Identity” has been interpreted broadly; imitations of
the plaintiff’s voice,336 pictures of cars similar to the one the plaintiff
drives,337 and even the portrayal of robots that remind people of the
plaintiff338 have all been held to appropriate the plaintiff’s identity.
The plaintiff need not be famous, or even known at all; anyone whose
likeness is used can sue under the right of publicity.339 The tort gener-
ally does not extend to the use of a plaintiff’s personal attributes in
traditional speech products, such as books or movies, whether factual
or fictional, even when the products are sold commercially.340 Rather,
it generally covers only advertisements and merchandising, such as T-
shirts, coffee mugs, or busts depicting or referring to the plaintiff.341
As with trademark law, some courts and commentators have as-
sumed that limiting the publicity right to commercial speech solves
the First Amendment problem, since commercial speech is not enti-
tled to full First Amendment protection.342 But as Judge Kozinski
noted in his White v. Samsung dissent, “less protected means pro-
tected nonetheless.”343 Commercial uses of someone’s likeness are
“speech” subject to First Amendment protection, and in many cases
the speech will have clear political or social content that would be sti-
fled by application of the right of publicity. Indeed, White itself is an
335. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977); see also Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen a distinctive voice of a professional singer is
widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers . . . have com-
mitted a tort in California.”). For a discussion of the diverse rationales behind the right of pub-
licity, see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993).
336. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler, 849 F.2d at
463.
337. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974).
338. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
339. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995).
340. See id. § 47 & cmt. c; see also Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
341. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 & cmt. b (1995). We speak
here only of advertisements for non-speech products, such as cars or video recorders. If a
speech product uses someone’s name or likeness, advertisements for that speech product can
generally likewise use that person’s name or likeness. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News,
Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 643 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a newspaper could feature its own
article on Joe Montana in advertisements without violating Montana’s right of publicity);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. a (1995).
342. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11.6[C]
(1998) (listing and discussing cases).
343. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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example. White involved a humorous parody of the set of the game
show Wheel of Fortune in 2012 A.D., in which host Vanna White had
been replaced by a robot in a blonde wig. The court’s conclusion that
because the parody took place in an advertisement it wasn’t protect-
able speech flies in the face of First Amendment doctrine.344
Further, the right of publicity doesn’t arise only in the context of
commercial speech. The diminished protection afforded commercial
speech is generally limited to commercial advertising; certainly the
fact that an item is sold commercially doesn’t make it commercial
speech, or else most newspapers, magazines, and books would fall
into this less protected category.345 The courts, though, have found
right of publicity violations in some noncommercial uses of a plain-
tiff’s image. For instance, while sculptures—such as busts of Martin
Luther King, Jr.—are generally seen as core protected speech, the
King estate won a right of publicity case against the distributors of
such sculptures.346 Paintings, photographs, and even inscriptions on T-
shirts are generally seen as core protected speech,347 but they too may
infringe the right of publicity.348
344. See White, 989 F.2d at 1519-20 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (criticizing the panel’s conclusion as inconsistent with the First Amendment). For other
examples of uses for “commercial advantage” that nonetheless convey a political or social mes-
sage, see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players’ Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that parody baseball cards are protected speech); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15
F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a novel about a fictional character recognizable as
the plaintiff was protected speech).
345. See supra note 315.
346. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
347. See Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is no ques-
tion that the T-shirts are a medium of expression prima facie protected by the free-speech
clause of the First Amendment, and they do not lose their protection by being sold rather than
given away.”); Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that merchandise which exhibits protected expression is protected speech); cf. Lake-
wood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 & 768 (1988) (holding that the act of
selling protected works is itself protected speech).
348. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. b (1995) (“An unau-
thorized appropriation of another’s name or likeness for use on posters, buttons, or other
memorabilia is . . . ordinarily actionable as an infringement of the right of publicity.”); Wendt v.
Host Int’l, Inc. 125 F.3d 806, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that licensees of “Cheers” televi-
sion show could violate the right of publicity by using robots that looked like characters from
the show in “Cheers” theme bars); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir.
1978); (holding that a poster depicting Elvis Presley infringed the Presley estate’s right of pub-
licity) Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding
that T-shirts depicting band logos violated the right of publicity), aff’d on other grounds, 735
F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1984). In our view, the sort of “decor speech” at issue in Wendt doesn’t fit
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Indeed, from a constitutional perspective, the right of publicity is
significantly more troubling than trademark or even defamation law.
The goal of both trademark and defamation law is to identify and
suppress false speech about a person or product which may mislead
the public. By contrast, nothing in the right of publicity requires that
the punished speech be false or misleading.349 No one would have
thought that the robot in the Samsung ad was Vanna White, or even
that she authorized the parody. Instead, White is given the right to
control the circumstances in which others can portray her, discuss
her, or even conjure up the idea of her,350 radical stuff in a country
which prides itself on promoting robust, open debate in the press and
among the public. The speech-restrictive potential of the right of
publicity goes much further than that of trademark law, or even libel
law, and it may mean that the doctrine as a whole is substantively un-
constitutional, at least to noncommercial speech but perhaps even as
to commercial speech. The First Amendment argument is especially
strong in states that apply the right of publicity to merchandising as
well as to ads, because merchandise itself is not commercial speech as
the Court has defined the term.
In the right of publicity context, courts have sometimes been
willing to acknowledge the First Amendment conflict,351 and in par-
within the traditional definition of commercial speech, because it doesn’t propose a commercial
transaction.
349. To be sure, some appropriations of the plaintiff’s name or likeness may mislead the
public, as where Tom Waits or Bette Midler are wrongly thought to be endorsing commercial
products. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988). But if such confusion in fact results, trademark and
unfair competition law provide a sufficient remedy. And courts have applied the right of pub-
licity even where the statements at issue are entirely true, and indeed helpful to consumers.
See, e.g., Nature’s Way Prods., Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1990)
(holding that the right of publicity precluded truthful advertisement that the plaintiff had de-
veloped the defendant’s recipe, without considering the First Amendment implications).
350. Cf. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100 (characterizing the right of publicity as a plaintiff’s
“personal property right . . . to control the use of his identity”).
351. The general First Amendment issue was discussed in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), albeit only with respect to a particular strand of the
right of publicity (the right to exclusive control over broadcasts of a performer’s entire act). For
detailed discussions of the First Amendment problems raised by the right of publicity that do
not focus on prior restraints, see Barbara A. Burnett, The Property Right of Publicity and the
First Amendment: Popular Culture and the Commercial Persona, 3 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 171
(1990); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can’t Take That Away From Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public
Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L.J. 37 (1997); Roberta Rosen-
thal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule
Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47 (1994); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First
Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983);
VOLOKH FOR PRINTER.DOC 02/23/99 7:57 PM
228 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:147
ticular the dangers of prior restraint.352 To be sure, judicial treatment
of the problem has been uneven. Some right of publicity cases have
granted preliminary injunctions against imitation or appropriation
without much consideration of the First Amendment.353 These cases
largely focus attention on the difficulty of compensating reputational
injury with damages354—the precise argument that has proven unper-
suasive in the libel context.355 But other cases apply the rule against
prior restraints to claims based in privacy and publicity.356 The result
is a rather puzzling mix of precedents, with no clear doctrinal line
separating those cases in which preliminary injunctions are granted
from those in which the prior restraint rule is applied.357
For cases that apply the right of publicity to noncommercial
speech, the proper outcome seems relatively clear: whether or not the
right is substantively constitutional, preliminary injunctions should be
considered unlawful prior restraints. For commercial speech cases,
the problem is harder. If the Court concludes that the prior restraint
doctrine does not apply at all to commercial speech, preliminary in-
junctions may continue (assuming the right of publicity is determined
Edward C. Wilde, The Scope of Liability Under California’s Right of Publicity Statutes: Civil
Code Sections 990 and 3344, 5 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 167 (1998); Edgar Sargent, Comment,
Right of Publicity Tarnishment and the First Amendment, 73 WASH. L. REV. 223 (1998).
352. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 972-73
(10th Cir. 1996) (“[E]levating the right of publicity above the right to free expression would
likely prevent distribution of the parody trading cards. This would . . . also have a chilling effect
upon future celebrity parodies.”); Page v. Something Weird Video, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1196 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) (finding that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s likeness was protected by the First
Amendment).
353. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); Bi-Rite Enters. v.
Bruce Miner Poster Co., 616 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mass. 1984), aff’d, 757 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1985); Ali
v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Aguilar v. Ragusa, 572 N.Y.S.2d 164 (App.
Div. 1991); Reilly v. Rapperswill Corp., 377 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div. 1975); Rosemont Enters.
v. Choppy Prods., 347 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
354. See, e.g., Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 729 (“Such difficulty in determining monetary dam-
ages . . . satisfactorily establishes irreparable injury for . . . preliminary equitable relief.”).
 355. See supra Part II.D.8.
356. See New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 131-32 (2d Cir.
1998); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1353 (1st Cir. 1986); Jones v. Turner, 23
Media L. Rep. 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Taylor v. National Broad. Co., 22 Media L. Rep. 2433,
2436-39 (Cal. Super. 1994); Rosemont Enters. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 380 N.Y.S.2d 839, 843
(Sup. Ct. 1975). For arguments by commentators, see Darren F. Farrington, Note, Should the
First Amendment Protect Against Right of Publicity Infringement Actions Where the Media is
the Merchandiser? Say It Ain’t So, Joe, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 779,
785-89 (1997).
357. Roberta Kwall describes the interaction between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment as an area of “massive confusion.” Kwall, supra note 351, at 48.
VOLOKH FOR PRINTER.DOC 02/23/99 7:57 PM
1998] PRIOR RESTRAINTS IN COPYRIGHT 229
to be substantively constitutional). But if commercial speech is ever
to be protected by the rule against prior restraints, the right of pub-
licity seems a good case for it.
C. Trade Secrets
State (and more recently federal)358 trade secret laws protect the
owners of valuable confidential information against the
“misappropriation” of that information.359 The definition of “trade
secret” is extremely broad, encompassing virtually every sort of in-
formation that can be both valuable and secret. But misappropriation
is limited to either (1) acquisition by improper means or (2) use or
disclosure in violation of a confidential relationship.360 Independent
discovery, independent creation, and even “reverse engineering” a
publicly available product are all permissible under trade secret
law.361
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides that “[a]ctual or threat-
ened misappropriation may be enjoined,”362 and preliminary injunc-
tive relief is quite common in trade secret cases.363 In part this stems
from the fragility of trade secret protection—public disclosure for-
ever destroys the secret,364 so the harm from unauthorized disclosure
is “irreparable” in a sense absent in most copyright or trademark
cases.365 Nonetheless, courts in trade secret cases apply the traditional
multifactor test in determining whether preliminary injunctive relief
is appropriate, and (unlike in copyright cases) give some teeth to
each of the requirements.366
358. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110
Stat.) 3488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (Supp. II 1996)).
359. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985). The Uniform Act has been enacted in 41
jurisdictions as of this writing. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 50, at 32.
360. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.
361. See generally MERGES ET AL., supra note 50, at 75.
362. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2.
363. See, e.g., SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1263-64 (3d Cir. 1985);
Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1455-62 (M.D.N.C. 1996); KLM Royal Dutch Air-
lines, N.V. v. deWit, 415 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
364. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(holding that information posted on the Internet becomes part of the public domain).
365. See CPG Prods. Corp. v. Mego Corp., 502 F. Supp. 42, 45 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (granting a
temporary restraining order to prevent imminent disclosure).
366. See, e.g., Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 357-58 (3d
Cir. 1980) (noting importance of detailed rather than conclusory analysis of the public interest
factor); Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405, 1422-38 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
(giving a detailed analysis of all four factors); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
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The conflict between the First Amendment and trade secret law
is less direct than that between the First Amendment and copyright
law. This largely results from the limited set of things trade secret law
defines as “misappropriation.” Some acts of misappropriation—the
mere acquisition of a secret by improper means, or the use of infor-
mation without authorization (for example to design a new prod-
uct)—may not involve restrictions on speech at all. Restricting disclo-
sure of a secret does limit speech, but there the limitation could
perhaps be justified on substantive constitutional grounds because
the disclosure occurred in breach of an existing contractual relation-
ship.367 Courts may enforce contracts not to speak through damage
awards368 and maybe even through permanent injunctions; this should
validate trade secret cases filed against people bound by confidenti-
ality agreements.
Still, preliminary injunctive relief may potentially run afoul of
prior restraint doctrine in three sets of trade secret cases. First, publi-
cation of a trade secret by a party who isn’t bound by the contract
might be constitutionally protected even against a damages judg-
ment, and certainly ought to be protected against a preliminary in-
junction. The interest of the trade secret owner in getting such an in-
junction is likely to be strong, since the secret itself may be destroyed
by the publication; but of course the same could have been said about
the United States interest in blocking publication of the Pentagon
COMPETITION § 44(2) (1995) (detailing additional factors to consider). Professor Milgrim, in
his treatise on trade secret law, notes:
A trade secret preliminary injunction is typically issued only if there is a reasonable
certainty that plaintiff will prevail in the ultimate disposition of the controversy, and
that in the absence of the preliminary injunction plaintiff risks irreparable injury. . . .
In those circuits where the public interest has to be evaluated, it must be closely
analyzed and may not be simply resolved on a conclusory basis.
3 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 14.01[1], at 14-2 to 14-17 (1996)
(citations omitted).
367. In fact, the relationship need only be “confidential,” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433, 437 (1990), but virtually all confidential relationships in trade
secret cases are based either on the existence of an actual written contract, or on an agreement
implied by the court from the circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 41 at 471-73 (1995); POOLEY, supra note 235, § 6.03[2], at 6-21 to 6-25.
368. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that a journalist’s
agreement to keep a source secret was enforceable by suit for damages against the journalist).
For an argument that enforcing a contract not to disclose a trade secret does not violate public
policy, see Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 300-03 (1998).
VOLOKH FOR PRINTER.DOC 02/23/99 7:57 PM
1998] PRIOR RESTRAINTS IN COPYRIGHT 231
Papers.369 Nonetheless, courts can’t order newspapers not to publish
materials, whether the Pentagon Papers or the formula for Coca-
Cola, even if the materials were leaked by someone (such as Daniel
Ellsberg) who had a duty to keep them private. Some courts have in
fact rejected trade secret injunctions on free speech grounds, though
the cases are not entirely consistent.370
Second, even a preliminary injunction against a party who is
supposedly bound by a confidentiality contract normally would be an
unconstitutional prior restraint, for the same reasons we gave in the
copyright discussion. Even if one can punish or enjoin speech based
on a finding that the speaker promised not to speak, the prior re-
straint doctrine should prevent injunctions based only on a finding
that the speaker might have promised not to speak. As with copy-
right, there might be some exceptions similar to the ones we dis-
cussed in Part IV: Perhaps a preliminary injunction might issue when
there’s no serious dispute about the existence of the contract and the
369. Likewise, as we discuss in Part II.D.8 supra, even though the publication of a libel can
irremediably hurt someone’s reputation, libels can’t be preliminarily enjoined.
370. In CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994), the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the broadcast of a videotape of its meat packing operations on a number of
theories. One of its arguments was that showing the videotape would disclose its trade secrets.
See id. at 1316. Justice Blackmun stayed a preliminary injunction, noting that “[s]ubsequent
civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior restraints, ordinarily are the appropriate sanc-
tion for calculated defamation or other misdeeds in the First Amendment context.” Id. at 1318.
In another case, the Oregon Supreme Court struck down as a prior restraint a secrecy order
imposed by the trial court to protect the trade secret once the trial began. See Oregon ex rel.
Sports Management News, Inc. v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304, 1309-10 (Or. 1996); see also Relig-
ious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 262-63 (E.D. Va. 1995) (refusing a preliminary in-
junction in a trade secret and copyright case on prior restraint grounds); Note, Trade Secrets in
Discovery: From First Amendment Disclosure to Fifth Amendment Protection, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1330, 1333-34 (1991) (discussing judicial presumption in favor of disclosing trade secrets
based on a First Amendment claim of public access to pretrial discovery materials). A similar
problem is raised in cases under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), though it is complicated
by the right to a public trial in criminal cases. See United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022, 1023-
24 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (denying the government’s motion for a protective order to protect trade
secrets stolen in violation of the EEA), rev’d, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998); James H.A. Pooley
et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 206-
09 (1997) (addressing the risk of disclosing trade secrets when seeking to enforce violations of
the EEA).
On the other hand, courts do sometimes issue injunctions in these cases. See Garth v.
Staktek Corp., 876 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that preliminary injunc-
tion against revelation of a trade secret was a prior restraint, but concluding that it was permis-
sible because it was “necessary to provide meaningful legal protection to the owners of intellec-
tual property”); Loveall v. American Honda Motor Co., 694 S.W.2d 937, 939-40 (Tenn.
1985) (noting the “serious” irreparable injury associated with disclosure of trade secrets ob-
tained in discovery).
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dispute turns only on constitutionally irrelevant questions,371 or per-
haps a Freedman-like system could allow for very brief temporary
injunctions with quick appellate review.372 But as a general matter,
preliminary injunctions justified by the possibility that the defen-
dant’s speech breaches a contract are no more warranted than pre-
liminary injunctions justified by the possibility that the defendant’s
speech is libelous.
Third, the controversial doctrine of “inevitable disclosure” in
trade secret law permits injunctions against employment or prospec-
tive speech, even without direct evidence that a secret will be dis-
closed, where the court considers disclosure especially likely.373 Find-
ings of inevitable disclosure are “exceptional,”374 and are generally
not made in a preliminary injunction hearing. But even after a full
trial on the merits, a speech-restricting injunction based not on actual
or threatened disclosure of a secret, but the mere possibility of inad-
vertent disclosure, seems troubling from a First Amendment perspec-
tive.
Trade secret law may well be substantively constitutional. But
both preliminary injunctions against the disclosure of secrets and
permanent injunctions against undefined future speech raise serious
constitutional issues.
D. Patents
The patent laws give those who apply for and receive a patent on
an invention the exclusive right to prevent others from making, using,
371. As with copyright, we see trade secret law as having a constitutionally mandated
core—for instance, the requirement that the defendant actually agreed not to speak—coupled
with some elements that are constitutionally irrelevant, such as the requirements that the trade
secret have economic value and not be generally known. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990). If the dispute is about whether the constitutionally mandated
requirements are satisfied, then a preliminary injunction based on a mere likelihood that they
are satisfied would be an improper prior restraint. But if it’s clear that these requirements are
met, then a preliminary injunction would be permissible even if it’s not certain whether the
other conditions are present.
372. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
373. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269-72 (7th Cir. 1995) (enjoining em-
ployee from immediate employment at competitor corporation in order to prevent “inevitable
disclosure” of trade secrets). But see Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467, 471-72 (1st Cir.
1995) (refusing to grant injunction because employer failed to show that former employee
would inevitably disclose trade secrets); cf. Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1464-65
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (granting limited injunction prohibiting plaintiff’s former employee from dis-
cussing certain subjects with new employer).
374. POOLEY, supra note 235, § 7.02[2][b][ii], at 7-17.
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selling, offering for sale, or importing the invention as described in
the claims of the patent.375 Inventions encompass any new, useful and
nonobvious machine, process, product, or composition of matter,376
but protection does not extend to literary or artistic works that con-
stitute mere “printed matter,”377 or anything outside the ill-defined
scope of the technological arts.378 Inventions protected by patent law
enjoy the benefits of a strong property rule. The patent owner gets
the right to control virtually any use of the invention for the term of
the patent, backed up by a presumptive entitlement to both prelimi-
nary and permanent injunctive relief. Preliminary injunctions are
granted as a matter of course, on the basis of a relatively simple
showing of likelihood of success on the merits. As in copyright cases,
courts have found irreparable injury, the balance of hardships, and
the public interest to tip in favor of the patent owner.379
375. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (Supp. II 1996).
376. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The Supreme Court has recognized this scope as expansive,
including “anything under the sun that is made by man.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980) (quoting legislative history).
377. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 1.02[4], at 1-17 (1998); see also In re Schrader, 22
F.3d 290, 297-99 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing and criticizing the history
of the printed matter and “method of doing business” doctrines); Hotel Security Checking Co.
v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469-72 (2d Cir. 1908) (holding a claim which merely set down on
paper a non-novel improvement to the art of cash-registering and account-checking unpatent-
able); Ex parte Gwinn, 112 U.S.P.Q. 439, 446 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1955) (stating that claims are
patentable only where they “define either new features of structure or new relations of printed
matter to structure, or both, . . . [and] give rise to some new and useful function or effect”). The
Federal Circuit’s recent decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Serv-
ices, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abolished the business methods exception, and there-
fore cast some doubt on the continued vitality of the printed matter exception as well.
378. For the technological arts language used in “mental steps” cases, see In re Musgrave,
431 F.2d 882, 890-93 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also Donald S. Chisum, The Future of Software Pro-
tection: The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 967-71 (1986) (discussing the
doctrines of patentability developed by cases such as Musgrave). While the technological arts
formulation has been criticized, and its continued applicability is unclear, certainly something
more than the literal language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 distinguishes the useful arts within the subject
of patent law from the liberal arts covered instead by copyright. For a discussion of this thorny
issue, see Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of Computer
Software and Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CINN. L. REV. 53 (1997).
379. See, e.g., H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 390-91 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (upholding an injunction against patent infringers after balancing the hardships);
Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (analyzing the ir-
reparable harm and public interest factors and granting an injunction against patent infringers);
MERGES ET AL., supra note 50, at 298-303. One study found that the majority of recent re-
ported patent decisions granted preliminary injunctions. See Steven E. Shapiro, Preliminary
Injunction Motions in Patent Litigation, 33 IDEA 323, 325 (1993).
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Unlike copyright law, though, patent law doesn’t ordinarily re-
strict speech. The statute prevents others from making, using, or
selling machines, products, or processes. By and large, those aren’t
activities that involve speech, and so restricting them shouldn’t raise
any First Amendment concerns. But there are at least four specific
circumstances in which patent law might restrict speech, and in those
specific cases a conflict might arise.
First, the patent statute was amended in 1994 to make it illegal to
make “offers to sell” an infringing product.380 This punishes speech—
albeit commercial speech—directly, but we don’t think it is especially
troubling as a general matter. If a court can legitimately punish a par-
ticular transaction (say, prostitution or selling drugs), it can also sanc-
tion speech which proposes that commercial transaction.381 Were it
otherwise, anti-solicitation statutes (and indeed general conspiracy
statutes) might be unconstitutional. So once a court has finally de-
termined that selling a product is patent infringement, it ought to be
able to prevent offers to sell the product too. Preliminary injunctions
barring offers for sale might be impermissible prior restraints on
speech, but we aren’t aware of any such preliminary injunctions, and
we don’t expect there will be any. If a court can preliminarily enjoin
the sale itself, it hardly needs to enjoin the offer too.382
Second, courts have occasionally held that where practicing a
method was infringement, telling someone how to practice the
380. See Act of Dec. 8, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a), 108 Stat. 4988 (1994) (amending
35 U.S.C. § 271).
381. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388
(1973) (“We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a
want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.”); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Shilon,
43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1616, 1618-19 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the
Lanham Act on the grounds that an offer to sell goods is not protected where the sale itself
would be unlawful).
382. The only circumstance in which we can imagine such an injunction being sought is
where the defendant is advertising on behalf of a third party, and is not itself making or selling
the goods. Even there, the plaintiff would seem better off suing the direct infringer than an en-
tity whose only connection to the infringement was publishing an advertisement. The offer for
sale provision may have more use near the end of the patent term, because it allows patentees
to sue for infringement based on an offer that occurred before the patent expired, even though
the sale itself took place afterwards. But an injunction seems unlikely in these circumstances,
because these suits by their nature will generally be filed after the patent has already expired,
and when the patentee is entitled only to damages. There is a plausible argument that enjoining
offers to sell in this situation violates the First Amendment, because the underlying sale is law-
ful. See Robert Ryan Morishita, Note, Patent Infringement After GATT: What Is an Offer to
Sell?, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 905, 920-32.
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method was illegal because it induced infringement.383 The most obvi-
ous example is Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS,384 where the court
held that makers of the Rubik’s Cube puzzle induced infringement of
Moleculon’s patent on a method of solving the puzzle by
“dissemination of an instruction sheet teaching the method of re-
storing the preselected pattern with each puzzle.”385 This result seems
troubling, in part because the patentee himself must disclose to the
world how to practice his method.386 If it really is unlawful to tell
someone how to practice an invention, there is a conflict between the
patent law and the First Amendment. In that limited set of cases, re-
stricting the speech may be substantively unconstitutional; but even if
it’s not, preliminarily enjoining it would almost certainly be an im-
permissible prior restraint.387
Third, the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951388 provides that the
government may effectively impound certain patent applications on
national security grounds by ordering the inventor to keep the inven-
tion secret389 and imposing criminal sanctions if the order is diso-
beyed.390 This is clearly a substantive restriction on speech; whether it
is constitutionally permissible to punish disclosure of this information
will depend on whether the national security argument justifies the
restriction.391 In either event, it is also a prior restraint. The statute es-
tablishes a group of agency heads, designated by the President, that
383. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994) (providing that one who “actively induces infringement”
is “liable as an infringer”).
384. 594 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Del. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 793 F.2d
1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
385. Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1272.
386. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring patent applications to contain sufficient instruc-
tions on how to make and use the product). Presumably CBS would not have been guilty of
inducing infringement merely for enclosing a copy of the Moleculon patent itself, even though
the patent necessarily teaches the claimed method.
387. Patent law does allow preliminary injunctions against inducers and contributory in-
fringers.
388. Ch. 4, 66 Stat. 3 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1994)).
389. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1994) (providing that if a government agency determines that a
patent application might “be detrimental to the national security,” the PTO “shall order that
the invention be kept secret”).
390. See 35 U.S.C. § 186 (1994) (providing for criminal punishment for willful disobedience
of a secrecy order).
391. We don’t want to delve into the national security case law here. For a discussion in the
context of the Invention Secrecy Act, see Lee Ann Gilbert, Patent Secrecy Orders: The Uncon-
stitutionality of Interference in Civilian Cryptography Under Present Procedures, 22 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 325 (1982); Sabing H. Lee, Protecting the Private Inventor Under the Peacetime
Provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 345 (1997).
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must preapprove publication;392 if the group orders an invention kept
secret, willful disobedience of that order is itself punishable as a
crime.393 While one could perhaps characterize this as a “subsequent
punishment,” since a violation triggers section 186 and not a con-
tempt proceeding, the fact that section 186 punishes disobedience of
the order itself, rather than the underlying speech, seems to bring it
within the scope of prior restraint doctrine.394
Finally, one district court has held that computer source code is
“speech” protected by the First Amendment.395 Because software is
patentable,396 taking this conclusion seriously leads to some tension
between patent law and the First Amendment. If writing code is pro-
tected speech, a law which precludes the “making” of such code in-
terferes with protected speech. Further, the substantive conflict can-
not be resolved by reference to the idea-expression dichotomy or the
fair use doctrine, as in copyright law, for patent law has neither.
Even if the Bernstein court’s conclusion is upheld, however,397 it
probably ought not extend past source code to object code.398 We
think most executable software is best treated as a virtual machine
rather than as protected expression.399 If we are right, patent law
could constitutionally prohibit the use of infringing object code in a
computer. This wouldn’t totally resolve the First Amendment con-
flict—an effort to prevent someone from writing, teaching, or per-
392. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1994).
393. See 35 U.S.C. § 186 (1994).
394. See Lee, supra note 391, at 387-89 (characterizing secrecy orders as prior restraints
because “the primary purpose . . . is to suppress information”). Lee notes, however, that some
prior restraints may be justified on national security grounds. See id. at 390-95.
395. See Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1287-88 (N.D. Cal.
1996). The case is not a patent case, but instead involves the constitutionality of U.S. restric-
tions on the export of strong encryption. For a more detailed analysis, see Thinh Nguyen, Note,
Cryptography, Export Controls, and the First Amendment in Bernstein v. United States De-
partment of State, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 667 (1997).
396. For the contours of software patent law, see Mark A. Lemley & David W. O’Brien,
Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255 (1997).
397. Two other district courts have come to the opposite conclusion. See Junger v. Daley, 8
F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Karn v. United States Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1996).
398. Source code written by programmers is converted into object code, a series of binary
electrical signals represented by 1s and 0s that computers can read.
399. On this distinction, see Weinreb, supra note 102, at 1167-71; Karjala & Menell, supra
note 102, at 186-92. There is no question that this distinction is at least somewhat artificial; cer-
tain programs (such as those written in LISP) might be thought of as combining source and
object code. But on the whole, we think there is a practical difference for speech purposes be-
tween machine-readable instructions and human-readable source code.
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haps even reading400 source code might be unconstitutional, and pre-
liminary injunctions against such conduct would almost certainly be
prior restraints on speech.401 But since most of the commercial value
of software comes from its functionality, the patentee’s right to con-
trol the functional use of the program would be largely unaffected.402
In short, patent law is qualitatively different from copyright law
because most of the acts it restricts don’t involve speech at all. Thus,
there is ordinarily no reason for the rule against prior restraints to
come into play. But in certain narrow circumstances patent law may
restrict speech. When it does, courts should give consideration to the
First Amendment implications of both preliminary injunctions and
permanent relief.
VI. PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR PROPOSALS
We readily acknowledge that our proposals are contrary to eve-
ryday intellectual property practice. Though we believe they are dic-
tated by the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law, we realize
that the traditions of the bench and bar (plus, of course, the occa-
sional circuit court precedents) often carry more weight in court than
does law review reasoning.
Nonetheless, we think our cause is far from hopeless. Quite a
few judges have expressed some concern about the problem we iden-
tify;403 we hope our doctrinal and policy explanations will support the
400. On the existence of a First Amendment right to read, see Julie E. Cohen, A Right to
Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 981 (1996).
401. Cf. Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1287 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(invoking prior restraint doctrine to invalidate government regulations prohibiting export).
402. This is not the only conceivable way in which patents on speech could run afoul of the
First Amendment. Certainly, if the PTO began granting patents on information or writings
simply because they were encoded on a computer-readable medium, the First Amendment
would come into play. For suggestions of movement in this direction, see State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that “the
transformation of [computer-readable] data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a ma-
chine [such as a computer] through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share
price,” constitutes a patentable application of a mathematical logarithm); In re Beauregard, 53
F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the PTO agrees that software on a floppy disk is
patentable subject matter); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Examination Guidelines for
Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (1996) (drawing the line of patentability be-
tween “functional” and “nonfunctional” descriptive material embedded in a computer-readable
medium).
403. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490,
497 (2d Cir. 1989) (reversing a preliminary injunction in a trademark case on the grounds that
“the drastic remedy of a prepublication injunction” was unjustified given “the public interest in
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views of these judges and of others who think as they do, and will
help them persuade their colleagues. More broadly, some judges—
including some Supreme Court Justices—have begun to express some
doubts about the practice of routinely granting injunctions in non-
piracy cases.404 Such an attitude may make courts more hospitable to
constitutional arguments against preliminary injunctions.
We also suspect that prior restraint arguments may have been
hurt in the past by being stated too broadly—perhaps so broadly as to
cover all injunctions, permanent or preliminary—and without a clear
policy justification. Many judges may be reluctant to accept a total
ban on injunctions, especially since banning all injunctions but toler-
ating all damages awards might seem like a pointless (and harmful)
formalism. Our approach, on the other hand, wouldn’t affect perma-
nent injunctions or preliminary injunctions in piracy cases, which we
think aren’t prior restraints; it would cover only preliminary injunc-
tions in non-piracy cases.405 This may be more palatable than a total
ban on all injunctions; and we think that it’s justified by our explana-
tion of why many preliminary injunctions are indeed more constitu-
tionally problematic than damages awards.
free expression”); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 405 (8th Cir. 1987)
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing that a permanent injunction in a trademark case was an un-
constitutional prior restraint); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs.,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to issue a preliminary injunction in a
copyright case, in part based on the concern that it would constitute a prior restraint); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1527 (D. Colo. 1995) (refusing to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction in a copyright case, in part because such an injunction would inhibit “dialogue
on matters of public concern”); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 262-63 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (refusing to issue a preliminary injunction in a copyright and trade secret case, in part
based on the concern that it would constitute a prior restraint); supra notes 352 and 356
(discussing right of publicity cases which applied the prior restraint rule); supra note 370
(discussing trade secret cases which applied the prior restraint rule, including Justice Black-
mun’s in chambers opinion in CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994) (Blackmun, Circuit Jus-
tice)).
404. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (stating that
“courts may also wish to bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law, ‘to stimulate the crea-
tion and publication of edifying matter,’ are not always best served by automatically granting
injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use” (quoting
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1134 (1990))); Abend
v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to issue a permanent injunction
against a movie based on plaintiff’s short story), aff’d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207
(1990), cited with approval in Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10; Leval, supra at 1132 (stating that
in non-piracy cases, especially those “raising reasonable contentions of fair use,” “there may be
a strong public interest in the publication of the secondary work [and] the copyright owner’s
interest may be adequately protected by an award of damages for whatever infringement is
found”), cited with approval in Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10.
405. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
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As for contrary circuit precedent, the mere fact that a circuit has
upheld preliminary injunctions, without considering the First
Amendment, isn’t precedent for the proposition that such injunctions
are constitutional; “cases cannot be read as foreclosing an argument
that they never dealt with.”406 Furthermore, a court’s upholding of a
permanent injunction against a First Amendment challenge should
leave the question open as to preliminary injunctions, which we argue
raise very different constitutional questions.407 Likewise, a court’s re-
jection of the First Amendment argument in, say, a trademark case
may leave the question open for copyright and other intellectual
property cases. And at least some rejections of the First Amendment
argument may, on examination, prove to be dicta.408
We do not think our proposal should necessarily occasion panic
among the intellectual property bar. By offering a way to distinguish
object code, permanent injunctions, and clear cases of piracy from
those cases presenting serious questions of copying, substantial simi-
larity of expression, or fair use, we hope that we’ve restricted our ap-
proach to situations where the copyright plaintiff’s interest in a pre-
liminary injunction is weakest and the First Amendment values are
strongest.
True, copyright plaintiffs in any particular case will no doubt
want a preliminary injunction any way they can get it, but copyright
owners are also copyright defendants, as many movie and television
studios can attest. Moreover, publishers would also do well not to
trample the First Amendment in their rush to protect intellectual
406. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678 (1994) (plurality opinion) (citing United States
v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952)); see also Miller v. California Pac. Med.
Ctr., 991 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1993) (“It is a venerable principle that a court isn’t bound by a
prior decision that failed to consider an argument or issue the later court finds persuasive.”).
407. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 778 (8th Cir.
1994) (remanding for entry of permanent injunction, based on a final finding on the merits of a
likelihood of confusion, and specifically noting the prior restraint dangers of broader injunc-
tions); Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 849-50 (11th
Cir. 1990) (upholding permanent injunction); Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 403 (upholding
permanent injunction, based on a final finding on the merits of a likelihood of confusion).
408. See In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 918 F.2d 140, 144-45 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding only
that the prior restraint doctrine doesn’t bar a court from ordering a defendant to turn over its
script for discovery purposes; stating in dictum that some sort of injunction against copyright
infringement would be permissible, without indicating whether that would be a preliminary or a
permanent injunction); Cable/Home Communication Corp., 902 F.2d at 849-51 (discussing
copyright law, but in the context of upholding a permanent injunction entered under federal
satellite telecommunications law, and specifically relying on the fact that the speech involved
was commercial speech).
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property; that sort of short-sightedness could come back to haunt
them the next time they’re accused of libel or obscenity. In those
cases that do in fact present substantial constitutional questions, we
think copyright law will be a stronger institution if it addresses those
questions head-on, rather than trying to evade the problem.
In some circuits and for some issues, precedent may indeed be
quite clearly against us: the Second and Ninth Circuits have specifi-
cally held that preliminary injunctions, including preliminary injunc-
tions of noncommercial speech, are permitted in trademark cases.409
The Ninth Circuit case also might be read as rejecting the prior re-
straint argument for copyright cases, though it’s not clear whether
that’s dictum or holding.410 Nonetheless, in many circuits these ques-
tions remain unresolved, and even the Second and Ninth Circuits
might change their minds. The cases rejecting the prior restraint ar-
gument aren’t particularly well-reasoned, and generally don’t con-
front the points we make here; these circuits might well be willing to
reconsider the question en banc.
In any event, we believe that our argument is strong enough that
defense lawyers should have little to lose, and perhaps quite a bit to
gain, from making it. Conventional wisdom does change; tradition
sometimes does yield to doctrinal and policy arguments. Traditional
libel law, for instance, was firmly entrenched throughout the United
States until the Court’s decisions since the 1960s—not only New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,411 but also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,412 Phila-
delphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,413 and others—drastically restruc-
tured it.
Likewise, the formerly commonplace bans on lawyer advertising
were dramatically cut back by Court’s commercial speech decisions
409. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d
Cir. 1979); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 n.11 (9th Cir.
1997).
410. The court said “[w]e reject outright Penguin and Dove’s claim that the injunction in
this case constitutes a prior restraint in violation of free speech guaranteed by the United States
Constitution,” Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1403 n.11, but it said this only in the trademark
section of its discussion, and cited only trademark cases in support of its conclusion. See id.
411. 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
412. 418 U.S. 323, 347-50 (1974) (imposing negligence requirement for the formerly strict
liability regime of private figure libel).
413. 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (holding that private figure plaintiffs have the burden of
proving falsehood, contrary to the common law rule).
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of the 1970s and 1980s;414 and, to give just one more example, in Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,415 the Court struck down formerly wide-
spread tax exemptions for religious publications.416 With the possible
exception of the libel decisions, these cases weren’t prompted by sea
changes in broad social attitudes or in the Court’s composition.
Rather, they seem to reflect the force of general constitutional doc-
trine applied to specific cases, and suggest that this doctrine can in-
deed override common law and legislative traditions.
CONCLUSION
In warning against the dangers of preliminary injunctions that
restrain speech, the Supreme Court wrote:
[Allowing preliminary injunctions in obscenity cases would
authorize] prior restraints of indefinite duration on the exhi-
bition of motion pictures that have not been finally adjudi-
cated to be obscene. . . . Such prior restraints would be more
onerous and more objectionable than the threat of criminal
sanctions after a film has been exhibited, since nonobscenity
would be a defense to any criminal prosecution. . . . That a
state trial judge might be thought more likely than an admin-
istrative censor to determine accurately that a work is ob-
scene does not change the unconstitutional character of the
restraint if erroneously entered.417
Substitute “infringing” for “obscene” in the Court’s language; the ra-
tionale remains the same, but the results reached by the courts shift
radically.
We don’t see the justification for this difference. Preliminary in-
junctions in copyright cases—and in certain other types of intellectual
property cases—are at least as troublesome as preliminary injunc-
tions in obscenity or libel cases. We believe that under the Court’s
prior restraint jurisprudence many intellectual property preliminary
injunctions are therefore unconstitutional.
At the same time, we think that this is a good opportunity to re-
flect not only on preliminary injunction practice but also on prior re-
414. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). But see id. at 391 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “[i]t has long been thought that price adver-
tising of legal services inevitably will be misleading” and is thus constitutionally unprotected).
415. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
416. See id. at 30-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing many such exemption statutes).
417. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1980) (citations omitted).
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straint jurisprudence itself. If you find our proposal to be impru-
dent—if you think preliminary injunctions in copyright cases
shouldn’t generally be declared unconstitutional—then perhaps this
suggests that prior restraint doctrine has gone too far, and might de-
serve some trimming for all claims. Or if you reject our broadest pro-
posal but accept our compromise based on Freedman v. Maryland,
then perhaps this shows that the much-maligned Freedman makes
more sense than many might at first think.
We ultimately believe that existing prior restraint doctrine is, de-
spite its costs, rather sensible; but we think that it does deserve reex-
amination, and that copyright law, a field where preliminary injunc-
tions are routinely issued, provides a good case study for such reex-
amination. But regardless of whether prior restraint doctrine is reex-
amined, we think that courts must apply it consistently. For all its
importance, intellectual property law shouldn’t be entitled to a First
Amendment free ride.
